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ABSTRACT
This dissertation includes three chapters that use applied microeconomics
theory to assess three different economic questions. The first chapter ana-
lyzes the labor market effects of import competition from high-wage countries
on emerging economies. Though abundant evidence shows that import com-
petition from low-wage countries decreases manufacturing employment and
wages of high-wage countries, less is known about the reverse: the impact of
import competition from high-wage countries on emerging economies. This
paper uses a natural experiment to examine the effects of import competi-
tion from the United States on workers and firms in Colombia. We exploit
industry variation in import exposure and regional variation in import ac-
cess in the wake of a free trade agreement that increased import competition
in Colombia but left its exports unaffected. Using administrative employer-
employee data to identify proxies for productivity and skills, we find that a
10 percent increase in import competition from the United States decreases
employment in Colombia by 6.4 percent in affected industries and states.
The impacts are driven largely by the exit and shrinking of less-productive
firms. Less-skilled workers experience the greatest impacts, with effects on
employment lasting for at least four years. Import competition induces work-
ers to shift from affected to unaffected industries and states, and decreases
the wage of workers employed in less-productive firms.
The second chapter includes an analysis of how school shootings affect
housing prices in the United States. We find that house prices within a school
district decline by 7.8 percent in the three year period after the episode,
along with a decline in number of transactions. The drop in property prices
is stronger among houses with more bedrooms, a measure that serves as a
proxy for properties most likely to have school-age children in the household.
We also find evidence of decrease in school enrollment and in the number of
ii
teachers in the aftermath of the shooting. The analysis suggests that it is
the deterioration in school quality that results in lower willingness to pay.
The third chapter compares the economic returns of workers’ skills with the
returns to schooling degrees. Using longitudinal data of all college graduates
in Colombia, we estimate labor market returns to postsecondary degrees and
to various skills –including literacy, numeracy, foreign language, field-specific,
and non-cognitive skills. Graduates of longer programs, of private institu-
tions, and of schools with higher reputation earn higher wages. Even after
controlling for all the characteristics of the degree, a one standard deviation
increase in each skill predicts an average wage increase of two percent. Re-
turns to skills vary along the wage distribution, with tenure, with the field of
specialization and the type of job obtained immediately after graduation.
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CHAPTER 1
ENTERING THE MAJOR LEAGUES: THE
EFFECT OF IMPORT COMPETITION
FROM THE UNITED STATES ON
WORKERS AND FIRMS IN AN
EMERGING ECONOMY
Leonardo Bonilla and Juan S. Muñoz
1.1 Introduction
Emerging economies are plagued by a glut of persistently low-productivity
firms, which can decrease total factor productivity up to 60 percent com-
pared to developed countries (Hsieh & Klenow, 2009, 2014; Busso, Madrigal,
& Pagés, 2013). A less dynamic exit of firms can therefore affect economic
development and explain cross-country differences in employment growth
(Eslava, Haltiwanger, & Pinzón, 2019; Eslava, Haltiwanger, Kugler, & Ku-
gler, 2004). Lack of market competition may induce slow firm exit, and
enable less productive firms to coexist with more productive ones. Trade
barriers and protectionist policies in emerging countries, for instance, are
one way in which competition is hindered, benefiting unproductive firms and
reducing productivity and employment (Eslava, Haltiwanger, Kugler, & Ku-
gler, 2013). Import competition from low-wage countries such as China has
also been shown to reduce manufacturing employment and wages in low-
and high-wage countries.1 However, it is still not clear if import competition
from high-wage countries induces firm exit and employment growth within
emerging economies.
Estimating the effects of increased competition on firms and workers in
1For effects among high-income countries, see Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013), Autor,
Dorn, Hanson, and Song (2014), Bloom, Handley, Kurman, and Luck (2019) ,Bernard,
Jensen, and Schott (2006) and Pierce and Schott (2016). For the effects among low-
income countries, see Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2017), Jenkins, Peters, and Moreira (2008),
Moreira (2007).
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emerging economies has proved challenging, especially because of difficulties
in separating the effects of imports from the effects of exports. Trade is widely
believed to increase competition and induce firm exit (Melitz, 2003; Melitz &
Ottaviano, 2008), usually by highlighting the positive effects of exports, but
the role of imports is ambiguous. Several developing countries have adopted
measures to increase trade with developed countries in an effort to increase
productivity and employment. Multiple free trade agreements have been
signed between emerging countries and the United States to induce a more
dynamic trade. At the same time, tensions over free trade between countries
of differing economic development levels have emerged, as evidenced by the
U.S.-China tariff wars beginning in 2018.
In this paper, we analyze how an increase in import competition from the
United States affects the distribution of firms and employment in Colombia.
As opposed to previous work (such as (Autor et al., 2013)), we focus on a
setting in which import competition from a high-wage country affects the
local labor market effects of a lower-wage country, and use a novel identi-
fication strategy. To the best of our knowledge we are the first to analyze
the effect of imports from a developed country on an emerging economy.
Previous literature has struggled to analyze such a phenomenon due to: 1)
empirical difficulties in the identification of an import competition shock that
does not affect exports; and 2) data restrictions that do not allow longitudi-
nal tracking of firms and workers. This paper overcomes these two difficulties.
First, we use exogenous variation induced by a free trade agreement im-
plemented between the United States and Colombia, and regional variation
in access to imports, to evaluate the effects of U.S. import competition. The
agreement, which took effect in 2010, affected imports but not exports. Tar-
iffs charged by Colombia fell, but tariffs imposed by the United States were
unaffected because they were already low (or zero) due to previous trade
agreements.2 We combine the variation induced by the free trade agreement
at the industry level with state variation across states with and without cus-
2The free trade agreement mainly reduced Colombian tariffs on manufacturing and
service goods. It left in place protections for certain agriculture products for longer periods
of time, with protections lasting five years for most products, but continuing for up to 20
years for some products, such as rice.
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toms ports. Transportation within Colombia, which lacks train and river
transportation options, relies on an underdeveloped road system to trade
across states. Political neglect and civil conflict hindered historical construc-
tion of roads within the country (Duranton, 2015; Bushnell, 1993), and, as a
result, 90 percent of incoming products from the United States stay within
eight states that have customs ports. We design a triple-difference model by
combining variation across industries that reduced tariffs, variation between
states with and without customs ports, and time variation before and after
the implementation of the free trade agreement. We find that the agreement
increases import competition from the United States in around 15 to 18 per-
cent, but, as expected, does not affect exports. We additionally show that
imports increase exclusively among states with customs ports, which gives
strong empirical support to our triple-difference estimates.
Second, we take advantage of administrative matched, formal-sector employer-
employee data that allow us to identify which firms employ which workers,
for what extent of time, and at what wage level.3 These data include longitu-
dinal earnings records for all workers that contribute to health or pensions in
a given month. The data include firm, municipality, and four-digit industry
identifiers, and are ideal to study the effects of import competition from the
United States on workers and firms in Colombia. We further combine these
records with administrative trade data on Colombian imports and exports
at the industry and state levels, and with information on tariffs charged by
Colombia and the United States. Our final data track individuals and firms
from 2008 to 2014 (four years after the tariff reductions in 2010), and are
merged with four-digit industry- and state-level imports and exports.
The data allow us to study the role of employers and employees by es-
3The data, accessed through the Colombian central bank, extend through 2016. How-
ever, due to confounding reasons involving currency devaluations and oil prices (explained
in greater detail in Section 1.3.1), we exclude data from 2015 and 2016 in our main anal-
ysis. We note, however, that results are unchanged when we do include these data. In
addition, we cannot distinguish if the flows out of the firms go to informality or unemploy-
ment since the data only include formal workers. We observe steady (or even decreasing)
informality rates for agriculture, manufacturing, mining, and services during the analyzed
period (2007-2014). Thus, we do not have strong evidence to suspect that our results are
driven by informality, and even if this were the case, we still consider the results to reflect
interesting dynamics across good-quality jobs.
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timating high-dimensional worker and firm-fixed effects models, and identi-
fying low- and high-paid workers and low- and high-paying firms. We fol-
low Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) (here onward called AKM) –and
further Card, Cardoso, Heining, and Kline (2018) and Card, Heining, and
Kline (2013)– to estimate the ex-ante distribution of worker- and firm-specific
wage premiums using the years previous to the tariff reduction. The firm-
specific wage premiums quantify the amount each employer pays to their
workers irrespective of the type of workers hired. This wage premium can be
interpreted as a combination of firm-specific productivity and rent-sharing
elasticities (Card et al., 2018). We consider it to be a good proxy for firm
productivity since these two measures strongly correlate (Card et al., 2018;
Alvarez, Benguria, Engbom, & Moser, 2018). The worker-specific wage pre-
mium quantifies the amount earned by a given worker irrespective of where
he/she works. We interpret this as a measure of worker skill. From here
onward we refer to the firm-specific wage premium as productivity, and the
worker-specific wage premium as skill. To the best of our knowledge we are
the first to estimate the heterogeneous effects of import competition on wage
premiums across the distribution of specific firms and workers.
Our empirical analysis yields three main results. First, we find that a
10 percent increase in import competition from the United States decreases
Colombian employment in around six percent, a magnitude that is similar to
that of Chinese imports on employment in the United States (Autor et al.,
2013). We additionally find that the decrease in employment is explained by
a decrease in both extensive margin (the number of firms) and intensive mar-
gin (the average firm size). These results are driven by low-skilled workers
who are more likely to lose their jobs, whereas more skilled workers remain
unaffected.
Second, the decrease in employment is explained by low-productivity firms,
which are more likely to shrink or exit the market. We do not observe any
effect on high-productivity firms, suggesting that missing production from
low-productivity firms is not reallocated to more-productive firms within
Colombia. Instead, consumers likely substitute to imports from the United
States. These results contrast to that of Chinese imports on firms in the
United States, where losses in employment were mainly driven by high-wage
4
multinational firms (Bloom et al., 2019).
Third, we do not find an effect of import competition on wages, but we do
find evidence that import competition induces reallocation of workers from
affected to unaffected industries or states (i.e., from industries that reduced
tariffs, and from states with customs ports, to industries that did not reduce
tariffs, and to states without customs ports). However, for workers originally
employed in low-productivity firms (that were most likely to close or shrink),
exclusively, we observe a wage reduction of around 0.75 percent. We interpret
this as workers in affected industries and states shifting into other positions,
and moving down the job ladder by accepting lower-paid offers after a job
loss. (Haltiwanger, Hyatt, Kahn, & McEntarfer, 2017).
We address two potential threats to identification that could undermine
our results. First, firm- and worker-level regressions would be subject to
selection bias if the sample were not constant in time, and some particular
types of workers or firms could be more likely to lose their jobs, or to exit
the market. To deal with this we follow Autor et al. (2014) and restrict
the sample to a panel of incumbent workers and firms. We track them over
time by keeping the sample constant. Second, our empirical strategy relies
on the assumption of no differential trends between treated (workers and
firms in industries that reduced tariffs, and in states with customs ports) an
untreated (all the rest) units before the tariff reduction. We estimate event
study models around the implementation of the free trade agreement using
imports, employment, number of firms, and firm size as dependent variables.
We do not find evidence of any pre-trends for any of these outcomes
.
In addition, we conduct a large number of robustness checks that highlight
the stability of our results. The estimates include a considerable amount of
fixed effects, and the main results may change depending on the specification
chosen. We show, however, that our results do not change when considering
alternative structures of fixed effects, or when using a difference-in-difference
model that accounts only for the changes in tariffs, and excludes variation
across states with and without customs ports. We also control for the value
of imported inputs, which, if omitted, could confound our estimations; our
results are robust to this. Finally, we include the mining sector and two
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additional years in the sample.4 The results again remain unchanged.
This paper contributes to a large literature quantifying the effects of im-
port competition on local labor markets. Most of this literature has focused
on the effect of low-price imports from China (an emerging economy) on
industries in high-income countries, such as the United States or countries
within Europe.5 Other analysis that does focus on the effect of Chinese im-
ports on emerging economies are largely descriptive, and they do not provide
any causal estimates (Jenkins et al., 2008; Moreira, 2007; Wood & Mayer,
2011). In addition, Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2017), Dix-Carneiro (2014),
and Attanasio, Goldberg, and Pavcnik (2004) study how unilateral liberal-
ization decreases employment and earnings in Brazil and Colombia. However,
these papers explore incoming import competition from all types of countries
including, for example, China. We contribute directly to this literature in
two ways. First, we analyze patterns by low- and high-productivity firms
and low- and high-skilled workers using the wage premiums estimated from
the AKM model. Second, we analyze the effect of imports coming from the
United States, and complement the results by understanding the importance
of firm exit.
We also contribute to the literature that studies the effects of trade on firm
productivity and exit. Melitz (2003) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) show
theoretically that an increase in trade increases the productivity of firms by
motivating low-productivity firms to exit the market and high-productivity
firms to export. Furthermore, Pavcnik (2002), Forlani (2017), Halpern, Ko-
ren, and Szeidl (2015), and Olper, Curzi, and Raimondi (2017) empirically
evaluate this result finding strong evidence for Chilean, Irish, Hungarian,
Italian, and French firms. Fieler, Eslava, and Xu (2018), Medina (2018),
and Bas and Strauss-Kahn (2015) additionally find that an increase in trade
motivates quality upgrading, whereas Egger and Kreickemeier (2009) theo-
4The mining sector is excluded because of confounding issues with oil prices, whereas
the years 2015 and 2016 are excluded because of a great devaluation of the Colombian
peso.
5The effect on the United States see: Autor et al. (2013), Autor, Dorn, and Han-
son (2015), Pierce and Schott (2016), Autor et al. (2014), Feenstra and Hanson (1999),
Bloom et al. (2019), Bernard et al. (2006).For the effect on Europe, see: Bloom, Draca,
and Van Reenen (2016), Branstetter, Kovak, Mauro, and Venancio (2019), Hummels,
Jørgensen, Munch, and Xiang (2014)
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retically analyze the effect of trade on profits and unemployment. Goldberg,
Khandelwal, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2010) analyze the effects of imported
intermediate inputs on firms’ production. Our results contribute to this lit-
erature by showing how imports from the United States motivate firm exit
and shrinkage in emerging countries, where the dispersion of firm productiv-
ity is larger (Hsieh & Klenow, 2009) compared to developed countries where
unproductive firms exit faster (Eslava et al., 2019).
Finally, we contribute to the literature that explains the importance of
firm heterogeneity by estimating employer- and worker-specific fixed effects.
This literature (Card et al., 2013, 2018; Abowd, McKinney, & Zhao, 2018)
studies the relevance of employers on determining wages and how sorting
between firms explain wage variation.6 We contribute to this literature by
estimating heterogeneous effects of import competition along the distribution
of firm- and worker-specific wage premiums. We find that the responses to
import competition are heterogeneous across firms with different wage struc-
tures, and workers earning different wages. Ignoring this heterogeneity can
have negative policy implications because of potential erroneous conclusions
about who is really affected by import competition.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 presents some
conceptual considerations relating the heterogeneous effects of increased im-
port competition and its relationship with the AKM model. Section 1.3
describes the background as well as the data we use. Section 1.4 details the
empirical strategy that identifies the casual effect of import competition from
the United States on workers’ and firms’ outcomes. Section 1.5 presents the
results. Section 1.6 provides some robustness checks. Section 3.6 concludes.
1.2 Conceptual Framework
Melitz (2003) shows how trade induces high-productivity firms to export,
and, simultaneously, forces low-productivity firms to exit the market. We
6Some recent papers have highlighted the importance of firm-wage premiums on eco-
nomic phenomena like the effects of job displacement (Lachowska, Mas, & Woodbury,
2018) and the gender pay gap (Card, Cardoso, & Kline, 2016)
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analyze a setting in which tariffs were reduced in one country (Colombia)
and not in the other (United States), leading to an increase in import com-
petition but not in exports. Applying the predictions of (Melitz, 2003) to
our setting, we expect import competition to heterogeneously affect low-and
high-productivity firms and low- and high-skilled workers. We present a basic
framework here (for a more detailed version, see Appendix A.1).
1.2.1 The Heterogeneous Effects of Increased Import
Competition
Consider a continuum of J firms indexed by j that combine labor (L) and
capital goods (X) to produce output Y . Labor can be either skilled (LS) or
unskilled (LU), whereas capital can be foreign (XF ) or national (XN). Each
firm is indexed by a level of productivity ϕj that is randomly drawn from a
distribution G. The production function takes the form of:
Yj = ϕjf (L(LS, LU), X(XF , XN)) ,
where f(·) is a production function with usual properties. πj(ϕ) = ϕjPj(τ)Yj−
cj(τ) stands for the firms’ profits, where cj(τ) is a cost function of firm j,
Pj(τ) is the price of goods, and τ is an ad valorem tariff rate charged to
foreign products. Firms have market power and act as monosopnies in a
monopolistic competition framework.
Denote ϕ∗ = inf{ϕ : π(ϕ) ≥ 0} as the threshold that determines firm exit.
Any firm with ϕ < ϕ∗ will exit the market, and any firm with ϕ ≥ ϕ∗ will





The threshold ϕ∗ depends on the tariffs charged to foreign products in two
ways: 1) a decrease in τ decreases ϕ∗ by decreasing the cost of inputs; 2)
a decrease in τ increases ϕ∗ by reducing the demand for local goods and,
consequently, decreasing the price Pj(τ). This framework suggests that a
decrease in Colombian tariffs will induce low-productivity firms to exit the
market if the decrease in demand for local goods is larger than the decrease
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in costs. It is then expected that import competition affects the likelihood
of exiting of low- and high-productivity firms differently.
In addition, the effects of decreasing τ on employment are also heteroge-
neous between skilled and unskilled workers. In this setting, workers can
lose employment in two ways. First, if import competition induces the exit
of low-productivity firms, then we will expect that workers in those firms
switch to unemployment, move to other firms, or leave the labor force. If
firms’ productivity is correlated with workers’ skills, then the effect of import
competition on employment should be heterogeneous by low- and high-skilled
workers. Second, skilled and unskilled employment can be also affected het-
erogeneously if there is a differential substitution between each type of labor
and imported goods. Consider the cost function as follows:
cj(τ) = WUjLUj(τ) +WSjLSj(τ) +XNQN(τ) +XFQF (τ),
where Wij is the wage obtained by individual i ∈ {S, U} and QN and QF are
prices of national and foreign goods, respectively. A decrease in tariffs will
increase the demand for foreign goods, and potentially decrease the demand
for skilled and/or unskilled labor. The magnitudes of L′S(τ) and L
′
U(τ) de-
pend on the degree of substitution of workers for foreign goods. For instance,
we expect to see a larger effect on unskilled employment if unskilled workers
have a higher degree of substitution with products from the United States.
1.2.2 Firms and Worker-Specific Wage Premiums
Given this setting, a fundamental task is to account for the heterogeneous
effects of import competition across firms’ levels of productivity and workers’
skills. Both measures are difficult to empirically quantify, but, following
Card et al. (2018), we suggest a framework that derives close proxies of
these measures and can be computed using matched employer-employee data.
Firms have market power and workers have heterogeneous preferences over
firms. As we show in Appendix A.1, the equilibrium wages for skilled and
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unskilled workers can be expressed as:
lnWij = lnλ+ ln(ϕjfL(Lj, Xj))︸ ︷︷ ︸
FWP
+ ln(L′(Li))︸ ︷︷ ︸
WWP
− ln(Mij(γij)), (1.1)
where Mij is a wage markdown caused by the firms’ monopsonic power, and
γij is the wage elasticity of labor supply of worker i to firm j.
Equation (1.1) has two important components that proxy for firms’ pro-
ductivity and workers’ skills. First, the firm-specific wage premium (FWP)
is a common measure across all individuals working in firm j and proxies
that firms’ productivity. It is composed of the firm’s level of productivity
and the marginal product of labor in that firm. In other words, it is com-
posed of the firms’ productivity and a measure of rent sharing from the firm
to its workers. Second, the worker-specific wage premium (WWP) captures
the common component among all workers of skill type i across firms, and
accounts for the productivity of individuals with a given level of skills. It can
be therefore considered as a proxy for the worker’s level of skill in produc-
tion. These measures can be estimated using the AKM model on matched
employer-employee data (Section 1.4 provides greater detail), and correspond
to proxies of firms’ productivity and workers’ skills that help account for het-
erogeneous effects of import competition.
1.3 Data and Background
1.3.1 Background
The Free Trade Agreement:- Trade between the United States and Colom-
bia grew remarkably after the beginning of the 1990s, when both countries
took measures to increase trade.7 In 1991 the United States, under the An-
dean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), eliminated tariffs on a large number of
7Appendix Figure A.1 presents the evolution of trade between both countries by indus-
tries. Colombian exports to the United States are mostly composed of mining products,
whereas imports are composed primarily of manufactured goods. Imports from the United
States are mainly manufacturing goods, while exports correspond primarily to mining and
secondly to manufacturing.
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Colombian products.8 At the same time, Colombia liberalized markets by
decreasing the tariffs charged to the United States to around 15 percent.9
Later, in 2006, both countries started negotiations on the implementa-
tion of a free trade agreement, that was approved in 2007 by the Colombian
government. Four years later, in 2011, the U.S. senate approved it, and
was legally implemented in May 2012. However, two years before the im-
plementation date, the Colombian government, under Decree 4114 of 2010
(implemented on November 5th, 2010), unilaterally implemented the tariff
cuts originally stipulated in the free trade agreement aiming to boost employ-
ment, reduce costs, and increase production. Therefore, Colombia effectively
adopted the tariff reductions two years before it was officially implemented
by the United States.
The free trade agreement renewed the existing tariff exemptions that had
been granted to Colombian products under the ATPA. In return, Colombia
reduced tariffs on incoming products from the United States. Tariffs were
eliminated for most manufacturing, services, and mining products. Some
other goods, most of them agricultural products, remained protected for ad-
ditional years (in most cases for five years, but for some products such as
rice, the tariffs were set to continue for an additional 20 years), allowing local
producers to adapt progressively to the incoming competition.10
Figure 1.1 presents the evolution of the tariffs charged by Colombia to the
United States (Panel 1.1a), and the evolution of tariffs charged by the United
States to Colombia (Panel 1.1b). Panel 1.1a shows that tariffs on mining
goods decreased with the free trade agreement, whereas tariffs for manufac-
turing and service goods decreased after 2010. Such decrease is explained
by Colombian decree 4111 of 2010. A big portion of agriculture goods, on
8ATPA was established to promote Colombia’s export industries, as well as to help
the fight against drug production. It was continuously renewed after 2002, when it was
called the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA).
9A more detailed discussion about Colombian liberalization can be found in Eslava et
al. (2004).
10The main protected products were rice, chicken, milk, cheese, butter, corn, meats, mo-
torcycles (between 1500 and 3000 cc.) paper, ink, iron and steel products, glass, and plas-
tics. The agreement additionally regulated competition, customs, environmental rights,
intellectual property, and investment procedures.
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the contrary, remained protected for some additional years. Panel 1.1b show
that tariff cuts for Colombian products entering the United States were much
lower, and basically renewed the already low tariff rates imposed years be-
fore. Such cuts, nonetheless, were implemented with the agreement in 2012.
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Notes: These graphs present the average tariffs charged by Colombia and the United States by two-
digit industry codes. These industries correspond to agriculture, manufactures, mining, and services.
The left panel presents the historical tariffs that Colombia charged on products from the United
States. The right panel plots the historical tariffs charged by the United States on incoming imports
from Colombia.
Imports from the United States increased strongly between 2010 and 2014
among industries that reduced tariffs, passing from 9 to 16 billion dollars.11
In figure 1.2 we present the dollar value of imports by industries that did
and did not reduce tariffs. The solid line depicts a continuous increase in
imports among the industries that experienced tariffs cuts, exclusively. Af-
ter 2014, however, the value of imports decreased presumably because of a
30% appreciation of the U.S. dollar with respect to the Colombian peso or a
strong decrease in international oil prices.12
Regional Trade in Colombia:- Connectivity and trade among Colombian
regions are very limited because train and river transportation is practically
11Appendix Table A.13 presents a list of the goods most frequently imported from the
United States to Colombia, and those that are seldom imported from the United States
to Colombia, before and after the free trade agreement.
12Appendix Figure A.2 shows the evolution of the exchange rate and oil prices for the
analyzed period. The decrease in oil prices affected the dollar value of exports, whereas
the peso devaluation (of around 30 percent) increased the price of importing goods from
the United States.
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Notes: This graph plots the value of imports in billions USD,
by industries were tariffs were and were not reduced. The solid
connected line depicts the value of imports among industries
that experienced tariff cuts. The dashed connected line presents
the value of imports in industries were tariffs did not change.
The dashed vertical lines depict the period 2008 to 2014, which
is the period we analyze herein. The solid vertical lines plot
the years in which Colombia and the United States decreased
tariffs.
nonexistent, and road infrastructure is very scarce (Duranton, 2015). The
Colombian government historically neglected road construction due to geo-
graphic limitations and civil conflict in many parts of the country (Bushnell,
1993). As a result, incoming products from the United States affect mainly
states with customs ports, and do not reach isolated areas. In Figure 1.3
we present a map of the different customs ports that receive incoming goods
from the United States, and the states around these ports. The map also
shows the main roads built as of 2010. All of the roads shown are two-
lane highways (i.e., one lane going in each direction). Red areas highlight
municipalities with customs ports, and blue areas highlight the surrounding
states. The three red areas within Colombian mainland correspond to Bo-
gotá, Medelĺın, and Cali, which are the three biggest Colombian cities with
customs in international airports. Around the coastline the red areas depict
the maritime customs of Buenaventura, Barranquilla, Santa Marta, Carta-
gena, and Riohacha.
Incoming products from the United States stay primarily in states with
customs ports. In figure 1.4 we present the value (in millions of U.S. dollars)
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Figure 1.3: Regional Trade
Notes: This map depicts the Colombian territory with all the municipality
boundaries. The areas depicted in red correspond to municipalities with cus-
tom ports for products imported from the United States. They correspond to:
Barranquilla, Bogotá, Buenaventura, Cali, Cartagena, Medelĺın, Riohacha, and
Santa Marta. In blue we depict the states where such municipalities are lo-
cated. These states correspond to: Atlántico, Boĺıvar, Cauca, Cundinamarca,
La Guajira, Magdalena, and Valle del Cauca.
of imported goods by states with and without customs ports. Around 80
percent of imports from the United States stay in the state where the cus-
toms port is located, and 90 percent stay within states that have customs
ports. The 10 percent difference stems from goods that move across states
that both have customs ports. The majority of the incoming goods stay in
the coasts, or reach the heartland by plane. A total of eight states (out of 33)
are mainly affected by import competition, while imports in the remaining
states are limited. Local producers outside states with customs ports rarely
buy products from the United States. In general, they produce products lo-
cally and use local inputs. Import competition from the United States thus
affects specific regions rather than the entirety of the country.
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Notes: This graph plots the value of imports in billions USD,
by states with and without customs ports. The solid connected
line depicts the value of imports among states with customs
ports. The dashed connected line presents the value of imports
in states with no customs ports. The dashed vertical lines depict
the period 2008 to 2014, which is the period we analyze herein.
The solid vertical lines plot the years in which Colombia and
the United States decreased tariffs.
1.3.2 Data
We use a rich and unique Colombian data set from three different sources.
First, we use yearly matched employer-employee earnings records from 2008
to 2014.13 This is a confidential, administrative data set that includes all
formal-sector workers who contribute to health or pension in any given month.
The data include firm identifiers, four-digit industry codes, and the munic-
ipality where the payment occurred. A primary feature of the data is that
we are able to follow every worker and firm. A limitation, however, is that
the data set contains only formal-sector workers, who correspond to around
60 percent of Colombian workers.14 We complement these data using head-
13The data include the years 2015 and 2016, but we excluded the use of data from these
years because of the strong devaluation (depicted in Appendix Figure A.2a).
14Even though informality is a big issue in Latin America, Appendix Figure A.3 shows
that informality by sector in Colombia did not increase during the period we analyze. In
fact, during the relevant time frame, we observe a slight decrease in informal employment
in the informal sector. This provides evidence that our results are not mainly driven
by people moving to informal work. Even if the results were driven by workers shifting
from formal to informal employment, we would still consider formal employment to be a
first-best option compared to either informal employment or unemployment.
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counts of workers per state and industry from the 2005 census.15
Second, we use highly detailed administrative records on Colombian im-
ports and exports from 2008 to 2014. These data, recorded at the 10-digit
level, are broken up by state where the good was bought (in the case of im-
ports) or sold (in the case of exports).16 These data constitute administrative
information from the customs authorities that is sent to the Colombian cen-
tral bank. We complement this information with data records on every single
imported and exported product by each firm in 2008.
Finally, we use tariff information from the United Nation’s Trade Analysis
Information System, the World Trade Organization, and the U.S. Interna-
tional Trade Commission. We use multiple tariff data due to differences in
the level of industry code aggregation, and because individually no single
source covers our entire period of study.17
We merge all the data sets using four-digit ISIC codes (845 industries)
and state identifiers (33 states), and create three different estimating sam-
ples. First, we collapse the data at the industry-state-year level and create
a yearly panel of industries by states (N = 142,212).18 The agreement could
have motivated the creation or destruction of industries in some states, so we
replace by zeros those industries-states-years that reported having at least
one worker between 2008 and 2014. So, for instance, if Bogotá reported pro-
duction of shoes in 2008 exclusively, then we replace further years with zeros,
and vice versa. This sample is static and does not change in time, so there
are not issues of potential selection bias.
Second, we create a panel of incumbent (before the free trade agreement)
workers in 2010. Individual-level samples change over time, raising concerns
about non-random selectivity if particular types of workers leave or enter the
15The 2005 census provided the number of workers for every state and industry. Such in-
formation is available at: http://systema59.dane.gov.co/cgibin/RpWebEngine.exe/
PortalAction?BASE=CG2005BASICO.
16Colombia has 33 different states that are very heterogeneous.
17These different data sources work with different industry codes. Therefore, we ho-
mogenize and merge them using four-digit industry codes.
18We drop industry by state cells that do not report any person employed from 2008
to 2014. So from a perfectly balanced panel of 195,195, we keep 142,212 observations.
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sample non-randomly. Therefore, following Autor et al. (2014), we restrict
the sample to workers observed before the tariff reduction, and track them up
to four years after. We limit the sample to workers between 25 and 64 years
old working in 2010 (N = 6,615,624). Third, we create a panel of incumbent
firms (N = 165,724), and again track them up to four years after the tariff
reduction. This sample also suffers from potential selection bias, so it is also
restricted to those observed in 2010. Following (Card et al., 2013), we keep
firms with more than five employees so that the AKM can be estimated.
Appendix Table A.1 presents descriptive statistics across all samples.19
1.4 Empirical Strategy
Our empirical analysis aims to find the causal effect of imports competition
from the United States on Colombian labor markets. The direct correlation
between import competition and employment estimated by OLS is unlikely
to reflect causal effects due to endogeneity concerns. Reverse causality (e.g.,
industries with more employment may be more subject to trade effects) and
potential unobserved confounders (e.g., unobserved productivity in certain
industries or states may correlate positively with trade and labor market
outcomes) can upwardly bias the coefficients. For this reason, we implement
the strategy detailed herein.
1.4.1 Measuring Import Competition








This measure accounts for the per capita import competition from the United
States faced by every industry j in state s, and year t in Colombia. We add a
one in the logarithm to include all those sectors and regions that have imports
equal to zero. It is important to include the zeros since some industries and
regions may have not imported before the free trade agreement took effect,
19We also use a fully balanced panel with a total of N = 195,195 observations (33 states,
seven years, and 845 industries), and the results remained unchanged.
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and, as a result of the reduction in tariffs, they may have started importing
goods. We normalize by the number of workers in 2005 using data from the
Colombian 2005 census at the state and industry levels.20
The purpose of this measure is to account for the degree of import com-
petition from the United States across industries and states. We normalize
the measure by the size of the workforce since smaller industries or states
are more subject to competition. This measure varies by state, industry, and
year, and it captures the degree of competition faced before and after the
free trade agreement.
Similarly, we define the following measure to evaluate whether the free








This measure replaces the value of exports, and accounts for the degree of
exports per worker in each industry, state, and year.
1.4.2 Industry and State Shocks
To address the endogeneity concerns we introduce some shocks that use the
exogenous decrease in tariffs and state disparities in access to imports. Con-
sider, first, the following imports and exports penetration shocks:
IMPddjt = 1(COL Reduction)j × Postt (1.3)
EXPddjt = 1(USA Reduction)j × Postt,
where 1(COL Reduction)j and 1(USA Reduction)j are categorical variables
that take the value of one if industry j experienced a tariff reduction in
Colombia and in the United States, respectively.21 Postt is a dummy indi-
cator that takes the value of one after 2010, and zero otherwise. We denote
20We divide by workers in 2005 since the free trade agreement may have affected the
number of workers in later years.
21We define a reduction in tariffs by comparing tariffs in 2014 with tariffs in 2010. A
tariff reduction implies that tariffs in 2014 are smaller than tariffs in 2010.
18
these shocks using the superscript “dd” to indicate that the shocks corre-
spond to a double difference.
The shocks in (1.3) do not take into account regional variation. However,
as shown in Section 1.3.1, Colombia has large regional variation in trade
flows, with eight states serving as the destination for almost 90 percent of
the imported goods from the United States. To account for this, we define
the following alternative and more reliable trade shocks:
IMPdddsjt = IMP
dd
jt × 1(Customs in State)s
EXPdddsjt = EXP
dd
jt × 1(Customs in State)s,
where 1(Customs in State)s is a categorical variable that takes the value of
one if state s has a customs port that receives imported goods from the
United States. We use the superscript “ddd” to denote that these shocks
come from a triple difference.
These measures rely on temporal, industry, and regional variation. We
expect that, after the implementation of the agreement, industries with lower
tariffs and regions with access to import competition from the United States
are more affected than protected industries in isolated regions. It is expected,
therefore, that imported goods have a greater effect on manufacturing goods
in states with customs ports, such as Bogotá, than non-tradable goods in
isolated states, such as the Amazon.
1.4.3 Triple-Difference Model (First Stage)





jt + µs + µj + µt + εsjt, (1.4)
where Ysjt corresponds to an outcome in state s, industry j and year t. Such
outcomes include the measure of import competition from the United States
and the measure of export per worker. This model includes state (µs), in-
dustry (µj), and year (µt) fixed effects to account for within variation.
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Equation 1.4 pools the effect of the decrease in tariffs across states with
and without customs ports. However, as suggested in Section 1.3.1, import
competition from the United States affects exclusively those states with cus-






sjt + µsj + µst + µjt + εsjt. (1.5)
This model includes state-by-industry (µsj), state-by-year (µst), and industry-
by-year (µjt) fixed effects and is identified using within industry-by-state
variation. The fixed effects account for potential confounding effects and
control for potential pre-existing differences. As treated units, the model
uses industries that experienced a tariff reduction, and that are located in
states with customs ports; as control units, the model uses industries that
did not receive tariff reductions, or that are located in states that do not have
customs ports. The model treats industries-by-states as separate units and
therefore isolates the effect of the tariff reduction by states with and without
customs ports.
1.4.4 The Effects of Import Competition (Second Stage)
The results of the triple-difference model quantify the effect of the free trade
agreement on import competition. We take advantage of these results and
estimate a second stage that uses variation induced by the free trade agree-
ment to identify the effects of import competition on worker and firm out-
comes. The richness of the data allows to estimate aggregated (i.e., at the
industry-state-year level) and individual level (i.e., at the worker and firm
level) models.
Aggregated Model:- We collapse the data at the state-industry-year level,
and use the variation in import competition to identify aggregated effects by
industries and states. These estimations do not suffer from sample selection
since the units of observation remain constant. Using equation 1.5 as a first
stage, we can find the effect of import competition from the United States
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on aggregated measures by estimating:
Ysjt = γ
ddd
1 log(ÎC)sjt + γ
ddd
2 log(EW)sjt + µsj + µts + µjt + esjt, (1.6)
where Ysjt correspond to an aggregated outcome (employment, number of
firms, and average firm size), log(ÎC)sjt stands for the predicted import com-
petition, and log(EW)sjt is the measure of exports per worker.
22 We also in-
clude state-by-industry (µsj), year-by-state (µts), and year-by-industry (µtj)
fixed effects. Excluding such fixed effects will bias the coefficients because
the instrument may be no longer exogenous. The parameter of interest is
γddd1 . Standard errors are clustered at the industry-by-state level.
Individual Level Model:- We additionally estimate regressions at the worker
and firm level. To deal with selection issues, we restrict the sample to in-
cumbent observations observed before the implementation of the free trade
agreement (i.e., in 2010). Our individual level model takes the form:
Yisj,t = δ1 log(ÎC)sj,t + δ2 log(EW)sj,τ + δ3Xi + µs + µj + uijs,t, (1.7)
where Yisj,t corresponds to an outcome, that varies for workers or firms i,
state s, and industry j. We measure the outcome year-by-year, up to four
years after the tariff reduction, and estimate separate regressions for each
year. The measure on import competition from the United States, log(IC)sj,t,
corresponds to that in equation (1.2) but included separately for each year.
The term log(EW)sj,t corresponds to the measure exports per worker.
23 Note
that this model includes state (µs) and industry (µj) fixed effects to control
for pre-existing differences, and resemble a differences-in-differences specifica-
tion with repeated cross sections. We additionally control for a set of baseline
characteristicsXi.
24 Standard errors are again clustered at the state–industry
level, and the parameter of interest is δ1.
22In the first stages we drop the term EXP dddsjt because it adds noise to the estimations.
We also control for the value of exports on the second stage, but excluding it does not
affect any of the results.
23Again these results are not sensitive to excluding this control.
24For workers we include age, age-squared, gender, earnings averaged from 2008 to 2010,
worker wage premiums averaged from 2008 to 2010, and number of days worked averaged
from 2008-2010. For firms we include wages, firm wage premiums, and the number of days
worked. Each of these measures is averaged across all workers within the firm, and then
averaged from 2008 to 2010.
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This specification is of course subject to reverse causality or omitted vari-
able bias, similar to the aggregated level estimations. To deal with this we
instrument using the interaction of the dummy that takes the value of one for
industries that decreased tariffs and a dummy for states that have customs
ports. Formally, this instrument is defined as:
ICsj = 1(Col Reduction)j × 1(Customs in State)s.
1.4.5 Firm and Worker Wage Premiums
Individual level estimations are useful to estimate heterogeneous effects across
workers and firms. As we showed in Section 1.2, the effects of import com-
petition are expected to be heterogeneous across firms’ levels of productivity
and workers’ skills. Even though in our data we are not able to directly
measure firm productivity and worker skills, we are still able to find proxies
by extracting information from wages. In particular, we follow Abowd et al.
(1999) and Card et al. (2013) and estimate the following high-dimensional
firm and worker fixed-effect model:
lnWijt = αi +ψJ(i,j) +X
′
ijtβ + εijt, (1.8)
where Wimt corresponds to income of individual i, in firm j, in period of
time t. Equation (1.8) is the sample counterpart of equation (1.1). The
components αi and ψJ(i,j) correspond to the worker- and firm-specific wage
premiums, respectively.25
The firm wage premium is the component of the wage that is common
to all the workers of the firms. Even though it is not an exact measure of
productivity, for the purposes of this paper, it can nevertheless serve as a
good proxy for productivity. As shown in Section 1.2, and following Card et
al. (2018), the firm wage premium can be a function of the firm’s productiv-
ity. Furthermore, it has been shown empirically that firm productivity and
firm wage premiums are highly correlated (Card et al., 2016; Alvarez et al.,
25We additionally control for year fixed effects.
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2018).26
The individual wage premium, on the other hand, measures the work-
ers’ compensation irrespective of the firm where he/she works. If wages are
equivalent to the marginal product of labor, then the worker wage premium
is a measure of worker productivity that is highly correlated with the level
of skills. As in the case of the firm wage premiums, we can interpret the
worker wage premium as a proxy for skills, but, if we do not accept such an
interpretation, then the worker wage premiums still rank workers according
to earnings irrespective of the employer. Such ranking reflects discrepancies
among workers that should be reflected in heterogeneous effects of import
competition.
We classify incumbent firms and workers based on their wage premiums
in the period 2008-2010. To do a more reasonable comparison, and to be in
line with our estimation strategy, we classify the samples by quartiles within
industries and states.27 We then follow this set of incumbents after the tariff
reduction, to identify the effect of the policy on firms and workers of different
ex ante ranks.
We estimate heterogeneous effects in three main ways. First, we break
down the sample of firms into quartiles of the distribution of firm-specific
wage premiums. Such partition distinguishes between low- and high-fixed
effect firms, which proxy low- and high-productivity firms. Second, we break
down the sample of workers into quartiles of the distribution of firm-specific
wage premiums. This allows us to see what happens to workers who were
originally employed in low- and high-productivity firms. Lastly, we divide
the sample of workers by quartiles of the distribution of worker-specific wage
premiums. With this we are able to distinguish among low- and high-fixed
effect workers, which proxy for low- and high- skilled workers.
26In any case, even if this interpretation of productivity were not accepted, the firm
wage premiums still rank firms between lower- and higher-paying firms, and the effects of
imports among them are expected to be different.
27To do this, we run a regression of the worker and firm wage premiums on state and
industry fixed effects, and take the residuals. We examine the results by quartiles of the
distribution of these residuals.
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1.4.6 Macroeconomic Confounders
Variation in oil prices and the exchange rate (Colombian pesos per dollar) can
cause spurious correlations that should be avoided. As we show in Appendix
Figure A.2, oil prices and exchange rates fluctuate strongly, especially after
2015. Therefore, we exclude the years 2015 and 2016 from our analysis. As a
consequence, our results are valid in the short term only, and we are unable
to say much about longer-term effects of import competition. Figure A.2b
shows, additionally, a strong decrease in the price of oil in 2009. This varia-
tion certainly affects the trade between Colombia and the United States, so
we drop the mining sector from our analysis. In Section 1.6 we show that
including 2015 and 2016, or including the mining sector, does not alter our
main findings, even though those results can be biased due to confounded
measures.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Effect of the Free Trade Agreement on Import
Competition (First Stage)
We begin by presenting the results of the free trade agreement on import
competition and exports per worker. Columns (1) to (3) in panel A) of Ta-
ble 1.1 present the results of estimating the differences-in-differences model
in equation (1.4).28 The results suggest that imports increased among the
sectors that reduce tariffs, and that the result is robust to alternative fixed
effects used. In columns (4) and (5), we present the results separately be-
tween states without and with customs ports, respectively, and find that the
increase in imports is entirely driven by a strong effect among states with
customs ports. In states without customs ports we do not see any effects on
imports, presumably because road connectivity hindered the access of these
products. We do not observe any effect regarding exports.
These results motivate the estimation the triple-difference model. The re-
28We control for the tariff reductions in the United States, but do not display the point
estimates.
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sults are displayed in columns (6) to (8) of Table 1.1. We observe a strong
increase in imports from the United States of around 15 to 18 percent among
industries that reduced the tariffs in states with customs ports. The results
are robust to the alternative structure of fixed effects. As expected, imports
from the United States increase remarkably among non-protected industries
in states with customs ports. We again do not observe any effects in exports
among industries in which the United States reduced its tariffs.
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Table 1.1: Effect of the Free-Trade Agreement on Imports and Exports
Differences-in-Differences Het. Effects by States Triple-Differences
No Customs Customs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A) Log(Import Competition)
1(COL reduction)*Post 2.434*** 0.077*** 0.077*** 0.027 0.175***
(0.100) (0.023) (0.023) (0.029) (0.037)
1(COL reduction)*Post*1(Customs) 0.172*** 0.175*** 0.150***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.045)
Ind. F 587.714 11.577 11.574 22.035 22.857 10.878
B) Log(Exports per Worker)
1(USA reduction)*Post 0.054 -0.060 -0.060 -0.040 -0.096
(0.175) (0.047) (0.047) (0.043) (0.110)
1(USA reduction)*Post*1(Customs) -0.095 -0.096 -0.101
(0.109) (0.109) (0.121)
Ind. F .097 1.591 1.591 .76 .776 .698
Observations 142,212 142,212 142,212 100,051 42,161 142,212 142,212 142,212
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
State FE Yes Yes Yes No No No
Industry*State FE Yes Yes Yes
State*Year FE Yes Yes
Industry*Year FE Yes
Note: This table presents the estimation of equation 1.5 on imports and exports. Panel A uses the import competition measure, defined as
equation 1.2, as dependent variable, and control for the reduction in U.S tariffs. Panel B uses as dependent variable log exports per worker defined
as equation 1.2, but changing the value of imports for the value of exports, and controls for the reduction in Colombian tariffs. Columns (1) to
(5) present the results of a difference-in-difference model. Columns (6) to (8) presents the results of a triple-difference model as in equation 1.5.
1(COL Reduction) and 1(USA Reduction) are categorical variables that take the value of one if Colombia and the USA reduced tariffs in a given
industry, respectively. 1(Customs) is a categorical variable that takes the value of one if the observation is within a state with customs port.
Post is a categorical variable that takes the value of one for observations after 2010. *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1
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In general, Table 1.1 suggests a strong impact of the free trade agreement
on import competition. No effect on exports was expected because tariffs in
the United States remained low under the agreement. In fact, the F-stats for
exports are very low, and the export shocks are not even significant. Thus,
in the rest of the specifications we focus only on imports, and we use exports
as a control to account for potential gains from the free trade agreement.29
1.5.2 The Effects of Import Competition from the United
States (Second Stage)
Aggregated-Level Results
Table 1.2 presents the results of the estimation of the second stage results
detailed in equation (1.6). We present the reduced form, OLS, and IV esti-
mates. Columns (1) to (3) suggest that import competition from the United
States decreases employment with an elasticity of employment to import
competition of around -0.64. Recall that the increase in import competition
estimated in table 1.1 is of around 15 to 18 percent, so this point estimate
implies a reduction in employment of around 9.6 to 11.5 percent. 30 This
magnitude is similar to the United States’ elasticity of employment to im-
ports from China found in Autor et al. (2013) (around -0.6), and resembles
many other results estimating the effect of import competition on employ-
ment around the world.
The decrease in employment can be driven by an extensive margin (firms
exit) or an intensive margin (firms downsize). Thus, we analyze the effect
of import competition from the United States on the number of firms and
the average firm size. Columns (4) to (6) show a strong and robust nega-
tive effect on the number of firms, equivalent to an overall decrease of 8.4
to 10 percent.31 Columns (7) and (9), on the contrary, show a less precise
29When we use alternative specifications with and without exports as controls, the
results do not change.
30Even though we reject the null only at the 10 percent level, we provide in Section 6
additional evidence that this effect is robust to many other specifications in which it is
more precisely estimated. We do this for simplicity in the presentation of the paper.
31This result is very robust to alternative specifications, as suggested in appendix ta-
ble 1.4.
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Table 1.2: Imports from the United States and the Decline in Employment
log (Employment) log (Number of Firms) log (Firm Size)
RF OLS IV RF OLS IV RF OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1(COL reduction)*Post -0.080* -0.064*** -0.023
1(Customs) (0.041) (0.016) (0.037)
log(Import Competition) -0.007 -0.640* -0.003 -0.559*** -0.006 -0.105
(0.006) (0.331) (0.002) (0.193) (0.005) (0.243)
Observations 142,212 142,212 142,212 142,212 142,212 142,212 142,212 142,212 142,212
F-first stage 11.352 11.352 11.352
Industry*State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table presents the estimation of equation 1.6. Columns (1)-(3) use log of employment as outcome. Columns
(4)-(6) use the log number of firms as outcome. Columns (7)-(9) use the log of the average firm size as outcome. Columns
(1), (4), and (7) present reduced form estimates. Columns (2), (5), and (8) presents OLS estimations. Columns (3), (6),
and (9) presents two-stage least squares results. All specifications control for industry–state, state–year, and industry–year
fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the industry*state level. *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1
and smaller, although still negative, effect on the average firm size.32 Even
though the point estimate is not significant, alternative specifications (shown
in Section 1.6) yield significant and meaningful results on this outcome, so
we cannot rule out that import competition does not affect firm size. This
estimate implies an overall reduction in firm size of 1.6 to 1.9 percent.
Such results suggest that import competition from the United States de-
creases employment among affected industries and states in Colombia. The
decrease in employment is mediated by the extensive and the intensive mar-
gin, even though the weight of the extensive margin is larger implying a
bigger importance for firm exit rather than for firms shrinking.
Individual-Level Results by Wage Premiums of Firms and Workers
Our main interest is to distinguish the effect between low- and high-productivity
firms and low- and high-skilled workers. So, as detailed in Section 1.4.5, we
estimate heterogeneous effects across the within industry-state distributions
32We measure firm size by counting the number of workers registered in each firm by
each year.
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of firm and worker wage premiums.33 As a result, we have three sets of re-
sults: 1) effects on firms by firm wage premiums; 2) effects on workers by
firm wage premiums; and 3) effects on workers by worker wage premiums.
The first two show heterogeneous effects by types of firms, whereas the third
shows effects that emerge according to types of workers.
Effects on Firms by Firm-Specific Wage Premiums: In Figure 1.5 we
present the estimation of equation 1.7 on two outcomes at the firm level:
Panel 1.5a uses an indicator variable for whether the firm exits or not;
Panel 1.5b uses the log of firm size. We estimate heterogeneous effects using
the quartiles of the distribution of firm-specific wage premiums, and track
the firms yearly. Quartile 1 corresponds to those firms in the first quartile of
the within industry and state distribution of firm wage premiums.
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Notes: These graphs present estimates of the parameter δ1 in equation 1.7 at the firm level by quartiles
of the distribution of firm-specific wage premiums. Panel 1.5a uses an indicator that takes the value of
one if the firm is not observed in year τ as outcome. Appendix table A.3 presents the underlying
regressions. Panel 1.5b use the log of firm size as dependent variable, and appendix table A.4 presents
the regression results. All quartiles are defined in the distribution of firm-specific wage premiums within
industry and state. Panel A presents estimates of a linear probability model. 90% confidence intervals
displayed.
We observe in Panel 1.5a that a 10 percent increase in import competition
from the United States increases the probability of exiting among firms in the
first quartile by around 0.003 percentage points. We also see a positive effect
among firms in the second quartile, although the magnitude (0.002 percent-
33The results of the first-stage estimation are presented in Appendix Table A.2. We
show a very robust first stage with a positive increase in imports.
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age points) and the precision are smaller. Firms in the fourth quartile also
show positive point estimates, but these are even less precise and smaller.
These results suggest that import competition motivates an exodus of firms,
especially low-productivity firms. We test for this by grouping below and
above the median, and we find that firms below the median are significantly
more likely to exit compared to firms above the median.
We also test for effects in firm size among the firms that do not exit. We
find that firm size decreases among firms in the first quartile, as shown in
Panel 1.5b. As opposed to the effects of Chinese import competition in the
United States (Bloom et al., 2019), we do not observe that more productive
firms increase in size. Such result implies that missing production generated
by firms exiting and shrinking is not appropriated by high-productivity local
firms. Instead consumers seem to substitute their previous consumption of
locally produced goods with imported goods from the United States.
In general, these results suggest two effects. First, low-productivity firms
are more likely to be driven out of the market, inducing a decrease in the
supply of locally produced goods. Second, low-productivity firms are likely
to shrink, whereas high-productivity firms do not grow. This provides some
evidence that local consumers (either individual consumers or firms) decrease
consumption, or stop buying locally produced goods and begin buying im-
ported substitutes or other goods from the United States. If this were not
the case, then we should observe increases in the size of high-productivity
firms induced by the decrease in the supply of locally produced goods. This
contrasts with the effects of Chinese competition in the United States, where
import competition affects mainly high-paying and bigger firms.
Firm dispersion in productivity is very large in developing countries. Such
distribution, especially in Latin America, is usually bimodal, with a predomi-
nance of very low- and very high- productive firms Busso et al. (2013); Eslava
et al. (2019). The results herein suggest that an increase in import compe-
tition from the United States induces the exit of firms, especially among
low-productivity firms, and that remaining low-productivity firms decrease
in size.
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Effects on Workers by Firm Wage Premiums: Results this far leave open
the question regarding what happens with the workers who were originally
working in firms with different levels of productivity, especially those who
lose their job because the firm exit or shrink. To answer this we estimate
equation 1.7 on the sample of incumbent workers, and estimate heteroge-
neous effects across the firms where these workers were initially employed.
Quartile 1 refers to workers who were initially working in a firm in the
first quartile of the distribution of firm-specific wage premiums. Figure 1.6
presents the results using as outcome a dummy for whether the worker works
(panel 1.6a), a dummy for whether working in an industry that did not re-
duce tariffs (panel 1.6b), an indicator variable for whether the worker works
in a state without customs ports (panel 1.6c), and the worker’s log daily wage
(panel 1.6d). We again follow the same format as in Figure 1.5 separating
the results by year and quartiles.
The results in Panel 1.6a present a small and positive effect on the prob-
ability of working among workers in the first quartile. Surprisingly, we do
not observe that workers in low-productivity firms transition into unemploy-
ment (or informality), but instead they are more likely to remain employed
than workers in unaffected industries or states. This can occur if workers
from low-productivity firms in affected industries or states are reallocated
into low-productivity firms in unaffected industries and/or states.
We find direct evidence of this by presenting, in panels 1.6b and 1.6c, the
effect of import competition on a dummy for working in an industry that did
not reduce tariffs and a dummy for working in a state with no customs ports,
respectively. We see that workers in the first and second quartiles are more
likely to move to industries that did not reduce tariffs, whereas there is a gen-
eralized movement across all quartiles to states without customs ports. The
point estimates in panels 1.6b, nonetheless, are much larger in magnitude,
implying a bigger reallocation across industries than across states. Such re-
allocation exists more prominently among workers in low-productivity firms.
This reallocation of workers to unaffected industries and states does not
explain entirely the positive point estimates in panel 1.6a. In fact, workers
can reallocate and that does not necessarily increase the probability of being
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Figure 1.6: Effects on Workers’ Outcomes by Quartiles of Firm-Specific
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Note: These graphs present estimates of the parameter δ1 in equation 1.7 by quartiles of the distribution
of firm-specific wage premiums of incumbent firms. Quartile 1 corresponds to workers working in a firm
in the first quartile of the within state-industry distribution of firm-specific wage premiums. Panel 1.6a
uses an indicator that takes the value of one if the workers is observed working in year τ as outcome.
Appendix table A.5 presents the underlying regressions. Panel 1.6b uses an indicator variable for whether
the worker is an industry that did not reduce tariffs as dependent variable, and appendix table A.7
presents the regression results. Panel 1.6c uses in indicator variable for whether the worker works in a
state without a customs port. Appendix Table A.8 presents the point estimates. Panel 1.6d uses the log
of workers’ daily wage, and appendix table A.6 presents the point estimates. Panels A, B, and C present
estimates of a linear probability model. 90% confidence intervals displayed.
employed. A possibility is that workers in unaffected industries or states
are displaced, decreasing therefore their probability of being employed. This
result is equivalent to a situation of job displacement in times of recession as
shown in (Haltiwanger et al., 2017).
Theoretically, reallocation of workers mitigates wage losses after a labor
demand shock. We observe in panel 1.6d that wages are not affected for
workers in the top three quartiles, but workers in the first quartile experi-
ence a wage decrease of around -0.05%. Two main reasons can explain this
result: 1) workers who switch jobs accept lower-paid offers; 2) workers who
32
stay experience wage losses. Unfortunately, we cannot rule out either of these
explanations. However, the evidence in panels 1.6a, 1.6b, and 1.6c shed some
light about workers in low-productivity firm relocating and displacing other
workers in low-productivity firms by accepting lower paid offers.
In general, two results can be derived here. First, workers in low-productivity
firms move into unaffected industries and states, and they can potentially dis-
place former workers by accepting lower-paid job offers. Second, workers in
all the other quartiles shift to unaffected industries and/or states and miti-
gate wage loses. Those in the second quartile are more likely to move into
other industries, whereas workers in high-productivity firms move geograph-
ically, across states.
Effects on Workers by Worker Wage Premiums: The effects of import
competition from the United States can differ depending on the levels of
skills of the workers. Thus, we analyze what happens to workers with differ-
ent levels of worker-specific wage premiums, which can proxy for skills. We
analyze the same outcomes included in Figure 1.6 but now separate the re-
sults by quartiles of the distribution of worker-specific wage premiums. These
results are presented in Figure 1.7 that follows the same format as Figure 1.6.
The results in panel 1.7a show a precise and negative effect on the proba-
bility of being (formally) employed among workers in the first quartile of the
workers wage premium distribution. The workers in this quartile do not shift
into unaffected industries (panel 1.7b) or into unaffected states (panel 1.7c),
and we do not see any effect in wages among the ones who remained employed
(panel 1.7d). Such results imply that the losses in employment are mainly
driven by low-skilled workers who transition to informality, unemployment,
or leave the labor force. The results in employment in Table 1.2 are thus
mainly driven by low-skilled workers.
These results contrast with those among workers in other quartiles. We do
not observe any effect on the likelihood of working, but we do observe pos-
itive point estimates on the probability of shifting into industries that did
not reduce tariffs (for workers in the third quartile) and into states without
custom ports (for all quartiles except the first). We do not see any effects
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Notes: These graphs present estimates of the parameter δ1 in equation 1.7 by quartiles of the distribution
of worker-specific wage premiums. Panel 1.7a uses an indicator that takes the value of one if the workers
is observed working in year τ as outcome. Appendix Table A.9 presents the underlying regressions.
Panel 1.7b uses an indicator variable for whether the worker is an industry that did not reduce tariffs as
dependent variable, and Appendix Table A.11 presents the regression results. Panel 1.7c uses in indicator
variable for whether the worker works in a state without custom ports. Appendix Table A.12 presents
the point estimates. Panel 1.7d uses the log of workers’ daily wage, and Appendix Table A.10 presents
the point estimates. All quartiles are defined in the distribution of worker-specific wage premiums within
industry and state. Panels A, B, and C present estimates of a linear probability model. 90% confidence
intervals displayed.
on wages, suggesting that reallocation could have mitigated potential wage
losses.
In general, we observe four main sets of results. First, the free trade
agreement between Colombia and the United States decreases the amount of
import competition but leaves exports relatively unaffected. Second, import
competition reduces employment by decreasing the number of firms, and
the average size of remaining ones. Such effects are mainly driven by low-
skilled workers who are more likely to lose their (formal) jobs. Third, low-
productivity firms are more likely to exit the market and shrink in size. We
interpret this as evidence of firm selection due to import competition. Fourth,
import competition from the United States induces worker movement from
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affected industries (i.e., those in which tariffs on related goods fell) and states
(i.e., those with customs ports) to unaffected industries (i.e., those in which
related tariffs did not fall) and states (i.e., those without customs ports).
Such reallocation of labor mitigates or increases wage loses, depending on
the case, and can potentially induce job displacement of workers who were
originally employed in unaffected industries or states.
1.6 Robustness Checks
1.6.1 Pre-trends
The biggest threat to identification comes by potential pre-trends between
our treated and non-treated units. We test for this estimating event study
models that identify potential pre-trends between the treated and control
groups. Figure 1.8a plots the coefficients of an event study model, and nor-
malize with respect to 2010, which is when Colombian tariffs were reduced.
Panel 1.8a uses the measures of import competition from the United States
as outcome, and resembles the first stage of the model. Panels 1.8b, 1.8c, and
1.8d use log employment, log number of firms, and log average firm size as
dependent variables, respectively. These results resemble the reduced form
estimates of Table 1.2. All the models are estimated in the sample aggre-
gated at the industry-state-year level.
We do not observe any pre-trends prior to 2010, suggesting that our main
results may not be driven by differentiated trends among industries that ex-
perienced tariff reductions nor states with and without customs ports. We
do observe an increase in imports after 2011 among industries where tariffs
were reduced and states with custom ports, as the first stage suggested. We
also see a decrease in employment, number of firms, and the average firm size
after 2010. The effect fades on time, except for the number of firms where
we do not see any process of mean reversion.
These results give strong evidence that our estimations are not driven
by differential pre-trends, and suggest that we are not violating the parallel
trends assumption that is necessary for the proper identification of the double
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Notes: This graph presents the point estimates of an event study model using
equation 1.5. Panel 1.8a uses import competition as dependent variable, panel 1.8b uses
log Employment, panel 1.8c use log of the number of firms, and panel 1.8d uses log of
average firm size. We interact IMP dddsjt and EXP
ddd
sjt with yearly dummies, and exclude
2010. We present the coefficients on the interactions of IMP dddsjt and the yearly dummies.
Standard errors are clustered at the state*industry level. 95% confidence intervals are
shown.
and triple-difference model. Instead, it gives evidence of the exogeneity of
our instrument and the validity of the exclusion restriction.
1.6.2 Differences-in-Differences
Our results are additionally robust to just using a differences-in-differences
strategy. In particular, we use the tariff reduction of the free trade agreement
before and after 2010 to design a differences-in-differences estimator, and
ignore differences among states with and without customs ports. For such
we use an import shock as in equation 1.3 and first identify the effect of
that shock on the measure of import competition. This estimation is the
36
first stage of the model, and the results are presented in columns (1) to (3)
of table 1.1. Using this as first stage, we instrument the measure of import
competition and estimate the following model:
Ysjt = γ
dd
1 log(ÎC)sjt + γ
dd
2 log(EW)sjt + µj + µs + µt + esjt, (1.9)
where we control by the measure of exports, and include industry (µj),
state (µs), and year (µt) fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
industry–state level. The results are presented in table 1.3. We present re-
duced forms, OLS, and IV results. Columns (1) to (3) use log employment
as outcome, columns (4) to (6) use the log number of firms, and columns (7)
to (9) use the log of average firm size.
Table 1.3: Imports from the U.S. and Decline on Employment: D-i-D
Model
log (Employment) log (Number of Firms) log (Firm Size)
RF OLS IV RF OLS IV RF OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1(COL reduction)*Post -0.268*** -0.135*** -0.130***
(0.022) (0.009) (0.018)
log(Import Competition) 0.044*** -2.020*** 0.011*** -0.952*** 0.031*** -1.065***
(0.008) (0.379) (0.004) (0.175) (0.006) (0.218)
Observations 142,212 142,212 142,212 142,212 142,212 142,212 142,212 142,212 142,212
F-first stage 33.315 33.315 33.315
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table presents the estimation of equation 1.9. Columns (1)-(3) use log of employment as outcome. Columns
(4)-(6) use the log number of firms as outcome. Columns (7)-(9) use the log of the average firm size as outcome. Columns
(1), (4), and (7) present reduced form estimates. Columns (2), (5), and (8) presents OLS estimations. Columns (3),
(6), and (9) presents two-stage least squares results. All specifications control for industry, state, and year fixed effects.
Standard errors clustered at the industry*state level. *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1
We observe again negative and very precise results in all three estimations.
These results suggest again that the decrease in employment is mediated by
firms exiting and shrinking. The magnitudes are bigger than the triple-
difference model, but they mix results in states who experienced import
competition with states that did not. The triple difference accounts for this
issue and gives more reliable estimates.
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1.6.3 Moving Fixed Effect Structure
All the estimates so far include a very conservative structure of fixed effects.
Our strategy relies on within industry and state variation as the proper
exogenous source of variation that identifies the model. However, there are
alternative combinations of fixed effects that use different source of time vari-
ation to estimate the model. Our results are not altered when considering
alternative less-demanding combinations. We present in Table 1.4 alterna-
tive models that change the structure of the fixed effects, and therefore the
identifying variation.
Table 1.4: Robustness of the Effects of Import Competition from the U.S.
Differences-in-Differences Triple-Differences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A) log Employment
log(IC) -0.697*** -1.874*** -2.020*** -2.057*** -2.176*** -2.258*** -0.640* -0.639*
(0.057) (0.374) (0.379) (0.383) (0.472) (0.484) (0.331) (0.331)
B) log Number of Firms
log(IC) -0.390*** -0.875*** -0.952*** -0.972*** -1.044*** -1.227*** -0.559*** -0.559***
(0.029) (0.173) (0.175) (0.177) (0.217) (0.249) (0.193) (0.193)
C) log Average Firm Size
log(IC) -0.270*** -1.000*** -1.065*** -1.079*** -1.229*** -1.029*** -0.105 -0.105
(0.029) (0.215) (0.218) (0.220) (0.296) (0.265) (0.243) (0.243)
Observations 142,212 142,212 142,212 142,212 142,212 142,212 142,212 142,212
F-first stage 377.439 33.349 33.315 33.418 26.318 27.098 11.352 11.338
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes No No No No
State FE Yes Yes No No No No
Industry*State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State*Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry*Year FE Yes Yes
Inputs Cost Reduction Yes Yes
Note: This table presents IV estimations using the log of employment as outcome in panel A), the log of number of
firms in panel B), and the log of average firm size in panel C). Log(IC) stands for log of import competition. Columns
(1)-(4) present the estimates of equation 1.9, but vary on the fixed effects included. Column (1) includes year fixed
effects, column (2) adds industry fixed effects, and column (3) adds state fixed effects. Column (4) includes the measure
of inputs costs. Columns (5)-(8) present the results of the estimation of equation 1.6. Column (5) includes year and state
by industry fixed effects. Column (6) includes state by industry and state by year fixed effects. Column (7) adds state
by industry fixed effects. Column (8) includes the measure of inputs costs. All specifications additionally control for the
log of exports per worker. Standard errors clustered at the industry*state level. *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1.
Columns (1) to (3) show that the result in the difference-in-difference model
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remains unchanged when different fixed effects are included. The precision
of the estimates is the same, although the magnitudes change. In columns
(5) to (7) we do the same using the triple-difference model. All specifi-
cations include state-by-industry fixed effects since our instrument is valid
exclusively using within state and industry variation. We see that the sign
does not change when including year-by-state not year-by-industry fixed ef-
fects. However, we do observe a decrease in magnitude and precision when
industry-by-year fixed effects are included. This estimate is our preferred
specification since it shows more conservative estimates.
1.6.4 Input Prices
An increase in imported products from the United States increases compe-
tition for local firms, but also decreases the cost of some inputs. Firms may
be harmed if there is an increase in import competition, but they may also
benefit if there is a decrease in the cost of inputs Goldberg et al. (2010).
The effects of import competition on the number of firms, for instance, may
be mediated by the direct effect of competition or by a decrease in the cost
of inputs. To account for the effect on input prices and isolate the effect of
import competition, we compute a measure for the cost of inputs and include
it as a control.
To construct this measure, we use detailed data on all the goods imported
by every firm in 2008. These data includes information on the firms’ industry
and state. Using this, we compute the following measure of input prices at











where k indexes each input and Ksj is the total number of inputs used per
industry by state. Importsksjt correspond to the imported value of input k
by industry j, state s, and year t. We multiply this value times some weights
that measure the relevance of input k and the intensity in imports of industry
j by state s. T 2008ksj is a weight equivalent to the percentage imported of good
k with respect to the total imported goods in industry j, state s, in 2008.
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Import intensity is a measure of how much the output sector j in state s
imported in 2008. We expect that industries that import more are more
affected by input prices. Therefore, we multiply the weights for a measure of
import intensity. We normalize such measure by the number of employees in
2005 and take logs. Formally such measure is equivalent to:








We then average across the k inputs to construct a weighted average of the
prices of imported inputs for each industry, state, and year.
We include this measure as a control, and present the results in columns
(4), for the differences-in-differences model, and columns (8), for the triple-
difference model, of Table 1.4. For both cases we observe that the measure
of input costs do not have much of an effect on the point estimate of the
coefficient associated with the measure of import competition. Therefore, we
are able to conclude that the effect of import competition from the United
States is neither mediated nor affected by a reduction in input prices. Similar
results are found in Autor et al. (2013) when analyzing the employment
effects of Chinese import competition among labor markets in the United
States.
1.6.5 Mining and additional Years
Finally, we present the results of our main strategy, including the mining sec-
tor and the years 2015 and 2016. Recall that we dropped the mining sector
because of potential confounders due to the high volatility in the price of oil.
A decrease in the price of oil can affect the mining industry, which is one
of the biggest industrial sectors in Colombia. Therefore, imports from this
industry could be correlated with fluctuations in oil prices, rather than with
the free trade agreement; this could confound the estimates. Furthermore,
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recall that data from 2015 and 2016 were also dropped because of a steep
devaluation that affected Colombia in those two years. A peso devaluation
(or a dollar appreciation) changes the prices of imports and, thus, could con-
found the timing of the free trade agreement’s potential effects. Both forces
could potentially bias our estimations, so we chose not to include them in
our main strategy.
However, our main results do not change much when these additional ob-
servations are included. In Table 1.5 we again present the results of the
difference-in-difference and triple difference models, including the reduced
form, OLS, IV, and input cost-controlled specifications. The results are very
close to our main estimates, but they may be somewhat biased due to the
variability in the price of oil in 2009 and 2010.
The same happens when we include data from 2015 and 2016. We present
these results in Table 1.6, in which we follow the same structure but include
these two additional years. Again the main results do not change much,
but these results do show larger point estimates that can be confounded
by exchange rate fluctuations that primarily affect our measure of imports.
We can evidence this by observing the decrease in the F-stat of the first
stage compared to the estimations without 2015 and 2016. Nonetheless, all
the estimates maintain the signs, and precision does not change dramatically.
In general, our results are robust to alternative samples, controls, and spec-
ifications. The signs, magnitudes, and precision are not affected. We also
show strong evidence about the non-existence of pre-trends, that validate our
identifying assumptions.
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper we explore how import competition from the United States
affects firms and employment in Colombia. We additionally take advantage
of a high-dimensional workers and firms fixed model (i.e., the AKM model)
to find proxies for firms’ productivity and workers’ skills, and estimate het-
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erogeneous effects of import competition among them. To the best of our
knowledge we are the first to study the effects of import competition from a
developed country on a developing country, to analyze the empirical effects of
free-trade agreements in general, and to estimate the heterogeneous effects of
import competition across the distribution of firm- and worker-specific wage
premiums.
We take advantage of the implementation of a free trade agreement signed
between Colom- bia and the United States, and regional variation in access
to trade, to estimate the effect of increased import competition from the
United States on Colombian firms and local labor markets. The free trade
agreement led to increased competition from goods coming from the United
States, but left exports unaffected because already low tariffs on Colombia
goods exported to the United States remained intact. Furthermore, compe-
tition from U.S. goods increased exclusively in specific Colombian regions:
those states with access to customs ports. Colombia’s lack of infrastructure
(trains and roads) hinders wider distribution of the imported products. This
unique setting enables us to identify the effect of import competition from
the United States on Colombian firms and formal-sector workers.
We use administrative matched employer-employee that allow us to track
job spells for formal workers up to four years after the tariff reduction. These
data also allow us to estimate high-dimensional firm- and worker-fixed effect
models, and estimate the heterogeneous effects among low- and high-fixed ef-
fect firms and workers. These fixed effects account for firm and worker wage
premiums, which can be interpreted as measures of productivity and skills,
respectively. Though the data set excludes informal workers, these data offer
a nearly ideal way to identify the effects of import competition on firm exit
and employment.
Our results suggest that a 10 percent increase in import competition from
the United States decreases employment on 6.4 percent in Colombia. The
decrease in employment is mainly driven by low-productivity firms that exit
or shrink. High-productivity firms do not grow, suggesting that local con-
sumers substitute locally produced goods for imported products from the
United States. We also observe that workers shift mainly from affected to
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unaffected industries and regions. We do not observe effects on wages sug-
gesting that reallocation mitigates such effects, except for the case of workers
originally working in low-productivity firms who presumably reallocate and
displace former workers in unaffected industries and regions by accepting
lower paid jobs. Low-skilled workers seem to be the most affected since they
are more likely to lose their (formal) job.
This paper provides evidence of the positive and the potentially negative
effects of import competition from high-wage countries for developing coun-
tries. Spurring the exit of low-productivity firms can boost employment and
development, as many have suggested. However, this process exacts a price
in terms of employment among lower-skilled workers. The question regarding
how long these effects last remains unanswered and should motivate future
research on the topic. Negative effects on employment may be mitigated in
a longer run, potentially boosting the benefits.
43
Table 1.5: Effects of Trade of Import Competition Including the Mining
Sector
Reduced Form OLS IV Inputs Cost
D-D D-D-D D-D D-D-D D-D D-D-D D-D D-D-D






log(Import Competition) 0.035*** -0.010* -2.718*** -0.816** -2.706*** -0.816**
(0.009) (0.006) (0.636) (0.393) (0.616) (0.393)





log(Import Competition) 0.009** -0.003 -1.252*** -0.585*** -1.245*** -0.585***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.289) (0.216) (0.279) (0.216)





log(Import Competition) 0.024*** -0.008* -1.503*** -0.269 -1.497*** -0.269
(0.006) (0.005) (0.368) (0.275) (0.359) (0.275)
Observations 149,611 149,611 149,611 149,611 149,611 149,611 149,611 149,611
F-first stage 20.59 9.782 21.593
Year FE Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry*State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Input Import Cost Yes Yes
Note: This table presents estimations using the log of employment as outcome in panel A), the log of number of firms
in panel B), and the log of average firm size in panel C). All specifications include the mining sector. Column (1) and
column (2) present the estimates of equations 1.4 and 1.5, respectively. The coefficients on EMPddsjt and EMP
ddd
sjt are not
shown. Column (3) presents the estimation of the OLS version of equation 1.9, and column (4) of equation 1.6. Columns
(5) and (6) present the second stage estimates of equations 1.9 and 1.6, respectively. Columns (7) and (8) additionally
control for input costs. Standard errors clustered at the industry*state level. *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1
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Table 1.6: Effects of Trade of Import Competition Including 2015-2016
Reduced Form OLS IV Inputs Cost
D-D D-D-D D-D D-D-D D-D D-D-D D-D D-D-D






log(Import Competition) 0.044*** -0.003 -3.731*** -1.165* -3.341*** -1.136*
(0.008) (0.006) (0.914) (0.679) (0.746) (0.660)





log(Import Competition) 0.010*** -0.002 -1.779*** -1.023** -1.574*** -0.977**
(0.003) (0.002) (0.433) (0.478) (0.348) (0.453)





log(Import Competition) 0.033*** -0.002 -1.963*** -0.100 -1.786*** -0.131
(0.006) (0.005) (0.498) (0.393) (0.416) (0.389)
Observations 182,844 182,844 182,844 182,844 182,844 182,844 182,844 182,844
F-first stage 17.768 5.203 21.582 5.353
Year FE Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry*State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Input Import Cost Yes Yes
Note: This table presents estimations using the log of employment as outcome in panel A), the log of number of firms
in panel B), and the log of average firm size in panel C). All specifications include 2015-2016. Column (1) and column
(2) present the estimates of equations 1.4 and 1.5, respectively. The coefficients on EMPddsjt and EMP
ddd
sjt are not shown.
Column (3) presents the estimation of the OLS version of equation 1.9, and column (4) of equation 1.6. Columns (5) and
(6) present the second stage estimates of equations 1.9 and 1.6, respectively. Columns (7) and (8) additionally control for
input costs. Standard errors clustered at the industry*state level. *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1
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CHAPTER 2
DO SCHOOL SHOOTINGS ERODE
PROPERTY VALUES?
Juan S. Muñoz and Ruchi Singh
2.1 Introduction
On March 24, 1998, two students from Westside Middle School near Jones-
boro, Arkansas, opened fire, killing five people and wounding ten others. A
year later, two students from Columbine High School in Colorado, killed 13
people and injured 23 others. More recently, a gunman at Sandy Hook El-
ementary School, in Newtown, Connecticut, killed 20 children, and six staff
members. The United States has more mass shootings at schools and else-
where than any other country. The number rose by more than five times in
the period from 2014 to 2017, as shown in Figure 1.1 About 15 percent of
these mass shootings occurred in schools. These incidents have sparked a
political debate over gun violence, zero tolerance policies and gun control.
School shootings are a type of crime that is unpredictable; they are excep-
tionally traumatic events, but are highly unlikely to be repeated in the same
location. Our research examines the effects of such occurrences on residen-
tial housing values and sheds light on mechanisms behind the relationship
between crime and house prices. This relationship has been broadly docu-
mented as negative and strong.2 Households might avoid areas with high
levels of crime because of the associated potential loss if they were to be
victimized in the future. This link appears to be the logical explanation for
1We define mass shootings as gun-related episodes with three or more victims (exclud-
ing perpetrators); these incidents are those that do not involve gangs, drugs, or organized
crime.
2See for instance: (Thaler, 1978); (Hellman & Naroff, 1979); (Linden & Rockoff, 2008);
(J. C. Pope, 2008); (D. G. Pope & Pope, 2012); (Lynch & Rasmussen, 2001); (Gibbons,
2004); (Ihlanfeldt & Mayock, 2010) ; (Abadie & Dermisi, 2008); (Gautier, Siegmann, &
Vuuren, 2009) ; and (Ratcliffe & von Hinke, 2015).
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the relationship between crime and housing prices, but it is not the only
one. Crime, in fact, may have some externalities that may shift housing
demand due to some other understudied or unrecognized channels. In the
case of school shootings, potential homebuyers might want to avoid the af-
fected area due to the associated trauma, lower perceived school quality (due
to decline in enrollment, scores etc.), or other stigmas associated with the
place.
Literature on mass shootings has traditionally focused on the effects on
victims. Empirical studies have shown that such horrific shootings can lead
to trauma, stress and increased frequency of mental health conditions such
as anxiety, fear, depression which might result in poor academic achievement
and have implications for long-term outcomes ((Nader, Pynoos, Fairbanks,
& Frederick, 1990)).
We extend this literature and analyze whether mass shootings in schools
affect house prices in the school districts in which they occur. Our results
suggest that house prices within the affected school districts fall by an average
of 7.8 percent (or $15,051 on average), and its effects persists for, at least,
five years. Additionally, we find that in the wake of such an incident the
number of transactions decreases in the affected school district.
We focus on mass shootings that took place in schools during the period
1998 to 2014. Our analysis employs two key sources of data: 1) the Stanford
Mass Shootings of America data project; and 2) individual transaction and
assessment records for the school districts where shootings took place and
the adjacent school districts for the period from 1991 to 2017. These data
were obtained from CoreLogic, Inc., which collects real estate information
nationwide. Our analysis uses micro-level transaction data from all U.S.
school districts in which a mass shooting took place on a school campus.
The coverage of the data makes our results externally valid.
The key challenge in estimating the effect of mass shooting on property
values is identifying the counterfactual scenario, i.e., how prices would have
evolved in absence of the shooting. Relying on cross-sectional variation alone
might lead to biased estimates because house prices might vary across ge-
ographic administrative boundaries due to both observed and unobserved
characteristics. We address this potential concern by exploiting an exoge-
nous shock in the timing of the shootings and using a difference-in-differences
strategy. To estimate the causal effects of school shootings on housing prices,
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we compare prices in the affected school district with those in neighboring
school districts.
Descriptive statistics at the census tract level suggest differences in observ-
able characteristics between affected and neighboring school districts prior
to the school shootings. The difference-in-difference strategy will take care
of these preexisting differences, but to test the robustness of our results we
use two alternative identification strategies. First, we use a boundary dis-
continuity approach within a difference-in-differences framework to compare
houses within half a mile of the school-district boundary to better control for
unobserved amenities. The effect is stronger when we restrict the analysis to
properties near a school-district boundary; prices in these areas fall by 13.6
percent (or $20,337 on average), and the decline remains persistent again for
five years after the shooting.
Second, we use a propensity score matching approach, within the difference-
in-difference framework, to reduce preexisting differences. Given that we use
repeated cross sections, we match at the census tract level using observable
characteristics before the shooting. Then, we compute kernel weights using
the propensity score, and use them to weight our observations. This strategy
suggest a smaller but still significant decrease in prices of around 3.5 percent.
We also perform additional robustness checks. Our results are not driven
by changes in the composition of houses sold. Furthermore, graphical evi-
dence and falsification tests provide no evidence of spurious negative effects
due to differential housing price trends. These tests support our findings that
the declines we document in housing prices are indeed an outgrowth of the
mass shooting incidents.
We then explore mechanisms that explain the decrease in housing demand
in affected schools districts. We first rule out the mechanism under which
housing demand decrease because homebuyers are afraid of experiencing an
associated crime in the aftermath of the shooting episode. We do so by
presenting difference-in-differences estimates that suggest that crime does
not increase in cities were the shooting occurred.
Next, we evaluate two alternative plausible mechanisms: deterioration in
valuation of school quality and place-based stigmas. To discern whether
the results are driven by homebuyers valuing school quality, we examine
the market for houses that have more bedrooms, which serve as a proxy
for family-size households (those that are most likely to include children
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who attend or will attend local schools). The decline in prices is higher for
houses with more bedrooms, suggesting that the response is larger in case
the family has children. Furthermore, we find a decrease in enrollment and
number of teachers in schools that experienced a school shooting and also in
neighboring schools that did not experience the shooting but that are within
the same school district. This suggest that the quality of school district
has deteriorated and that is being capitalized into house prices. Finally,
we find no effect on the price of non-residential properties. These findings
suggest that lower perceived quality of schools represent particular concerns
for potential homebuyers.
Next we test if place-based stigmas explain the decrease in housing de-
mand. If place-based stigmas explain the decrease in demand, then the
properties closer to the area of the shooting should witness a larger decrease
in prices. We find, however, that house prices seem to remain unaffected
when comparing properties closer to the school where the shooting occurred
with those farther away. Therefore, place based stigmas do not seem to
explain the observed results.
This paper is the first analysis of the effect of school shootings on house
prices. It contributes to two strands of research. First, we contribute to
the literature on the capitalization of school quality into house prices. Ex-
isting research shows that housing prices respond to local school quality as
measured by test scores, value added, level of capital expenditure per pupil,
school report cards, popularity of school, etc.3 These papers suggests a lower
willingness to pay for housing in neighborhoods in which schools are reputed
to be of poor quality.4 In fact, in a study of school shootings, (Beland & Kim,
2016) find that school quality decreases after a school shooting. Thus, our
paper adds to this literature by providing further evidence that deterioration
in school quality results in decline in house prices.
Second, we contribute to the literature on the effect of crime on house
prices by analyzing how crimes with almost zero probability of repetition
3A summary of this literature is provided by (Gibbons & Machin, 2008), (Black &
Machin, 2011), (Nguyen-Hoang & Yinger, 2011) and (Machin, 2011). There is a consensus
estimate of around 3–4 percent house price premium for one standard deviation increase
in school average test scores.
4See (Black, 1999), (Agarwal, Rengarajan, Sing, & Yang, 2016) , (Andreyeva &
Patrick, 2017), (Davidoff & Leigh, 2008), (Fack & Grenet, 2010), (Gibbons, Machin, &
Silva, 2013), among others.
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affect property values. Our work adds to the existing works of (Linden &
Rockoff, 2008) and (J. C. Pope, 2008), who analyze how proximity to the
home of a registered sex offender decreases house prices, and to the work of
(Abadie & Dermisi, 2008), (Gautier et al., 2009), and (Ratcliffe & von Hinke,
2015) who analyze the effects of terrorism.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes
the data used in our analysis. Section 3 describes our empirical method-
ology. Section 4 presents the empirical results, and section 5 explores the
mechanisms that explain our key results. Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Data
We combine data from two main sources. First, we use arm’s length real
estate transaction data for the period 1996-2017 for the school districts that
were affected by mass shooting in schools, and for the neighboring districts
that were unaffected.5 We merge these data with assessment records using a
unique property identifier for each property to ascertain the characteristics
of the house. Both, the real estate transaction data and assessment records,
come from Corelogic Inc., a national real estate company. The data contain
information on transaction, price, and date of sale, along with the geographic
coordinates of the house and characteristics of the house like size, age, number
of bedrooms, baths, presence of garage, fireplace etc.6
We match the sales data to the school districts by using the latitude and
longitude coordinates of the property. The school-district boundary maps
are obtained from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). We
5The counties used in our analysis include Craighead, Greene, Lawrence, Jackson,
Poinsett in Arkansas; Lane in Oregon; Jefferson, Park, Clear Creek, Gilpin, Boulder,
Adams, Denver, Araphoe in Colorado; Rockdale, Dekalb, Gwinnett; Walton; Newton and
Henry in Georgia; San Diego, Lake, Modoc, Lassen, Pulmas, Sierra, Nevada, Placer, El
Dorado in California; Beltrami, Marshall, Clearwater, Pennigton, Polk in Minnesota; Or-
ange, Almance, Durham, Chatam, Caswell, Person in North Carolina; Lancaster, Chester
in Pennsylvania; Multnomah, Clackmass in Oregon; Cuyahoga in Ohio; Saginaw, Bay in
Michigan, Geauga, Lake in Ohio, New haven, Fairfield, Litchfield in Connecticut; Washoe,
Harney, Carson City, Churchill, Douglas, Humboldt, Lyon, Pershing, Storey in Nevada
and Snohomish in Washington.
6We drop transactions with sales prices in top and bottom 1 percent of the distribution
for each county to eliminate outliers. We also clean the data to remove outliers for any
other property characteristics. We normalize the sale prices using quarterly Case-Shiller
Home Price Indices for each state to September 2017.
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also identify the corresponding census tract by overlaying the transaction
data with Census Tract shapefile (2010 definition) obtained from the U.S.
Census Bureau.
Second, we use data for mass shootings in America from the Stanford
Mass Shootings of America (MSA) data project (courtesy of the Stanford
Geospatial Center and Stanford Libraries). The project started in 2012 in
reaction to the Sandy Hook mass shooting incident in Connecticut, and col-
lects data from online media sources. The project defines mass shootings as
those that involve three or more victims (not necessarily fatalities), exclud-
ing the shooter. The shootings do not include those that are gang-, drug- or
organized crime-related. The dataset includes the time, date, and location of
the shooting, along with number of victims and number of fatalities. It also
indicates whether the shooting took place at a school or not. We consider
all mass shootings at schools that happened after the year 1998.7
These data do not include socio-demographic information about homeown-
ers, although it is very rich and descriptive about house prices and amenities.
In order to describe the setting, we therefore use census information at the
census tract level prior to the shootings (i.e. we use census 1990 data) merged
to the affected and non-affected school districts. The first three columns of
Table I present average socio-demographic characteristics for census tracts
located within an affected school district (treatment), census tracts located
within adjacent school districts (controls), and census tracts in the rest of the
country. Column (4) presents the p-value of a difference in means between
treated and control areas.
Treated and control census tracts differ across majority of characteristics.
In general, control areas are wealthier, have a bigger share of white pop-
ulation, less unemployment, more female labor force, and a bigger share of
college graduates. Treated areas, on the contrary, are much similar to the av-
erage census tract with a population of around 3,200, a median home value of
$93,000, a share of white people close to 80%, and a share of college graduates
close to 12%. These results suggest a big degree or preexisting differences
among treated and control areas. Additionally, we also use crime data at the
city level from City-Data.com and the school enrollment and data on number
of teachers from National Center for Education Statistics (NCES).
7The date and episodes are presented in Appendix Table 1.
51
2.3 Empirical Strategy
2.3.1 Effect of Mass Shootings on House Prices
Individuals choose where to live based on many factors such as housing char-
acteristics, school quality, local amenities, proximity to labor markets, etc.
This individual sorting usually hinders any potential estimation of the effect
of crime on housing values. It is expected that there is higher demand for
areas with low crime rates but is also the case that crime is endogenously de-
termined in certain locations. Furthermore, unobserved characteristics also
play an important role by including potential confounding factors into the
estimation.
School shootings, however, are isolated exogenous episodes that homeown-
ers and buyers are not able to predict. They occur in a random fashion,
and thus enable a potential estimation framework free of confounding factors
such as individual sorting.
The key empirical challenge, nonetheless, is finding a valid counterfac-
tual distribution - i.e., what would have happened if the shooting had not
taken place. We, therefore, use a difference-in-differences strategy to com-
pare house prices in the school district where shooting took place (“treated”
school district) to the adjacent school districts (“control” school districts).8
This strategy estimates the ex-post average price difference between treated
and control areas by taking into account the preexisting differences across
locations. We will call this our main specification.
We append 15 shooting episodes from 1998 to 2014, and analyze a time
window of three years before and after the episode. We also explore longer-
term effects by varying the temporal window around the incident. Figure 2
describes our strategy using a map for Fairfield County, Connecticut, where
the Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting took place in 2012. The blue
8We use school-district boundaries instead of school-attendance zones (as treated and
control units) because the attendance boundaries are not available for some of the schools
in our datasets. Moreover, it is more difficult to clearly identify the control areas (which
are the adjacent areas to the treated unit) for our analysis as the attendance zones overlap.
The advantage of using school district-level data is that the schools within the district are
subject to the same policies and regulations. For more information on the advantages of
school district boundaries see (Dhar & Ross, 2012). The other key advantage of using
school-district boundaries is that they do not change much. To our knowledge, for our
sample, the school district boundary has changed only for one school.
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triangle plots the exact location where the shooting took place. The red area
marks the affected school district, whereas the green areas plot the adjacent
school districts. Areas in grey are dropped. Our strategy compares the red
and green areas.
The estimating equation for the effects of mass shootings on house prices
is, therefore:
˜ln(pijt) =α + β1Tij + β2(Tj ∗ 1(After shooting)t) + γXit + µt (2.1)
+ Census Tract Fixed Effects +
14∑
(k=1)
µt × 1(episode)k + εijt
Where l̃n(pijt) is the log of the deflated house price for property i in school
district j in year t. Tj is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if
the property is inside the treated school district and zero otherwise. Xit is a
matrix of observable housing characteristics such as log of building area, log
of land area, dummy for condos, fireplace, brick construction, etc. We include
year-month fixed effects (µt) to control for time trends and census tracts fixed
effects to control for the unobserved characteristics of the neighborhood. We
also include episode specific time trends (µt ∗ 1(episode)k) to account for
time-varying trends across episodes.9 εijt is the error term. Standard errors
are clustered at the census-tract level.
It is worth noting that the treated area is the school district, and thus our
strategy is based on an economic intuition. Homeowners in treated school
districts are likely to be affected as their children are likely to attend the
affected school, whereas homeowners in control areas are eligible to enroll
their children outside the affected school district. Thus, the shooting episode
affects homeowners in the entire school district and not only those living
closer to the school.10
The difference-in-difference estimator controls for preexisting differences
across treated and control areas. However, to further reduce the concern
about preexisting differences we employ two alternative strategies as robust-
91(episode)k is a dummy that equals one if the observation corresponds to mass shoot-
ing episode k which is interacted with time to control for differing time trends across the
regions.
10The previous literature usually defines treated areas to be within an arbitrary radius
around the place of the episode. Our strategy does not rely on this, but instead defines
treated areas as areas within a given school district where the shooting took place.
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ness checks. First, we use an alternative identification strategy which com-
pares the affected school districts with the adjacent ones, but restricts the
sample to observations within half mile from the school-district boundary.
Figure 3 describes this strategy for the shooting in Orange High School, NC,
in 2006. The different colors represent the distance from the border. We
use the properties marked in blue inside and outside the border as treated
and control locations, respectively.11 The estimation strategy is the same
as equation (1), but includes properties which are physically closer and are,
thus, likely to be similar in observed and unobserved amenities.
Second, in order to reduce preexisting differences, we additionally employ a
propensity score matching approach in which we match census tracts based
on observable characteristics. First, we identify the census tracts within
treated and control school districts and compute a propensity score based on
observable attributes prior to the shooting (we use 1990 census data). Second,
we match treated and control census tracts using a kernel that computes
weights that minimize the observable differences between both distributions
using the propensity score. Lastly, we merge these weights into the individual
data and compute a reweighting estimator for equation (1) that is balanced
in the pretreatment period and further controls for preexisting unobserved
heterogeneity. Columns (5) and (6) of Table I show the average value of
the observed characteristics weighted by such kernel weights. Column (7)
presents the p-values of a difference in means test. The weights balance
quite closely the treatment and control areas.
2.3.2 Effect of Mass Shootings on Number of Sales
In addition to the effect of school shootings on sales prices, we also estimate
the change in number of transactions taking place after the shooting. We
aggregate the data at the census tract - year level for one to three years
before and after the incident. We then estimate the following difference-in-
11We vary the width of the radius around the border in the section detailing robustness
checks. The results are consistent across different specifications.
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differences specification.
ln(Sales)jt =α + β1Tj + β2(Tj ∗ 1(After shooting)t) + Year Fixed Effects
(2.2)
+ Census Tract Fixed Effects + εijt
Where ln(Sales)jt is the number of sales in census tract j in year t, Tj is
a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the census tract is in the
school district where shooting took place, and 1(After shooting)t is a dummy
that equals one for observations after the shooting. We also include year and
census tract fixed effects, and εijt represents the error term.
2.4 Results
In this section, we present the graphical evidence and our key findings.
2.4.1 Graphical Evidence
The key identifying assumption for our difference-in-differences strategy is
the parallel trends assumption (i.e., house prices had similar time trends in
treated and control areas before the mass shooting took place).
Figure 4 presents the evolution of house prices in treated and control areas
for three years before and after the shooting.12 Panel (a) compares the school
district where shooting took place to the adjacent school districts, while Panel
(b) includes only properties within a half mile of the school district boundary.
The pre-trends seems to be similar across the treated and control areas in
both panels.
If mass shootings in schools negatively affect housing prices in the school
district, then we should expect a decrease in prices after the incident. This
decrease should be, at least, larger in the affected school district as opposed
to the adjacent ones. Figure 4 suggests that there is an immediate decrease
in the price of properties in treated as well as in neighboring school districts.
However, the decrease is larger in the affected school districts, and, in partic-
12Mass shootings took place at different times across the region. Thus, we normalize
the time with time period zero reflecting the date of the shooting.
55
ular, for properties near the school district boundary. This evidence supports
the fact that school shootings decrease property prices, in particular, among
residents near the school district boundary. The ex-post decline in prices
reflects the causal effect of school shooting on house prices.
2.4.2 Main Results
In columns (1) to (4) of Table II, we present the estimation result of equa-
tion (1), comparing house prices in affected and adjacent school districts
three year before the shootings to three year after the incident. For illus-
trative purposes, we first present estimates including only month-year and
census-tract fixed effects, but no other control variables (column 1). The
result suggests an average decline of 6.6 percent in affected school districts
as compared to house prices in the neighboring school districts over a three
year period.
In column (2), we include house characteristics to control for observable
heterogeneity in properties. Our most complete specification is shown in col-
umn (3) of Table II, where we include episode-specific time trends to account
for time varying heterogeneity across shooting episodes. Our estimates sug-
gest that housing prices decline by 7.8 percent in the school district where
shooting took place.
Finally, in column (4) we weigh each observation by the inverse of the total
number of transactions in each episode before the shooting.13 We estimate
an 11.1 percent decline in house prices when using the weighted regression.
This estimator reinforces our results and suggests that our findings are not
driven by any specific episode where higher number of transactions have
taken place.14
Next, we analyze whether the relative decline in house prices in affected
districts persist. We estimate equation (1) but compare prices three year
prior to the shooting with prices one to five years after the episode. The
results are presented in columns (5) to (9) of Table II, and are similar to
an event-study analysis. As column (5) shows prices decrease 9.3 percent
13We sum the number of transactions three years before shooting and weigh each ob-
servation by the inverse of this number.
14In addition, we estimate in Appendix Table II the same weighted regression but
excluding each episode separately. The results hold and are still robust meaning that one
episode is not explaining the entire result.
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during the first year after the shooting and then decline by 6.8 percent and
4.5 percent in the second and third year. We observe negative effects even
four to five years after the incident. This result implies that the effect of
shooting declines but persists up to almost five years in the aftermath of the
shooting.
2.4.3 Effect on Number of Transactions
The decline in prices may be explained by shifts in housing supply or demand
after the shooting. To understand what drives the decrease we estimate the
effect of shootings on the number of sales using equation (2). The results
are presented in Table III. Columns (1) to (3) present estimates for the
entire school district while Columns (4) to (6) present the result for area
half mile around the boundary. Columns (1) and (4) show results for the
effect of shooting when we include observations three year before and after
the shooting. Columns (2) and (5) include observations two years around
the shooting, and columns (3) and (6) repeat the analysis for one year before
and after the shooting.
The results are insignificant for the first year. The point estimates increase
in magnitude in the following years, revealing a decrease in the number of
transactions. After two years, for instance, the number of properties sold
in the affected school districts decrease by 8.3 percent and 13.9 percent af-
ter three years. We also find suggestive evidence of decline in number of
transactions in half mile area around the school district boundary but the
results are not statistically significant, probably due to small sample size.
Supply and demand analysis tells us that for prices and quantity (number
of transactions) to decrease jointly, the decrease in the demand for housing
must be larger than the possible increase in the supply of housing. If demand
decreases and supply remains steady, then we may observe a new equilibrium
with lower prices and quantities. However, the supply of housing can still
increase but not as much as the decrease in demand, and we can also observe
a decline in prices and quantities. The above results suggest, therefore, that
the underlying cause of the fall in prices in the wake of a school shooting is





We now analyze alternative specifications that minimize preexisting differ-
ences between treated and control school districts. We first restrict the anal-
ysis to properties near the school district boundary, which may be more
comparable in observed and unobserved characteristics. Then we use kernel
weights obtained from propensity score matching to estimate a weighted es-
timator that balances the sample of census tracts in the pretreatment period.
Table IV summarizes the results obtained from the regression where we
restrict our analysis to houses within half a mile of the school-district bound-
ary. We keep the same structure as Table II. The results suggest that mass
shootings decrease property values by 13.6 percent (column 3) over a three
year period after the shooting among households who live near the school
district border. This result is again robust to alternative specifications and
weighing strategy.15 The effect on properties near the boundary persists as
suggested by columns (5) to (8) suggest. In fact, in the first year after the
shooting we observe a 17.2 percent decrease in house prices, although such
effect decreases monotonically in magnitude.
We then present the results using the propensity score weights in Table
V. These estimates resemble a reweighting estimator that balances the ob-
servable characteristics between treated and control census tracts. The point
estimate suggests a 3.5 percent decline and remains statistically significant.
These results suggest that the estimated effects are robust to alternative
methods that further control for preexisting differences among treated and
control areas.
2.5.2 Falsification Tests
To test the robustness of the previous estimates, we next need to determine
whether the shooting was indeed uncorrelated with any other observable
or unobservable factor. Moreover, there is a possibility that the estimated
decrease in home values is a result of differential trends between affected
15In Appendix Table III we vary the radius around the boundary. We show that the
effect is not driven by picking particular radius around the boundary.
58
and non-affected areas before the shooting. This would be a serious concern
for our estimates because if the affected areas were experiencing a relatively
slower decline in prices, our findings could be due to a spurious negative effect.
To test for these concerns, we perform placebo experiments by leveraging the
length of our transaction dataset. Instead of using the actual year of the mass
shooting, we use false shooting dates two, three, and four years before the
actual shooting. We estimate the placebo test for the entire school district
and for properties within a half mile boundary of the school district, and
re-estimate equation (1) using a one-year windows before and after the fake
episode.16
The results of the placebo experiments are presented in Table VI. Neither of
the six specifications reveal a negative and significant decline after the fake
episode, suggesting no systematic differences between treated and control
areas previous to the shooting. These results suggest that the decline in
housing prices after the shooting is indeed a result of the mass shooting
itself.
2.5.3 Composition of Houses
A final potential concern is the possibility that the types of houses being
sold before and after the incident are different. This could happen if the
potential sellers of expensive houses in affected school districts had decided
to postpone placing their houses on the market in the hope that housing
prices would eventually recover after some time passed. Thus, our results
might not be capturing the dis-amenity due to mass shootings but instead
might be reflecting the changes in composition of houses being sold by virtue
of a market characterized by having more houses available at the lower end
of the price range and fewer houses available at the higher end of the market.
To test this we compare the observable characteristics of the houses sold
before and after the incident. We use the same model as in equation (1), but
instead of using house prices as the dependent variable, we include one-by-
one the housing characteristics. Results are presented in Table VII. We do
not find any evidence of changes in composition of houses on the market.
16We use one-year windows because we do not have enough observations for all the
episodes to estimate three-year windows in the pre-shooting period that do not include
observations after the shooting.
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2.6 Mechanisms
The relationship between crime and property values may be explained by
many potential channels. Perhaps the most prominent channel is that hous-
ing demand in high-crime areas is low because individuals do not want to
personally experience crime. However, the probability that a school district
experiences a shooting again is very low, and is no different from the proba-
bility that any other school district experiences its first school shooting.
In fact, we test for this by estimating a difference-in-differences model at
the city level using yearly crime rates from 2002 to 2016 as the dependent
variable. We use cities where the school shooting took place as treated units
and neighboring cities as controls.17 The results are presented in Table VIII.
Each column uses the number of crimes per 100,000 as dependent variable,
except for column (9) that uses a principal component index computed using
the previous eight columns. The results provide suggestive evidence of decline
in crime. Therefore, increase in crime (i.e. a higher probability of repetition)
is not the reason for the decline in house prices.
Two other potential channels might be driving the observed decrease in de-
mand for affected areas. First, parents might want to avoid the area because
of a possible decline in perceived school quality. (Beland & Kim, 2016),
in fact, find strong evidence of a decrease in school quality after a school
shooting. School shootings may give strong negative signals to homebuyers
about the quality of the schools within the school district and also about the
future quality of those schools. Second, place based stigmas may motivate
people to avoid the area in general. Both explanations may shift the demand
for housing in a particular location, and may coexist in the case of school
shootings. We find strong evidence for the mechanism concerning perceived
school quality, but not for the mechanism concerning broader social stigma.
2.6.1 Deterioration of School Quality
If deterioration in school quality is driving the results, we would expect the
effects to be stronger for families with school-age children. In our dataset,
we cannot directly observe which families have children. Thus, we use the
number of bedrooms in a house as a proxy for family size because families
17This analysis does not cover all of the cities but only cities where data was available.
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are likely to have houses with more bedrooms. Our prior assumption posits
that houses with more bedrooms will witness a larger decrease in prices as
compared to houses with fewer bedrooms.
In Table IX, we estimate equation (1) for properties with one, two, three,
and four bedrooms. In the last two columns we pooled properties with fewer
and more than two bedrooms. We find that the effect becomes stronger as the
number of bedrooms increases, whereas one-bedroom houses have a positive
point estimate. These estimates support the fact that families with children
are driving the price decrease, presumably because of a deterioration in the
perceived school quality, or a desire to avoid low quality schools.
To explain the mechanism better, we test whether school quality has deteri-
orated after shooting. We observe a remarkable decrease in school enrollment
and the number of teachers, which is in line with (Beland & Kim, 2016). In
Table X, we present difference-in-difference estimates at the school level using
the number of students and teachers as dependent variable. Columns (1) and
(2) present the results on enrollment, whereas columns (3) and (4) present
the results for the number of teachers. We present only the interaction term
of the difference-in-differences model, and in columns (1) and (3) we define
treated schools as those within the school district of the school where the
shooting occur. In the remaining columns we estimate separately the effect
for the schools where the shooting occurred and for neighboring schools that
are within the affected school district but did not experience the shooting
directly.
The results show an overall decrease of 16 percent in enrollment and 8
percent in the number of teachers among all the schools within the school
district where the shooting occurred. When we look separately at the schools
where the shooting took place we see a bigger reduction of 17.6 percent in
enrollment and 12.6 percent in the number of teachers. Furthermore, in
neighboring schools within the affected school district (excluding the directly
affected one) we also observe a decrease of 7.5 percent in enrollment and
5.2 percent in the number of teachers, although the latter is not precisely
estimated.
These results suggest that school shootings reduce enrollment and the num-
ber of teachers across the entire school district. In fact, not only schools
where the shooting took place where affected, but we also find some spillover
effects to neighboring schools within the same school district. This argument
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reinforces the mechanism that school quality deteriorates after shooting and
results in decline in house prices.
Finally, if deterioration in school quality is the key reason for decline in
house prices, then we should not expect prices of commercial and industrial
properties to decline. Thus, we estimate equation (1) for non-residential
properties and present the results in Appendix Table IV. The coefficients
of these regressions turn out to be positive and insignificant, suggesting no
effect on prices of non-residential properties.
2.6.2 Place-Based Stigmas
To determine if place-based stigmas, and not valuation of school quality,
explain the decrease in demand for housing we analyze what happens with
housing values within the school district. In particular, the entire school
district has to experience a decrease in prices if perceived school quality
is what really declined. That is, if stigmas about the area led to decline
in prices, then properties closer to the shooting will have a larger decrease
in prices compared to the ones farther away, but if school quality concerns
drive the decreases, then everyone within the district will experience a price
decrease. To test for this, we limit our estimation to properties close to the
shooting, and compare the effect on properties within this limited range of
houses.
Following (Linden & Rockoff, 2008) and (J. C. Pope, 2008), we construct
radius of 0.3, 0.5, and one mile around the school, and compare property
value inside these radii to properties outside of it. For consistency, we again
restrict the time frame to three years before and after the shooting. The
results of these estimations are presented in Table XI. Columns (1) to (3)
include properties within three miles of the shooting, whereas columns (4)
to (6) include properties within five miles.
We do not find any differential effects among properties closer to and far-
ther from the affected schools. The point estimates are not statistically
different from zero. These results suggest that stigmas may not be driv-
ing the result; if they were, properties closer to the school would have been
“more stigmatized” than properties farther away. Instead, the results imply
a general erosion of property values within the entire school district. This
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supports our contention that valuation of school quality drives the shift in
demand, and not potential place based stigmas.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we estimate the effect of mass shooting in schools using a
difference-in-differences framework. We find that, on average, the home val-
ues in affected school districts decrease by 7.8 percent (or $15,051) one year
after the shooting. The effect is stronger when we look at homes closer to the
school district boundary (about 13.6 percent or $20,337).18 We also observe
some persistence in this effect for, at least, five years throughout the district.
Additionally, we find a decrease in the number of transactions taking place
after the shooting.
Furthermore, we find strong evidence that our results are driven by the
trauma witnessed by school children and perceived deterioration in school
quality. Literature has suggested that schools are a highly valued amenity
among households. Our results validate these findings and suggest that po-
tential homebuyers avoid school districts in which a shooting has taken place,
and that school quality decreases (lower enrollment rates, scores etc.) after
the shooting. We do not find much evidence of place based stigmas as being
the mechanism for decline in house prices.
The magnitude we estimate for the entire school district (around 7.8 per-
cent over a three-year period) is slightly larger compared to previous esti-
mates of the effects of schooling outcomes on property values. For instance,
(Black, 1999) estimates a 2.5 percent increase in housing values for a 5 per-
cent increase in test school scores, whereas (Gibbons et al., 2013) estimate
a 3 percent increase in prices for an increase of one standard deviation in
average value added.
The decrease in prices we find near the school-district boundary (around
13.6 percent) is comparable to the dis-amenity found by (Linden & Rockoff,
2008) in work conducted in North Carolina that examines the effect on prices
of houses in close proximity to the residence of a registered sex offender (a
18The average price of houses in affected school districts prior to the shooting was
around $192,961. A 7.8 percent decrease then implies a decrease of approximately $15,051.
The average value of a house near the school-district boundary was $149,539, so a 13.6
percent decrease is equivalent to approximately $20,337.
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decline of 11.6 percent). Our results are also similar to the effects on house
prices that stem from the discovery of a cancer cluster of child leukemia (a
decline in values of 14 percent) ((Davis, 2004)), and the temporary, one-year
effect of getting a school quality rating of “A” rather than “B” (20 percent)
found by (Figlio & Lucas, 2004).
Overall, our results suggest that households have a strong preference to
reside in a good school district. Incidents such as school shootings that
deteriorate the school quality, might therefore lead to decline in house prices
in that school district. Future research is needed to understand how to deal
with locations affected by crime shocks, particularly with school- related
crime.
Figure 2.1: Number of Mass Shootings 2000-2016
Note: Data source is the Stanford Mass Shooting in America data
Project. Episodes included had more than three victims and were
not drugs, gangs, or organized crime related.
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Figure 2.2: Sandy Hook and Adjacent School Districts
Note:This map plots Sandy Hook school district in
Newton, CT. The blue triangle indicates the location
of the 2012 shooting. The red area indicates the af-
fected school district whereas the green area the adja-
cent school districts.
Figure 2.3: Distance of Properties to Border in Orange School District, NC
Note: This map plots Orange County, NC County.
The red cross indicates the location of Orange high
school, where a shooting took place in 2006. The dif-
ferent colors show the distance to the school district
boundary.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics at the Census Tract Level for Affected and
Non-affected School Districts
Raw Weighted
Covariate Treated Controls Rest P-values Treated Controls P-values
(1) vs (2) (5) vs (6)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Population 3217.9 3337.2 3423.7 0.094 3269.7 3267.0 0.967
Median Home Value 93003.3 112291.2 101291.1 0.000 97926.3 98490.8 0.810
Median Rent 415.8 462.0 391.9 0.000 424.5 434.4 0.112
Income Per Capita 14054.6 16066.7 14447.5 0.000 14425.5 14738.0 0.167
Median Household Income 31940.4 35519.4 32079.0 0.000 33138.3 33702.3 0.306
Percentage White 80.1% 82.6% 83.2% 0.026 83.7% 85.0% 0.219
Percentage Black 15.1% 10.6% 10.9% 0.000 11.2% 10.1% 0.276
Percentage Hispanic 4.9% 6.6% 6.9% 0.000 5.3% 5.0% 0.306
Labor force 50.4% 53.2% 49.5% 0.000 51.8% 52.0% 0.435
Employment Rate 91.6% 94.5% 93.3% 0.000 93.1% 93.3% 0.404
Unemployment Rate 8.4% 5.5% 6.7% 0.000 6.9% 6.7% 0.404
Manufacturing Share 16.7% 16.7% 17.3% 0.830 16.2% 16.5% 0.497
Female Labor Force 58.9% 61.3% 56.6% 0.000 60.3% 60.6% 0.490
Self-Employment Share 6.6% 7.4% 7.7% 0.000 6.9% 6.9% 0.925
Share College Graduates 12.0% 17.1% 13.0% 0.000 12.6% 12.8% 0.477
Percentage Married 40.4% 43.2% 43.4% 0.000 41.9% 42.2% 0.408
Poverty Rate 14.2% 9.9% 12.8% 0.000 12.2% 11.3% 0.059
White Poverty Rate 7.1% 6.1% 7.8% 0.000 7.3% 7.1% 0.597
Percentage of Old Houses 39.0% 32.4% 40.1% 0.000 35.0% 35.6% 0.627
Note: This table presents summary statistics from the census 1990 at the census tract level. Columns
(1)-(3) presents mean values using raw data. Columns (5) and (6) present weighted mean values that
use weights from a kernel propensity score matching algorithm. Census tracts are matched using 1990
characteristics, and the sample is restricted to the common support. Columns (4) and (7) present the
p-values of a difference in means test between affected and non-affected school districts for the raw and
the weighted averages, respectively.
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Figure 2.4: Price Evolution before and After the Shooting of Affected and
Adjacent School Districts
(a) All School District (b) Half Mile from Boundary
Note:Both panels present the results of a kernel-weighted local polynomial regres-
sion for treated and control areas. Bottom panel includes only properties within
half mile to the school district boundary, whereas the top panel includes the full
school district. The plots include observations three years before and after the
shooting.
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Table 2.2: Average Effect of School Shootings in the School District
Dependent Variable : ln(Price)
3 year window around the shooting Persistence (Comparing to three years before episode)
<1 year 1-2 years 2-3 years 3-4 years 4-5 years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1(Within Affected SD) -0.066*** -0.075*** -0.078*** -0.111*** -0.093*** -0.068*** -0.045*** -0.038*** -0.046***
*1(After Shooting) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.016) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Observations 797,611 797,611 797,611 797,611 484,259 495,798 492,208 478,298 470,415
R-squared 0.643 0.752 0.758 0.706 0.764 0.769 0.773 0.769 0.761
Year*Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Census Tract FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Property Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Episode Specific Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weighted Regression Yes
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the deflated price per property. Estimations include all properties within the school
district. Columns (1) to (4) include observations three years before and after the shooting. Columns (5) to (9) compares
observations three years before with observations 1,1-2, 2-3, 3-4, and 4-5 years after the shooting, respectively. Property
characteristics include the log of area of land, the log of area of building, a dummy for whether or not is an apartment, a
dummy if the property has a fireplace, a dummy if the house is constructed with brick, and the number of bedrooms. The
regression in column 4 weighs the observations by the inverse of the total number of properties sold within each episode.
Standard errors clustered at the census tract level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.3: Effect of School Shooting on the Number of Sales at the Census
Tract Level
Dependent Variable: ln(Sales)
Full School District Half Mile Around Boundary
+3\-3 yr +2\-2 yr +1\-1 yr +3\-3 yr +2\-2 yr +1\-1 yr
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1(Within Affected SD) -0.139*** -0.083* 0.016 -0.101 -0.039 -0.023
*1(After Shooting) (0.044) (0.045) (0.051) (0.078) (0.083) (0.110)
Observations 14,331 4,804 4,744 3,049 1,055 2,924
R-squared 0.725 0.826 0.777 0.727 0.825 0.850
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Census Tract FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Property Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: These regressions are done at the census tract-year level. The dependent variable
is the log of the number of sales at the census tract and year. Columns (1) to (3) include
the full school district. Columns (4) to (6) include properties one mile from boundary.
Columns (1) and (4) include observations on the number of transactions three years before
and after the shooting. Columns (2) and (5) include observations of the number of trans-
actions two years before and after the episode. Columns (3) and (6) include observations
of the number of transactions one year before and after the shooting. Property charac-
teristics include the average log of area of land, the log of area of building, percentage of
apartments, percentage of condos, percentage of properties with fireplace, percentage of
properties constructed with brick, and the average number of bedrooms. Standard errors
clustered at the census tract level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.4: Effect of School Shootings in Properties Half Mile around School District Boundary
Dependent Variable : ln(Price)
3 year window around the shooting Persistence (Comparing to three years before episode)
¡1 year 1-2 years 2-3 years 3-4 years 4-5 years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1(Within Affected SD) -0.144*** -0.142*** -0.136*** -0.176*** -0.172*** -0.133*** -0.107*** -0.100*** -0.118***
*1(After Shooting) (0.039) (0.038) (0.036) (0.042) (0.044) (0.042) (0.031) (0.028) (0.030)
Observations 59,948 59,948 59,948 59,948 38,896 38,754 38,367 37,093 36,992
R-squared 0.670 0.711 0.718 0.679 0.697 0.698 0.698 0.700 0.691
Year*Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Census Tract FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Property Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Episode Specific Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weighted Regression Yes
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the deflated price per property. Estimations include properties within 1 mile of the
school district boundary. Columns (1) to (4) include observations three years before and after the shooting. Columns (5) to
(9) compares observations three years before with observations 1,1-2, 2-3, 3-4, and 4-5 years after the shooting, respectively.
Property characteristics include the log of area of land, the log of area of building, a dummy for whether or not is an apartment,
a dummy if the property has a fireplace, a dummy if the house is constructed with brick, and the number of bedrooms. The
regression in column 4 weighs the observations by the inverse of the total number of properties sold within each episode.
Standard errors clustered at the census tract level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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1(Within Affected SD)*1(After Shooting) -0.026* -0.035** -0.046***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
Constant 6.867*** 2.009*** 113.709***
(0.041) (0.081) (42.381)
Observations 771,530 771,530 771,530
R-squared 0.640 0.731 0.738
Year*Month FE Yes Yes Yes
Census Tract FE Yes Yes Yes
Property Characteristics Yes Yes
Episode Specific Trend Yes
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the deflated price per property.
Estimations include all properties within census tracts matched with a kernel
propensity score algorithm using census 1990 characteristics at the census
tract level. All observations are weighted by the kernel weights generated in
the propensity score algorithms. Property characteristics include the log of
area of land, the log of area of building, a dummy for whether or not is an
apartment, a dummy if the property has a fireplace, a dummy if the house
is constructed with brick, and the number of bedrooms. Standard errors
clustered at the census tract level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.6: Falsification Test using Placebo Episodes Prior to the Shooting
Dependent Variable: ln(Price)
Full School District Half Mile Around Boundary
2 years before 3 years before 4 years before 2 years before 3 years before 4 years before
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1(Within Affected SD) 0.006 -0.024 -0.007 0.025 -0.016 -0.016
(0.027) (0.033) (0.036) (0.035) (0.038) (0.043)
1(After X years before -0.004 0.008 -0.010 -0.019 0.017 0.003
shooting)*1(Within SD) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Observations 223,916 198,927 158,096 19,263 17,988 15,825
R-squared 0.751 0.759 0.755 0.706 0.727 0.724
Census Tract FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year*Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Episode Specific Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Property Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the deflated price per property. Columns (1) to (3) include the full school district.
Columns (4) and (6) include properties half a mile from boundary. Columns (1) and (4) use a dummy that takes the value of
one for a placebo test two prior to the shooting. Columns (2) and (5) use a dummy that takes the value of one for a placebo
test three years prior to the shooting. Columns (3) and (6) use a dummy that takes the value of one for a placebo test four
years prior to the shooting. All regressions include a one year window before and after the placebo shooting date. Property
characteristics include the log of area of land, the log of area of building, a dummy for whether or not is an apartment, a
dummy if the property has a fireplace, a dummy if the house is constructed with brick, and the number of bedrooms. Standard
errors clustered at the census tract level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.7: Balance Test of Housing Characteristics
Full School District Half Mile Around Boundary
House Characteristic Coefficient Std. Error P-value Coefficient Std. Error P-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1(Fireplace) 0.040 0.033 0.228 0.010 0.024 0.668
1(Brick) -0.044 0.034 0.194 -0.020 0.023 0.391
1(Condo) 0.057 0.037 0.120 0.036 0.023 0.114
Number of Bedrooms -0.002 0.061 0.971 -0.051 0.078 0.512
ln(land) 0.135 0.159 0.395 0.250 0.160 0.119
ln(Building) -0.040 0.024 0.097 -0.015 0.032 0.650
Years Since Built 4.017 2.200 0.068 1.001 1.446 0.489
Note: Each row of the table presents a different housing characteristic. We estimate a
linear regression using equation (1) and varying the outcome. Columns (1) to (3) include
observations in the complete school district. Columns (4) to (6) include properties half
mile around the boundary. Coefficients, standard errors, and p-values associated with the
treatment parameter are presented.
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Table 2.8: Average Effect on Crime
Dependent Variable: Crime Rate PCA index
Murders Rapes Robberies Assaults Burglaries Thefts Auto Thefts Arson
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1(Within Affected City) -0.532 -5.155 -9.161 -104.704*** -85.046 261.614** -133.462*** -18.292* -24.523
*1(After Shooting) (1.300) (4.099) (15.465) (37.139) (85.028) (117.979) (27.772) (10.247) (17.907)
Observations 1,514 1,490 1,491 1,476 1,474 1,474 1,475 1,450 1,474
R-squared 0.447 0.589 0.837 0.799 0.784 0.823 0.752 0.496 0.854
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Regressions are estimated at the city level using the affected city as treated and surrounding cities as controls. All
dependent variables are rates per 100,000, except for the PCA index in column (9) which corresponds to a principal component
index of the variables in columns (1) to (8). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.9: Average Effect of School Shootings by House Size
1 BR 2 BR 3 BR 4 BR Less than 2 BR More than 2 BR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1(Within Affected SD)*1(After Shooting) 0.084*** -0.036*** -0.054*** -0.118*** -0.033** -0.087***
(0.032) (0.013) (0.011) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012)
Observations 24,556 155,870 386,242 183,028 180,426 617,185
R-squared 0.805 0.792 0.732 0.765 0.787 0.753
Census Tract FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year*Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Episode Specific Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Property Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the deflated price per property. All specifications include properties with different
number of bedrooms. Column (5) and (6) pool together properties with less and more than two bedrooms, respectively.
Property characteristics include the log of area of land, the log of area of building, a dummy for whether or not is an
apartment, a dummy if the property has a fireplace, a dummy if the house is constructed with brick, and the number of
bedrooms. Standard errors clustered at the census tract level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.10: Average Effect on School Enrollment and Number of Teachers
Dependent Variable: Ln(Enrollment) Dependent Variable: Ln(Teachers)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1(Affected SD)*1(After Shooting) -0.161*** -0.083*
(0.042) (0.044)
1(Affected School)*1(After Shooting) -0.176** -0.126*
(0.085) (0.069)
1(Surrounding School within SD)*1(After Shooting) -0.075* -0.052
(0.042) (0.035)
Constant 6.103*** 5.537*** 3.341*** 2.561***
(0.065) (0.097) (0.061) (0.073)
Observations 26,115 26,115 25,255 25,255
R-squared 0.254 0.818 0.315 0.820
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Episode FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
School District FE Yes Yes
School FE Yes Yes
Note: Regressions are done at the school level using the total number of students and teachers as dependent variable. Columns
(1) and (3) present the pooled effect for all the schools within the affected school district. Columns (2) and (4) present results
separately for the schools where the shooting occurred, and non-affected schools within the affected school district. Columns
(1) and (3) include school district fixed effects. Columns (2) and (4) include school fixed effects. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.11: Average Effect of School Shootings Using as Treatment a
Radius around Affected School
Properties within 3 Miles Properties within 5 Miles
0.3 Mile 0.5 Mile 1 Mile 0.3 Mile 0.5 Mile 1 Mile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1(Within X Mi.)*1(After Shooting) 0.050 -0.002 -0.003 0.055 0.001 0.010
(0.065) (0.043) (0.022) (0.065) (0.044) (0.023)
Observations 49,229 49,229 49,229 109,924 109,924 109,924
R-squared 0.735 0.735 0.735 0.734 0.734 0.734
Year*Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Episode Specific Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Property Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Census Tract FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the deflated price per property. Columns (1) to (3) include only
observations within a three mile radius from school shooting. Columns (4) to (6) include only observations
within a five mile radius from school shooting. Columns (1) and (4) use properties within 0.3 miles around
the school as treated units. Columns (2) and (6) use as treatment properties within 0.5 miles around the
school. Columns (3) and (6) use as treatment properties within one mile around the school. Property
characteristics include the log of area of land, the log of area of building, a dummy for whether or not is
an apartment, a dummy if the property has a fireplace, a dummy if the house is constructed with brick,




UNBUNDLING RETURNS TO SKILLS
AND DEGREES: EVIDENCE FROM
POST-SECONDARY EDUCATION IN
COLOMBIA
Mat́ıas Busso, Juan S. Muñoz, and Sebastián Montaño
3.1 Introduction
There is a long-standing tradition in economics of estimating returns to hu-
man capital by using the years of education with which the individual enters
the labor market. This paper shows that returns to education are not enough
to capture all the returns to human capital. We jointly estimate the labor
market returns to various types of postsecondary degrees as well as to sev-
eral types of skills (academic, specific and non-cognitive). We find that for
individuals who graduated from similar programs, a one standard deviation
increase in the measure of skills yields an average wage premium of 2 percent.
Similarly, for students of comparable skills, the market valuation of postsec-
ondary degrees is positive and varies widely with the length and quality of
the program.
We combine administrative records from a variety of sources to build a lon-
gitudinal data set that follows students from high school to college and into
the labor market. Students in Colombia are evaluated after high school grad-
uation by means of a mandatory standardized test (analogous to the SAT
in the United States) on mathematics, language (Spanish), foreign language,
and other subjects. We combine those data with information on students’
enrollment and graduation in postsecondary programs. For all college gradu-
ates we observe a rich set of characteristics including their field of study and
the length of the program. Students who are about to graduate from two-
and four-year colleges undergo evaluations on mathematics, literacy and for-
eign language, as well as on specific tests related to their field of studies (akin
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to the subject GRE). Furthermore, after graduation, Colombia’s Ministry of
Education surveys a subgroup of recent graduates in a follow-up survey that
contains measures of non-cognitive skills. We combine all these data with
records from the Colombian Social Security Administration that contain in-
formation on wages and employment characteristics.
We use an expanded Mincer earnings function to jointly estimate the labor
market returns to different types of degrees and skills. We assuage concerns
of an ability bias by controlling for a broad range of measures of both base-
line and contemporaneous skills as well as quality measures of the different
programs. A similar approach was taken recently, for instance, by Saiz and
Zoido (2005), Hanushek, Schwerdt, Wiederhold, and Woessmann (2015), and
Lindqvist and Vestman (2011).
We first estimate returns to finishing different types of higher education
degrees. We distinguish among four types: i) public two-year programs, ii)
private two-year programs, iii) public four-year programs, and iv) private
four-year programs. We find that the annual returns to graduating from a
four-year private school (instead of a two-year public program) are 6 per-
cent. Following MacLeod, Riehl, Saavedra, and Urquiola (2017), we com-
pute a measure of college reputation: for each individual the reputation of
her college is calculated as the average of the high school exit exam among
graduates in the same college. A one standard deviation in our measure of
college reputation carries a wage premium of 3 percent. There is also a large
heterogeneity in the returns by fields of study. Similarly to Kirkeboen, Leu-
ven, and Mogstad (2016), we find that the returns to certain fields are as
large as the returns to completing a four-year college.
We then estimate that, conditional on the degree, the program and its rep-
utation, an increase in one standard deviation in skills yields a wage return
of 2 percent. Returns to education are not enough to capture all the returns
to human capital. Returns to skills are fairly homogeneous. The returns to
purely academic skills, numeracy and literacy, are 2 and 2.5 percent, respec-
tively. Returns to foreign language are 1.6 percent. Returns to specific skills
are 2.2 percent and the wage premia to non-cognitive skills are 2.3 percent.1
1The estimates of returns to one year of education were obtained using the Integrated
79
Because tests scores are imperfect measures of a person’s skills, returns could
be biased towards zero. We provide instrumental variables estimates that use
high school exams as instruments to alleviate the attenuation bias potentially
caused by measurement error.
We explore different patterns of heterogeneity in the returns to skills. First,
consistent with Farber and Gibbons (1996), we find that the returns to those
skills that are less observable to the employer (numeracy and literacy), in-
crease with tenure in the firm while returns to a more easily observable skill
(such as foreign language) is constant. We assume that foreign language
skills are easier to evaluate in an interview than skills in numeracy or lit-
eracy. Second, individuals realize what we term “returns to specialization.”
For example, people who work or study in more math-oriented fields and
industries have a higher return to numeracy, whereas individuals who grad-
uate from social sciences have a larger return to literacy, and individuals
who work in tourism have a higher return to foreign language skills. Third,
returns to numeracy are higher for people graduating in most fields of study,
and working in most economic sectors. Fourth, we find that women have
more returns to foreign language skills than men.
This study contributes to a large literature estimating returns to skills.
Most of the previous literature provide estimates for developed countries.
Our estimates for Colombia, a developing country with relatively low quality
of education, fall within the range of estimates previously found in other stud-
ies. Returns to numeracy skills have been found to be on the order of 2 to 20
percent Levine and Zimmerman (1995); Murnane, Willett, and Levy (1995);
Tyler (2004); De Coulon, Marcenaro-Gutierrez, and Vignoles (2008); Song,
Orazem, and Wohlgemuth (2008); Joensen and Nielsen (2009); James (2013);
Hanushek et al. (2015). Returns to foreign language have been found to be
around 2.5 to 60 percent Bleakley and Chin (2004); Saiz and Zoido (2005);
Christofides and Swidinsky (2010); Azam, Chin, and Prakash (2013); Guo
and Sun (2014); Budŕıa and Swedberg (2015); Di Paolo and Tansel (2015);
Stöhr (2015). Returns to literacy have been found to be as high as 20 per-
cent Ishikawa and Ryan (2002); De Coulon et al. (2008); Fasih, Patrinos,
Household Survey data (GEIH, according to the Spanish acronym) and are available upon
request.
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and Sakellariou (2013); Hanushek et al. (2015); Sanders (2016). Several pa-
pers find that non-cognitive skills are valued in the labor market as much
as cognitive skills Bowles, Gintis, and Osborne (2001); Heckman, Stixrud,
and Urzua (2006); Lindqvist and Vestman (2011); Dasgupta, Mani, Sharma,
and Singhal (2017). Similarly to this literature, we find that field-specific
and non-cognitive skills are also as valued in the labor market as academic
skills are.2 To the best of our knowledge we are the first to estimate all these
measures jointly.
This paper also contributes to the literature analyzing the heterogeneity
in the returns to different types of postsecondary degrees on two dimensions
Hastings, Neilson, and Zimmerman (2013); Rodŕıguez, Urzúa, and Reyes
(2015); Kirkeboen et al. (2016); Busso, Dinkelman, Mart́ınez, and Romero
(2017).3 First, controlling for a wide range of measures of skills and for the
quality of the college (as measured by its reputation), we find that the types
of degrees as well as the field of study affects dramatically future income.
Second, we estimate the returns to college reputation and find that this mea-
sure leads to sizable increases in wages.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the
Colombian education system and the data used. Section 3.3 presents the re-
sults for the returns to skills and postsecondary degrees. Section 3.4 analyzes
the robustness and heterogeneity in the estimation of the returns to skills.
Section 3.5 then presents the robustness and heterogeneity in the estimation
to different types of postsecondary degrees. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Background and Data
Education in Colombia is divided into primary school (first to fifth year),
middle school (sixth to ninth year), high school (tenth and eleventh), and
postsecondary education. Programs in postsecondary education are divided
2Appendix Table C.1 summarizes the results, methodologies and samples used in pre-
vious studies.
3Several studies review the evidence of returns to education in Latin America. See for
instance, Psacharopoulos and Ng (1994), Behrman, Birdsall, and Székely (2007), Bassi,
Busso, Urzúa, and Vargas (2012), and Lustig, Lopez-Calva, and Ortiz-Juarez (2012).
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into college degrees (equivalent to a U.S. bachelor’s degree, with a duration
of four years) and two-year programs that offer vocational or technical in-
struction in different fields. We refer to all the institutions in postsecondary
education as colleges, regardless of the duration of the program.
During high school, students take classes in mathematics, language (Span-
ish), and foreign languages as part of the school curriculum. Around 95
percent of schools choose to teach English as a foreign language; therefore,
we refer to English and foreign language interchangeably. During postsec-
ondary education, the level and intensity of instruction in these areas depend
on the student’s major, but most institutions require a minimum of foreign
language knowledge as a graduation requirement.
After graduation, students’ abilities and qualifications are extremely valu-
able in finding a job. Moreover, a mismatch of occupations and skills is more
likely to happen among individuals with lower levels of abilities. A survey
implemented in 2013 shows that 67 percent of the firms have employed at
least one graduate with less than two years of experience and 73 percent,
among these firms, consider that knowledge or specific abilities constitute
the main selection criteria for hiring a graduate.
Measures of Skills. Since 1980, all high school seniors in Colombia have
been evaluated before graduation through a mandatory, high-stakes exit
exam (Saber 11). The exam is a requirement for graduation, and its results
are sometimes used by colleges to make decisions.4 The test resembles the
SAT in the United States. It evaluates students in several subjects that, for
convenience, we divide into two broad areas: i) general skills, which includes
mathematics, reading and language (in Spanish), and foreign language; and
ii) subject skills, which includes biology, philosophy, physics, chemistry, and
social sciences. The test is administered in two sessions, each of four hours
and 30 minutes. It evaluates general knowledge of each subject with roughly
40 questions. The mathematics test measures basic knowledge in algebra,
calculus, geometry, probability, and statistics; students must interpret infor-
4Some colleges establish minimum scores that students must achieve to be considered
for admission, while others apply their own admission exams and take Saber 11 only as
an enrollment requirement.
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mation, design solutions to problems, follow procedures, and justify steps in
problem-solving. The reading test evaluates the student’s ability to under-
stand, interpret, and analyze critically written texts. The language exam
tests the ability of the student to communicate in Spanish. The English test
evaluates reading, grammar, and vocabulary.
Since 2003, college students who completed at least 70 percent of their
coursework have been also required to take a college exit exam (Saber Pro).
This exam is a graduation requirement and resembles the GRE, both the
general and subject tests. The exam provides a strong signal for students
readiness to make the transition from college into the labor market. It is
very common for schools to provide incentives (e.g., public recognition to the
best-performing students within each school) to motivate students to aim for
high scores because the results are used for calculating school quality indexes
that are routinely published by the Ministry of Education.
The college exit exam has two main components; one is general and the
other is specific to the field of study from which the student is graduating.5
The general section includes tests in numeracy, writing, reading, English, and
citizenship abilities. Students have four hours and 40 minutes to complete the
test, which includes a total of 161 questions (35 in numeracy, 35 in reading,
35 in citizenship abilities, 55 in English, and one in writing). The numeracy
section evaluates basic mathematics knowledge needed to analyze and solve
problems using quantitative methods and procedures. The reading section
examines the capacity to read analytically by understanding the text and
identifying different perspectives and value judgments. The writing section
evaluates the ability to communicate ideas of a particular given topic. The
English section focuses on testing the ability to communicate effectively in
English. The specific section evaluates basic knowledge in the student’s field
of study. There is a total of 40 specific exams, and students have 90 min-
utes to answer between 30 and 60 questions included in each of them. The
questions, designed by experts in each of the different areas, follow specific
5Although the general part of the exam started in 2003, major-specific exams were
introduced by a staggered roll out. By the second semester of 2011, all students were
taking the general tests, while the specific exams have been applied since then to a large
share of students.
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standards that assure comparability of the exams. Economics majors, for
instance, are advised to take an Economics Analysis test with micro, macro,
and econometrics questions.
In addition, since 2005, the Ministry of Education implemented a follow-up
survey to recent college graduates that included measures of non-cognitive
skills, with the purpose of tracking and evaluating professional performance.
The survey was tested from 2005 to 2008 using a sub-sample of recent grad-
uates that voluntarily completed an online form. Starting in 2011, and until
2014, the survey was implemented in person at the moment of graduation,
and over the telephone to collect information from older cohorts.6 Respon-
dents were asked to answer a 10 to 15 minutes interview that demanded
information about five modules: i) family background, ii) level of skills, iii)
life plan, iv) job situation, and v) identity of the institution they graduated
from.
The survey includes questions regarding the use of non-cognitive skills
acquired in college and applied to the current job. Former students were
asked to rank (from one to four) the use of skills related to communication,
persuasion, innovation, and readiness to learn, among others. We use this
information to compute a factor analysis index that measures non-cognitive
skills among the sub-sample of surveyed graduates.7 This measure quantifies
those non-cognitive skills that have been proven to affect job market per-
formance Heckman et al. (2006). More information and details about the
different components and the index are given in Appendix C.2 on measures
of skills.
Postsecondary Degrees. Similar to the experience in other Latin American
countries, postsecondary education in Colombia has expanded dramatically
in the last 10 years Busso, Cristia, Hincapie, Julian, and Ripani (2017). Post-
secondary education in Colombia is delivered in the form of two-year and
6Respondents were contacted one, three, and five years after graduation by telephone.
7Appendix Table C.3 presents the loadings, corresponding to the factor with the largest
eigenvalue, for each question used to compute the non-cognitive or non-cognitive measure
used herein. We use a different set of non-cognitive questions to build a second measure,
which is used later as an instrumental variable. Appendix Table C.4 presents the results
from the factor model applied to compute this latter measure.
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four-year programs. Two-year programs are mostly technically oriented and
resemble vocational programs in the United States. Four-year programs, by
contrast, are academically oriented and are equivalent to a bachelor’s degree
in the United States. The Colombian postsecondary education also includes
public and private institutions; 30 percent of the postsecondary institutions
in the country are public, while the other 70 percent are private. We clas-
sify academic programs into four categories: i) two-year public, ii) two-year
private, iii) four-year public, and iv) four-year private. In addition, our data
also allow us to identify individuals who have pursued graduate studies.
The degrees that students receive vary, not only in terms of the length
of study required, but also in terms of quality, reputation, and tuition cost,
among other dimensions.8 In Colombia, as in the case of most countries in
Latin America, each program (major) in each college makes its own admis-
sions decisions. This decision is decentralized and puts a heavy weight on
the high school exit exam. We compute a measure of reputation by program-
college following MacLeod et al. (2017): the reputation measure is calculated
as the average of the high school exit exam among students admitted in each
program-college combination. The measure relies on the assumption that
better regarded programs-colleges (i.e., with better reputations) can be more
selective and will admit a set of applicants with higher high school exit exams.
Data and sample. The database used in this paper corresponds to a unique
data that we assembled in collaboration with the Colombian Ministry of
Education. We merged five different administrative datasets:
1. We use test score measures from the college exit exam from 2011 to
2015. The general components are compulsory for each student, but the
specific tests are not. The decision on which field-specific tests to take is
made by the college and not by the student. So, for instance, students
graduating from economics may take the economics-specific test but
also the business-specific test if their respective college indicates so.
Some institutions do not require any specific exam, so a considerable
number of students do not take field-specific tests. For this reason, we
8We lack information on the cost of tuition for each program in each university that
would allow us to net out the cost of attending each program in calculating returns.
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only observe field-specific test scores for a subgroup of students.
2. We merge data on the high school exit exam from 1996 to 2013. These
data include information on the multiple test scores and, in addition,
they include information on the student’s municipality, school, and
some individual characteristics, such as gender and age.
3. We merge records of all students enrolled in college between 1998 and
2016. These records include yearly information on graduation and en-
rollment of all students in postsecondary education for all universities
and programs, and have detailed information on the program of study,
as well as socioeconomic information about the student and her family.
4. We merge longitudinal yearly earnings records for workers who grad-
uated from college. These data include individual earnings from 2011
to 2016 of all the workers who finished any college program after 2001,
and who contributed to the Social Security System. Four-digit industry
codes, the municipality where the contribution was paid, and establish-
ment identifiers are also included.9
5. We merge data on the graduate follow-up survey implemented by the
Ministry of Education. We linked the 2013 and 2014 cross-sections
to obtain a random sample of graduates from cohorts 2011 to 2013.
These data correspond to individuals surveyed in 2013 and 2014, who
graduated in or before 2013. Therefore, the sample of individuals we
observe with non-cognitive measures represents a subgroup of people
with more tenure, compared to the average individual we observed in
the full sample.10
The final sample includes 363,464 individuals who took the college exit
exam between 2011 and 2015, graduated after 2011, and worked formally
between 2012 and 2016. The high school and the college exit exams are
not fully comparable across their different editions. Hence, all test scores are
standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation one within each test’s
edition. We use three different samples: i) test-takers from 2011 to 2015 who
9Workers who do not contribute to health or pensions are not included in the data.
10In Appendix Table C.5 we show that individuals in this survey are older and have
more tenure.
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are working formally (N = 363, 330), ii) test-takers with major-specific scores
available who are working formally (N = 155, 939), and iii) test-takers who
were included in the graduate follow-up survey, for whom we have measures
of non-cognitive ability, and who are working formally (N = 2, 401).11
Descriptive Statistics Individuals included in the main sample are on av-
erage 27 years old. Sixty percent are female, 73 percent live in urban areas,
and 45 percent belong to low-income households.12 The majority (82 per-
cent) are graduates of four-year programs, and the main fields of study are
science, technology, engineering, and mathematics, hereafter STEM, (26 per-
cent), business and economics (31 percent), social sciences and humanities
(16 percent), and health and education (22 percent). Six out of 10 work for
the service sector, and 28 percent are employed by large firms.13
Appendix Table C.6 presents a correlation matrix of all the different test
score measures in our sample. We present a panel for each sample. Several
highlights are in order. First, all correlations are positive and large which, as
suggested by Rindermann (2007), indicates that these measures are captur-
ing in part a broader trait such as cognitive ability. There is even a positive
correlation between cognitive and non-cognitive (captured by non-cognitive)
skills. Second, the largest correlations are found within exams (shown in bold
type). This is suggestive of skill complementarities. Third, the correlations
within subjects and across time (shown in non-bold type) are large and pos-
itive which suggests the existence of self-productivity Cunha and Heckman
(2007); Cunha, Heckman, and Lochner (2006). Fourth, the magnitudes of
the correlations are very stable across the three panels. Fifth, the largest
11Appendix C.3 describes in detail the steps followed to build the data and each sample.
Initially, it is worth noting that the larger sample of students contains complete information
on wages, socioeconomic background, and high school. The same happens to the sample
of students with major-specific scores, which is then a perfect subset of the first sample.
However, some observations (134 students) within the survey sample do not belong to
the larger sample because it was not possible to identify the high school from which they
graduated. We decided to keep these individuals to maintain as many observations as we
can in the smaller sample.
12We identify low-income households using the Colombian housing stratification system.
For purposes of targeting social assistance, all houses in the country are assigned to an
economic stratum from one to six, depending on the neighborhood and house. We defined
low-income households as those living in the first two strata.
13In Appendix Table C.5 we present a set of statistics that describe our sample.
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correlation (0.94) is between the average high school exit exam result and
what we call the subject exam result, which corresponds to the average of
the high school exit exam excluding the numeracy, language, and English
components. This high correlation allows us to replace the average result in
the high school exit exam with the “subject” exam in our empirical strategy.
3.3 Returns to Degrees and Skills
The following equation describes our expanded Mincer earnings equation
which we use to estimate jointly returns to degrees and skills:
log(Wifct) = Pifctβ1 +Tifcτβ2 +β0θi+α1CQct+Xiγ+µf +µt+µτ +µs+εipct.
(3.1)
Wifct is the wage of individual i who graduated from field of study f at
college c in year t. Pifct is a vector that includes three indicator variables
that take the value of one if the individual has a postsecondary degree cor-
responding to: i) a two-year private program, ii) a four-year public program,
or iii) a four-year private program. The omitted category is two-year public
programs. Tipcτ is a vector of college exit tests scores that includes measures
of numeracy, literacy, and English. Individual i’s test scores correspond to
results observed in edition τ of the college exit exam. Depending on the
sample, vector Tipcτ also includes measures of major-specific or non-cognitive
skills. θi is a measure of the initial level of ability. We include the measure
for college reputation (CQct). Xi is a vector of individual characteristics that
include gender, age, age-squared, mother’s education, an indicator variable
for graduate studies, and socioeconomic stratum. µf , µt, µτ , and µs are field
of study, cohort, test edition, and high school fixed effects.
To reduce ability bias concerns, we include a measure of initial ability (θi)
which is measured by the subject skills components of the high school exit
exam.14 This measure is highly correlated (0.94) with the average of all the
14We reserve the general high school skills components of the exam (mathematics,
language, and foreign language) to be used as instruments later in the analysis. Results,
however, are similar when including these general high school skills in the measure of
initial ability.
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tests in the high school exit exam.15
Equation 3.1 resembles an estimation of a value-added measure in which
the effect on students’ knowledge is conditioned on initial knowledge.16 In
our case, however, we estimate the economic return to skills enhanced during
college and to types of degrees, conditioning on the abilities that each stu-
dent had at the time of starting college. An advantage of that specification
is that it eliminates observed and unobserved confounding elements about
the history of parental and school inputs, and, therefore, reduces remark-
ably the likelihood of suffering of omitted variable bias Rivkin, Hanushek,
and Kain (2005). The inclusion of θi in equation (3.1) together with the full
set of skills measures and fixed effects attempts to address possible concerns
regarding ability bias of β̂. We interpret β̂1 as the return to skills acquired
or enhanced during college –conditional on skills prior to college. β̂2 should
be interpreted as the economic return to type of degrees conditioning on the
skills a student has before and after graduation. Note that estimating these
jointly isolates the returns of attending a specific program independently of
college quality (which is controlled by the measures of skills and the measure
of college reputation).
If our set of control variables is not rich enough to ensure our estimators
are unbiased, our resulting estimates may still be informative about the rela-
tive returns if the bias is the same for all coefficients in the vectors β̂1 and β̂2.
In other words, similar to methodology underpinning some of the previous
related literature Hanushek et al. (2015); Lindqvist and Vestman (2011), the
difference between coefficients will eliminate the bias, and we will still be
able to correctly rank the returns to skills and types of degrees.17
Table 3.1 presents ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of equation (3.1).
15See Appendix Table C.6 for more information about the correlation among the mea-
sures of skills.
16A considerable amount of papers have used value-added measures to estimate the
return to better teachers. A discussion of this model is presented in Hanushek and Rivkin
(2010).
17Assume a true model of the form: W = α+β1T1+β2T2+θ+u. If the estimated model
is W = α+ β1T1 + β2T2 + ε, where ε = θ+ u, then the probability limits of the difference
between the OLS estimators will be: Plim(β̂1 − β̂2) = (β1 − β2) + (β̂θT1 − β̂θT2), where
β̂θT1 is the coefficient of a regression of θ and T1. Our assumption states that β̂θT1 ∼ β̂θT2 .
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Given that we observe wages for multiple periods, we use the current ob-
served wage as dependent variable.18 Column (1) presents the estimation in
the full sample. Columns (2) and (3) restrict the sample to those individuals
with field-specific and non-cognitive skills, respectively.19 Columns (4) to
(6) follow the same format, but additionally include the measure of college
reputation; these are our preferred estimates.
Returns to different types of degrees are fairly heterogeneous across pro-
grams. Using the point estimates in column (5) and adjusting by the years
it takes to graduate from each program, we find that, relative to two-year
public degrees, an additional year of education increases wages by 4.2 per-
cent for two-year private, 3.9 percent for four-year public, and 5.9 percent for
four-year private degrees. The reputation of the program also carries a wage
premium of three percent. However, we observe that education does not
capture the full extent of human capital. The returns to skills conditional
on education are meaningful and comparable to the returns to education.
Among the returns to skills, numeracy seems to have the largest return (up
to 3.7 percent), except in the survey sample. Literacy, foreign language,
non-cognitive, and field-specific skills have a similar return of, roughly, two
percent. These results are fairly stable across columns, which vary both the
specification and the sample used in the estimation.
3.4 Robustness and Measurement Error
Sensitivity of the Mincer Earnings Equation We analyze the sensitivity of the
point estimates of the expanded Mincer equation by estimating alternative
specifications, and present the results in Table 3.2. Column (1) presents es-
timates of the returns to degrees unconditionally of the returns to skills and
field of study, whereas column (2) includes back field of study fixed effects
aiming to control for potential pre-graduation sorting into fields. Columns
18In Appendix Table C.7 we present results with alternative measures such as the
average wage observed for each individual, the first observed wage after graduation, and
total annual earnings. The results are essentially the same.
19Columns (3) and (6) use the information of the follow-up survey of college graduates.
For more details about this dataset visit the webpage https://ole.mineducacion.gov
.co/portal/A-quienes-aportamos/Investigadores/
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Table 3.1: Returns to Skills and Types of Degrees
Dependent Variable: log(Current Wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Two-Years Private 0.086 0.088 0.109 0.080 0.084 0.128
[0.018] [0.015] [0.039] [0.014] [0.012] [0.049]
Four-Years Public 0.210 0.194 0.236 0.174 0.156 0.197
[0.016] [0.020] [0.044] [0.011] [0.013] [0.042]
Four-Years Private 0.268 0.257 0.229 0.249 0.236 0.212
[0.025] [0.026] [0.037] [0.020] [0.021] [0.036]
Graduate Studies 0.158 0.183 0.048 0.156 0.181 0.045
[0.017] [0.019] [0.063] [0.016] [0.019] [0.060]
College Reputation 0.032 0.031 0.061
[0.004] [0.005] [0.023]
Literacy 0.028 0.022 0.018 0.027 0.020 0.017
[0.001] [0.002] [0.007] [0.001] [0.002] [0.007]
Numeracy 0.037 0.028 0.024 0.035 0.025 0.019
[0.002] [0.003] [0.009] [0.002] [0.003] [0.010]
Foreign language 0.020 0.020 0.036 0.016 0.016 0.026
[0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]




Sample: Full Specific Survey Full Specific Survey
Observations 363,330 155,939 2,401 363,330 155,939 2,401
R-squared 0.192 0.218 0.239 0.194 0.219 0.247
Controls:
Individual Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline Ability Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Field of study Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes. Ordinary least squares estimations. The dependent variable is the natural log of the last observed
wage from 2011 to 2016 for each individual. Literacy, numeracy, and foreign language scores are computed
from the college exit exam and standardized within each sample using the average and standard deviation of
the corresponding test edition. The field specific scores are standardized with respect to the average not only
of the test edition but also considering the groups of related majors. The omitted category of postsecondary
degrees is 2-3 Years Public, which identifies individuals who graduated from technical or vocational tertiary
programs taught by public universities. The college reputation variable is computed following MacLeod
et al. (2017) and then standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation one within each sample.
Individual control variables include gender, age, age squared, socioeconomic stratum, mother’s education
level, a dummy for graduate studies, a proxy of initial abilities, high school fixed effects, cohort fixed effects,
and test edition fixed effects. Initial abilities are proxied using the standardized average of biology, physics,
chemistry, philosophy, and social sciences scores computed from the high school exit exam. Field of Study
refers to fixed effects of related majors: accounting, agricultural sciences, architecture, arts, business and
related fields, economics, education, engineering, health, humanities, journalism, medicine, natural and exact
sciences, nursing, law, psychology, social sciences, and sports. Standard errors are clustered by municipality
and in brackets.
(3) to (5) present the returns to skills across different samples, but uncon-
ditionally of the types of degrees and field of study. In columns (8) to (10)
we include field of study fixed effects, again aiming to control for potential
pre-graduation sorting. Comparing these estimates with those in Table 3.1
give informative evidence on the degree to which the returns to degrees com-
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plement the returns to skills.
Table 3.2: Returns to Different Types of Postsecondary Degrees
Dependent Variable: log(Current Wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Two-Years Private 0.046 0.078
[0.012] [0.014]
Four-Years Public 0.127 0.175
[0.017] [0.011]
Four-Years Private 0.235 0.243
[0.011] [0.020]
Graduate Studies 0.163 0.160
[0.015] [0.017]
College Reputation 0.042 0.042
[0.005] [0.006]
Literacy 0.023 0.022 0.012 0.027 0.022 0.024
[0.002] [0.002] [0.007] [0.001] [0.002] [0.007]
Numeracy 0.055 0.058 0.044 0.034 0.029 0.025
[0.005] [0.004] [0.012] [0.002] [0.003] [0.010]
Foreign language 0.017 0.017 0.024 0.028 0.024 0.042
[0.003] [0.003] [0.008] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007]




Sample: Full Full Full Specific Survey Full Specific Survey
Observations 363,330 363,330 363,330 155,939 2,401 363,330 155,939 2,401
R-squared 0.130 0.188 0.118 0.143 0.137 0.177 0.207 0.224
Controls:
Individual Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline Ability Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Field of Study Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes. Ordinary least squares estimations. The dependent variable is the log of the last observed wage for each
individual from 2011 to 2016. 2-3 Years Private is a dummy variable for individuals graduated from technical or
vocational tertiary programs taught by private universities, 4 > Years Public includes graduates from bachelor
programs taught by public universities, and 4 > Years Private includes graduates from bachelor programs taught
by private universities. The omitted category of postsecondary degrees is 2-3 Years Public, which identifies
individuals graduated from technical or vocational tertiary programs taught by public universities. Columns (4)
and (8) include measure of skills –literacy, numeracy and foreign language– computed from the college exit exam.
Individual and field of study controls as described in the notes of Table 3.1. Standard errors clustered at the
municipality level and in brackets.
The results in Column (1) are quite different from the returns to types of
degrees in column (4) of Table 3.1. This difference can be attributed to the
exclusion of the field of study fixed effects or the measures of skills. Including
back the fixed effects in column (4), we recover point estimates very close to
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those in Table 3.1. This implies that including the measures of skills does
not affect the coefficients on the types of degrees.
Similar results are obtained in columns (3) to (5) when we estimate returns
to skills unconditionally from the returns to degrees and fields of study. We
do see that excluding these controls slightly affects the magnitudes, espe-
cially in the return to numeracy skills. However, controlling for potential
pre-graduate sorting into fields recovers point estimates similar to those ob-
tained in Table 3.1. These results as a whole imply that the measures of skills
and the measures of types of degrees capture different information when es-
timating economic returns. In fact, it poses strong evidence suggesting that
the returns to human capital cannot be exclusively attributed either to re-
turns to education or returns to skills, but rather that a combination of both
is important.
Skills Collinearity. The results in Table 3.1 include simultaneously multi-
ple test score measures that are highly correlated. As previously discussed
in Section 3.2, there is a high degree of skill complementarity: the level of
skills of any given individual in a given subject is positively correlated with
the skills of that individual in other subjects. This could be, for instance, be-
cause having better mathematics skills can allow a student to acquire science
skills faster, or because having higher literacy skills, by better understanding
the underlying structure of language, can affect the capacity of an individual
to learn a foreign language. The simultaneous estimation of equation (3.1)
will therefore yield a lower bound of the effect of skills on wages because the
coefficient of one test score will bias the coefficient of the other test score.
The separate inclusion of the test score measures, however, will estimate the
upper bound of that effect (see Lindqvist and Vestman (2011)).
Table 3.3 shows OLS estimates of equation (3.1) including every measure
of skills simultaneously and separately (to save space, these point estimates
are presented stacked).20 In columns (1) to (3) we present the same results
as in Table 3.1, for comparison. Columns (4) to (6) show the point estimates
of three and four separate regressions that use equation (3.1), but include
20Appendix Table C.9 presents the same results in Table 3.3, but including the point
estimates for each type of degrees.
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each measure of skills separately.
Using the full sample of workers, we again find that numeracy has the
highest return (up to 4.4 percent), whereas literacy and foreign language
have returns of 3.8 and 3 percent, respectively. Once again, we see that the
return to numeracy decreases the most when considering the specific sample,
although it remains the largest. Specific skills again show a point estimate
among the highest (3.8 percent) when estimated in the same restricted sam-
ple. The coefficients on numeracy and literacy decrease, again suggesting
that individuals who score high in generic skills also score high in specific
skills. Regarding the estimations using the survey sample, we observe that
the estimated returns to cognitive skills increase (compared to column (3)),
while the return to non-cognitive skills remains stable (2.3 percent).
Table 3.3: Extensions: Estimates’ Ranges and Measurement Error
Dependent Variable: log(Current Wage)
OLS IV: Measurement Error Correction
Simultaneous Stacked Simultaneous Stacked
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Literacy 0.027 0.020 0.017 0.038 0.036 0.026 0.075 -0.004 0.105 0.106 0.112
[0.001] [0.002] [0.007] [0.002] [0.002] [0.007] [0.011] [0.057] [0.012] [0.013] [0.046]
Numeracy 0.035 0.025 0.019 0.044 0.041 0.027 0.045 0.154 0.087 0.083 0.140
[0.002] [0.003] [0.010] [0.003] [0.003] [0.010] [0.006] [0.046] [0.008] [0.010] [0.028]
Foreign Language 0.016 0.016 0.026 0.030 0.031 0.035 -0.002 0.002 0.040 0.041 0.053
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.004] [0.027] [0.006] [0.005] [0.022]
Field Specific 0.022 0.038 0.123
[0.004] [0.003] [0.017]
Socioemotional 0.023 0.023 0.026 0.022
[0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.006]
Sample: Full Specific Survey Full Specific Survey Full Survey Full Specific Survey
Observations 363,330 155,939 2,401 363,330 155,939 2,401 363,330 2,401 363,330 155,939 2,401
Controls:
Individual & Field Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Types of Degrees Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes. The dependent variable and measures of skills are as described in the notes of Table 3.1. Estimations within the full sample
use the same specification as column (4) of Table 3.1. Likewise, estimations within the specific and survey samples use, respectively, the
specifications of columns (3) and (5) of Table 3.1. Stacked results refer to separate regressions for each ability measure. In columns (7)
to (9), cognitive skills were instrumented using each time numeracy, literacy and foreign language standardized scores computed from
the high school exit exam. Individual and types of degrees area as described in the notes of Table 3.1. Standard errors clustered by
municipality and in brackets.
Measurement Error Correction. Test scores are just a proxy variable of
the true level of an individual’s skills. In other words, even though the exit
exams are official and well established it is possible that test scores measure
skills with error, biasing the estimated coefficients towards zero (attenuation
bias). To account for this possibility, we assume a classical measurement
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error setting and instrument the college exit test scores with the high school
exit test scores. We additionally control for initial ability. The identification
of this model relies on the assumption that the level of a given skill in high
school only affects wages through the skills level in college.
Columns (7) to (11) of Table 3.3 show the IV estimates. In column (7)
we include all three measures of generic skills simultaneously and instrument
them with the mathematics, language, and English result in the high school
exit exam. The point estimates in the IV estimation increase considerably
for literacy and numeracy, and they are similar in magnitude to those found
by Lindqvist and Vestman (2011). The coefficient on literacy increases more
than the others, and it becomes larger than the coefficient on numeracy. No-
tice as well that the returns to foreign language decrease and are negative,
possibly because it estimates a lower bound when estimated jointly with the
other measures of skills. In column (8) we restrict the sample to individu-
als from the follow-up survey of graduates. This column includes our three
generic cognitive abilities and the measure of non-cognitive skills, which we
instrument with the mentioned scores from the high school exit exam and
a score computed from another set of non-cognitive related questions con-
tained in the survey sample.21 We observe that the returns to non-cognitive
skills are similar in magnitude to those found using OLS, while there is a
remarkable change for the returns to cognitive skills. Observe that literacy
and foreign language returns are close to zero, and the returns to numeracy
are up to 15 percent.
Column (9) includes each test score measure estimated separately but over-
identified using the scores in mathematics, language, and English in the high
school exam jointly as instruments.22 We find that all coefficients increase
and are much larger than those estimated separately by OLS (in column (4)
of Table 3.3) or estimated jointly (in column (7)). The point estimate on
foreign language (4 percent) is now positive. Column (10) deals with the
measurement error for workers who took the major specific test. Each point
21Appendix Table C.4 shows the results from the factor model used to compute the
instrument for the measure of non-cognitive skills.
22We also performed estimations using one instrument at a time. The results do not
change.
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estimate corresponds to a separate regression. The results show that, as in
the OLS case, the returns to literacy and foreign language do not change
largely in this sample (compared to columns (9)), whereas the returns to nu-
meracy decrease. All the coefficients increase compared to column (5), but
the increase in specific skills and literacy is remarkable changing from 3.8 to
12.3 percent and from 3.6 to 10.6 percent, respectively.
The last column in Table 3.3 shows the results, adjusting for measurement
error, for workers contained in the follow-up survey. Estimations are ob-
tained from separate regressions for each measure of skills. We over-identified
each measure using mathematics, language, and English from the high school
exam, as well as a non-cognitive score computed from the questions contained
in the survey of graduates. Literacy and foreign language returns increase
(in comparison with column (8)) and are up to 11.2 percent and 5.3 percent,
respectively. Returns to numeracy are around 14 percent, and returns to
non-cognitive skills stay close to 2 percent.23
Taken together, these estimates indicate that numeracy skills have a return
that ranges between 1.7 percent and 14 percent, literacy a return between 1.4
percent and 11.2 percent, foreign language skills between 1 percent and 12.6
percent, specific skills from 2.1 percent to 12.3 percent, and non-cognitive
skills return around 1.2 percent and 2.6 percent. These ranges include upper
(regressions with each test score alone) and lower bounds (regressions with
all the measures simultaneously) accounting and not accounting for measure-
ment error.
3.5 Beyond Average Returns
We now focus on the heterogeneity of returns to degrees and skills. First, we
explore heterogeneity across the wage distribution, then we present returns
by tenure and, finally, we estimate the returns among fields of study, eco-
nomic sectors, gender, and firm size.
23We additionally estimate a latent variable model that implements alternative estima-
tion methods to deal with attenuation bias. The results are presented in Appendix C.4.
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Returns Across Wage Distribution. We estimate conditional regression
quantiles for each type of postsecondary degree and present the results in
Figure 3.1. OLS point estimates are plotted to allow comparisons. We use
the specification in column (4) of Table 3.1. Figure 3.1a shows the results
for two-year private, figure 3.1b for four-year public, and 3.1c for four-year
private.
Figure 3.1: Returns to Types of Degrees at Conditional Quantiles of the
Wage Distribution
(a) Two-Year Private (b) Four-Year Public
(c) Four-Year Private
Notes. The solid lines represent the regression quantiles using Koenker and Bassett (1978) estimator.
The dashed lines correspond to an OLS specification. Quantile and OLS estimations for 2-3 years
private, 4-year public and 4-year private programs used specification (4) in Table 3.1. Figures 3.1a, 3.1b,
and 3.1c used the full sample of students who graduated from 2011 to 2016. OLS standard errors are
clustered at the municipality level. Regression quantiles standard errors computed using 20 bootstrap
replications. Confidence intervals of 95% are presented for all estimates.
The results suggest an important degree of heterogeneity in the returns
to postsecondary degrees. The three graphs show strictly increasing returns
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with wages, indicating that postsecondary degrees matter more among higher
wage quantiles. Note that the lowest point estimate among four-year private
degrees is around 0.8, which is comparable to the point estimates on returns
to skills. It means that taking individuals from a two-year public program
and placing them in a four-year private, keeping abilities constant, will in-
crease the wage by at least 8 percent even if they get a job that pays in the
first decile of the wage distribution. A similar increase in wage would be
achieved if those same persons stayed in the two-year public program but
increased their numeracy skills by one standard deviation.
In Figure 3.2 we present the results of conditional regression quantiles for
each measure of skills.24 We use again the main specification as in column
(4) of Table 3.1 and contrast the quantile point estimates with the OLS.25
Figures 3.2a, 3.2b, and 3.2c use the full sample of students who took the
college exit exam between 2011 and 2016. Figure 3.2d uses the reduced sam-
ple of students with information about field-specific tests scores. Figure 3.2e
shows the results within the sample of surveyed workers with measures of
non-cognitive skills.
The returns to all the measures of skills are mostly positive along all deciles.
They are lowest among people in the lowest percentiles and increase mono-
tonically until roughly the 40th percentile. The returns to foreign language
skills, however, are strictly increasing in the whole distribution, ranging from
zero to 0.2. The returns to numeracy remain stagnant beyond the 40th per-
centile, although these are the highest returns we observe. The returns to
literacy and major-specific skills decrease slightly beyond the 50th percentile,
but that decrease is not statistically significant. The returns to non-cognitive
skills are not precise because of the small sample size. However, they in-
crease until the 20th percentile, remain steady until the 80th percentile and
increase again for the top percentiles. One implication of these results is that
inequality in the distribution of skills can explain part of the observed wage
inequality in Colombia.
24We also estimate unconditional regression quantiles as in Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux
(2009). Results are very similar and available upon request.
25For the case of specific and non-cognitive skills we use specifications (5) and (6) of
Table 3.1, estimating the models in the corresponding restricted samples.
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Figure 3.2: Returns to Skills at Conditional Quantiles of the Wage
Distribution
(a) Literacy (b) Numeracy
(c) Foreign Language (d) Field Specific
(e) Non-Cognitive
Notes. The solid lines represent the regression quantiles using Koenker and Bassett (1978) estimator.
The dashed lines correspond to an OLS specification. Quantile and OLS estimations for numeracy,
literacy and foreign language used specification (6) in Table 3.1. Figures 3.2a, 3.2b, and 3.2c used the
full sample of students who graduated from 2011 to 2016. Figures 3.2d and fig:qregses used, respectively,
the sample of students with major-specific test scores available and the sample of individuals in graduate
follow-up survey. OLS standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. Regression quantiles
standard errors computed using 20 bootstrap replications. Confidence intervals of 95% are presented for
all estimates.
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Returns Across Tenure. In some economics models, wages increase over
time as a function of the capability of the employer to observe workers’
abilities (Farber & Gibbons, 1996). Skills that are easily observable by the
employer (such as foreign language) are predicted to have higher returns in
the first year on the job, but then stay constant. The returns to less observ-
able skills (such as numeracy or literacy), on the contrary, are expected to
increase as the employer updates her beliefs about the worker.26 Notice that
the worker’s type of postsecondary degree is very observable by employers
and thus, following the previous argument, returns to degrees should not
vary much with tenure.
We test that hypotheses between tenure and returns by exploiting the
longitudinal feature of the data. Estimations use the same specification as
column (4) in Table 3.1, but among workers with one, two, three, and four
years of tenure. Figures 3.3 and 3.4 present the results. In Figure 3.3 we plot
the returns to postsecondary degrees across years of tenure. Slight increases
in the returns are observed, but the confidence intervals suggest that these
slight increases are not in fact significant. We interpret this as evidence in
favor of Farber and Gibbons (1996), suggesting that the returns to education
degrees should not increase with tenure if they are observable for employers.
26We assume that foreign language skills are more observable in a face-to-face interview
(which is very common in a hiring process), whereas literacy and numeracy skills are more
difficult to observe.
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Figure 3.3: Returns to Degrees by Years of Tenure
Notes. The plotted circles, squares and triangles represent the point estimates of 2-3 year private
programs, 4-year public programs and 4-year private programs, respectively. Separate regressions were
run among workers with different years of tenure to the estimate simultaneously the returns to different
types of degrees. Estimations used the same specification as in column (4) of Table 3.1. The dependent
variable is the log(Wage) for each year of tenure. Confidence levels of 95% are presented for all point
estimates.
Returns across tenure for each measure of skills are presented in Figure
3.4. We additionally include the results among students with field-specific
scores for comparability. Non-cognitive skills are not included because of
the small sample size of workers who have available scores for this measure.
The returns using the complete sample of students are plotted with circles,
and the corresponding confidence intervals are represented with a dark area.
These results show that numeracy and literacy are increasing with tenure.
However, the returns to numeracy increase much more steeply, growing from
1.5 percent to 3.6 percent. The returns to foreign language, on the con-
trary, do not increase as much; they remain relatively steady across years
of tenure. We interpret this as evidence in favor of the Farber and Gibbons
(1996) model.
We find similar patterns if we restrict the sample to students with available
field-specific tests scores. Estimations within this sample use specification (5)
in Table 3.1. Returns are plotted using squares, with whiskers representing
confidence intervals. Using this sample, we are able to estimate returns to
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major-specific skills and observe that these do not change across years of
tenure. We explain this by considering that during hiring processes employ-
ers may apply tests that allow them to know their applicants’ level of specific
abilities. On the other hand, applicants could also reveal their specific skills
during interviews in order to increase their probability of being hired. Thus,
specific skills could be more observable for employers than other skills, at
least in the labor market for college graduates.
Returns to Specialization: Field of Study and Economic Sector. Returns to
degrees and skills can in part reflect specialization. For instance, individuals
with better mathematics skills can choose careers that place greater emphasis
on those abilities. Then, they can find jobs that value their skills, receiving
higher payments for greater levels. We explore whether the magnitude of
returns varies with the person’s specialization (either in field of study or in
economic sector). Estimations of returns across different areas of study use
specifications (4) and (5) in Table 3.1 without including field of study fixed
effects. We exclude the estimation of returns to non-cognitive skills because
of low sample sizes.
In Table 3.4 we present the returns to degrees and skills across groups of
similar postsecondary programs or study areas. We estimate the returns for
graduates of STEM, business and economics, social sciences and humanities,
and health and education.
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Figure 3.4: Returns to Skills by Years of Tenure
(a) Literacy (b) Numeracy
(c) Foreign Language (d) Field Specific
Notes. The plotted circles and squares represent the point estimates for each measure of skills using,
respectively, specifications (6) and (8) of 3.1. Separate regressions were run among workers with different
years of tenure to estimate simultaneously numeracy, literacy, foreign language and major-specific skills.
The dependent variable is the log(Wage) for each year of tenure. Confidence levels of 95% are presented
for all point estimates.
We find three main results. First, the positive gradient in the returns
to degrees (by which four-year degrees pay more than two-year degrees and
graduates from private school earn more than those of public schools) is
observed in all fields of study. However, it is more pronounced in STEM,
business and social sciences. Second, literacy and numeracy skills matter in
all fields. In that sense, these basic skills are always remunerated, proba-
bly because they are highly transferable and ubiquitous across fields. Third,
there is some evidence of positive returns to specialization in Table 3.4. Spe-
cific skills tend to be homogeneous across fields. Of course, different specific
skills would be tested for each program. To shed some light on what those
specific skills capture we estimate the model in the full sample without in-
cluding specific skills (odd columns). Numeracy skills have the highest return
in STEM, business and economics, but not in social sciences and humanities;
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for these individuals, the largest return is to literacy skills. Workers with
STEM degrees have the lowest return to literacy skills (2.3 percent). Gradu-
ates from health and education degrees have similar returns across all skills.
Furthermore, we see that including field-specific skills decreases remarkably
the returns to numeracy for most fields, suggesting a large complementarity
between specific and numeracy skills.
Table 3.4: Heterogeneous Effects: Study Area
Dependent Variable: log(Current Wage)
Study Area:
STEM
Business and Social Sciences Health and
Other
Economics and Humanities Education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Two-Year Private 0.062 0.052 0.029 0.031 -0.036 0.307 0.131 0.170 0.114 0.194
[0.022] [0.029] [0.014] [0.020] [0.038] [0.094] [0.032] [0.033] [0.032] [0.116]
Four-Year Public 0.234 0.218 0.091 0.078 0.359 0.522 0.228 0.205 0.140 0.173
[0.024] [0.025] [0.026] [0.028] [0.028] [0.068] [0.025] [0.021] [0.029] [0.086]
Four-Year Private 0.311 0.314 0.204 0.187 0.427 0.595 0.216 0.201 0.168 0.251
[0.039] [0.038] [0.012] [0.021] [0.039] [0.069] [0.023] [0.023] [0.018] [0.072]
Graduate Studies 0.085 0.115 0.177 0.238 0.163 0.186 0.142 0.144 0.042 -0.035
[0.033] [0.032] [0.021] [0.020] [0.018] [0.021] [0.025] [0.029] [0.034] [0.079]
College Reputation 0.024 0.023 0.052 0.051 0.044 0.049 0.012 0.009 0.017 0.020
[0.004] [0.003] [0.013] [0.013] [0.003] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.013]
Literacy 0.023 0.020 0.033 0.024 0.032 0.033 0.026 0.015 0.013 0.024
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.005] [0.013]
Numeracy 0.038 0.023 0.042 0.036 0.019 0.013 0.021 0.018 0.025 0.039
[0.002] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.008] [0.007] [0.008] [0.006] [0.014]
Foreign language 0.010 0.012 0.020 0.019 0.012 0.003 0.023 0.020 0.004 -0.000
[0.005] [0.004] [0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.011] [0.011] [0.012] [0.007] [0.010]
Field Specific 0.024 0.024 0.022 0.022 -0.003
[0.007] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.008]
Sample: Full Specific Full Specific Full Specific Full Specific Full Specific
Observations 95,270 40,668 112,184 42,572 56,568 23,697 78,526 43,690 20,782 5,312
R-squared 0.213 0.266 0.251 0.300 0.232 0.341 0.316 0.365 0.242 0.459
Controls:
Individual Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Types of Degrees Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes. The dependent variable and measures of skills are as described in the notes of Table 3.1. Estimations using the
full sample follow the same specification as column (4) of Table 3.1, but within the set of individuals belonging to the
population of interest –defined by the categories on top of the table. In the study area vector, the STEM samples in
column (1) includes individuals graduated from engineering, mathematics and natural sciences. Column (2) includes
individuals graduated from business and economics, column (3) from social sciences and humanities, column (4) from
health and education sciences, and column (5) from agronomy and arts. Standard errors clustered at the municipality
level are in brackets.
Using model 3.1 we can additionally estimate heterogeneity among fields of
study. Figure 3.5 shows the field of study fixed effects estimated in Column
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(4) of Table 3.1.27 The returns to different fields of study vary dramatically.
Sports have the lowest returns, while medicine is more than 70 percent higher.
These results suggest that what a person studies is as important as the
institution at which those studies take place.
Figure 3.5: Returns to Fields of Study
Notes. Every plotted dot is the point estimate for each category of the field of study fixed effects, taking
Arts as the base for comparison. Confidence levels of 95% are represented by boxes for all point
estimates. The estimation uses the same specification as in column (4) of Table 3.1. Standard errors
were clustered at the municipality level. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
In Table 3.5 we then present the returns among workers in different eco-
nomic sectors. To save space we present only the results for the sample
of individuals for whom we have a measure of field-specific skills. Results
for the full sample are very similar.28 Again, we find clear returns to spe-
cialization, in particular for workers in the trade and tourism industries, in
which the highest return is to foreign language skills (6.9 percent and 7.5
percent, respectively). Field-specific skills have a sizable and precise return
in manufacturing, trade, and services. Numeracy skills show the biggest re-
turn for manufacturing and services. We also observe some heterogeneity in
the gradient of returns to degrees. In the tourism and in the trade sector
27The field of study fixed effects estimated using the specifications in the other columns
of Table 3.1 are very similar to those reported in Figure 3.5.
28The results for the full sample are available from the authors upon request.
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the differences between degrees is much more attenuated. Among the other
economic sectors, the differences between types of degrees remain relatively
constant.
Table 3.5: Heterogeneous Effects: Economic Activity
Dependent Variable: log(Current Wage)
Economic Activity: Gender: Firm Size:
Manufacture Trade Services Turism Retail Female Male Small Large
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
2-3 Years Private 0.009 -0.021 0.118 0.077 0.135 0.087 0.078 0.070 0.070
[0.037] [0.046] [0.012] [0.052] [0.043] [0.013] [0.016] [0.015] [0.013]
4¿ Years Public 0.187 0.126 0.192 0.056 0.182 0.154 0.175 0.191 0.257
[0.023] [0.054] [0.017] [0.069] [0.046] [0.011] [0.021] [0.020] [0.019]
4¿ Years Private 0.243 0.189 0.275 0.222 0.299 0.237 0.245 0.257 0.326
[0.022] [0.069] [0.018] [0.058] [0.038] [0.016] [0.032] [0.016] [0.020]
Graduate Studies 0.195 0.202 0.192 0.214 0.089 0.190 0.172 0.175 0.170
[0.045] [0.105] [0.021] [0.098] [0.083] [0.016] [0.035] [0.023] [0.027]
College Reputation 0.037 0.040 0.032 0.066 0.048 0.037 0.022 0.040 0.034
[0.018] [0.016] [0.004] [0.013] [0.017] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.007]
Literacy 0.031 0.011 0.017 0.017 0.039 0.020 0.020 0.018 0.019
[0.008] [0.016] [0.002] [0.012] [0.012] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003]
Numeracy 0.051 0.021 0.018 0.003 0.041 0.030 0.023 0.020 0.028
[0.007] [0.018] [0.003] [0.019] [0.015] [0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.003]
Foreign language 0.027 0.069 0.010 0.075 0.048 0.020 0.011 0.030 0.011
[0.010] [0.016] [0.005] [0.019] [0.021] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.008]
Field Specific 0.034 0.027 0.021 0.019 -0.011 0.019 0.027 0.025 0.021
[0.007] [0.014] [0.005] [0.022] [0.010] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003]
Sample: Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific
Observations 9,610 4,907 86,051 1,410 5,300 98,182 57,757 39,626 82,124
R-squared 0.528 0.642 0.274 0.175 0.633 0.246 0.247 0.387 0.297
Controls:
Individual Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Types of Degrees Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes. The dependent variable and measures of skills are as described in the notes of Table 3.1. Estimations using
the full sample follow the same specification as column (5) of Table 3.1, but within the set of individuals belonging to
the population of interest –defined by the categories on top of the table. Economic activity categories were defined by
grouping four-digit industry codes. Column (6) and (7) use the subsamples of women and men, respectively. columns
(8) and (9) include individuals working for small and large firms, respectively. Individual, college and occupation
controls as described in the notes of Table 3.1. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level and in brackets.
Returns by Gender and Firm Size. We also explore heterogeneity by gender
and firm size. Columns (6) and (7) of Table 3.5 present the returns by gender
and suggest that female workers have, for numeracy and foreign languages
measures, slightly higher returns than male workers. However, males have
higher returns to specific skills than females (2.7 percent vs. 1.9 percent).
We do not observe heterogeneity by gender in terms of returns to degrees.
Columns (8) and (9) of the same table explore heterogeneity among firm
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size. 29 We find that numeracy skills and returns to postsecondary degrees
are higher among people working in large firms compared to those in smaller
firms.
3.6 Conclusion
Understanding the reasons that make some workers earn higher wages than
others is a key question in labor economics. In this paper, we investigate
how skills and postsecondary degrees relate to labor market outcomes later
in life. Our paper differs from the previous literature in that we are able to
jointly measure the importance of a broad set of skills (literacy, numeracy,
foreign language, field-specific and non-cognitive) and different types of post-
secondary degrees (by length, quality and field of study).
Exams required for graduation from high school and college in Colombia
evaluate students in multiple areas including mathematics, language (Span-
ish) and foreign language (English). A follow-up survey then assesses the
non-cognitive abilities of former graduates. We combine a vast vector of
test scores from these exams with college enrollment and graduation data
and with Social Security records to create a data set that follows individuals
from high school to college, and into the first years in the labor market. This
uniquely rich dataset allows us to unbundle the returns to postsecondary ed-
ucation: we jointly estimate returns to different skills and to different types
of degrees, accounting for the length, quality and field in which those degrees
were granted.
We view the results presented in this paper as a building block toward
better understanding which skills and degrees are valued in today’s labor
market. Our evidence confirms that the return to basic skills (like math-
ematics, literacy, foreign language, and non-cognitive) are sizable even for
people who graduated in essentially the same program. On average, a one
29The firm size is computed using the number of workers observed by establishment in
the earnings records. These records only include formal workers who have been enrolled
in a postsecondary education program; they could be active students, dropouts or have a
college degree. Although this is not a perfect measure of firm size, it still proxies fairly
well for firm size.
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standard deviation increase in numeracy skills has a return between 1.7 per-
cent and 14 percent, in literacy skills between 1.4 percent and 11.2 percent,
and in foreign language between 1 percent and 12.3 percent. Specific skills
are also important, ranging between 2.1 percent and 12.3 percent. Returns
to non-cognitive skills range from 1.2 to 2.6 percent. This is equivalent to
half to one year extra of education in a 4-year private university. We also
find that the type of postsecondary degrees individuals obtain are associated
with very different wage returns. First, the returns to college reputation are
as high as the returns to skills. Second, the annual returns to a four-year
degree public program is 3.9 percent higher than returns to two-year public
(and 5.9 higher in a private school). Third, what field people study can be
as important as where they earn those degrees: students of engineering and
medicine expect 33 to 70 percent higher wages than students of arts or edu-
cation.
The results in this paper can be useful for a number of related literatures.
There is a large literature in economics evaluating the effect of education
interventions aimed at improving learning (most frequently of numeracy and
literacy skills), including i) school choice (e.g., competition, vouchers), ii) hu-
man resources policies (e.g., teacher pay, incentives, and training), iii) school
and classroom management policies (e.g., class sizes and student tracking),
and iv) school resources (e.g., spending, computers, remedial teaching, stu-
dent incentives). Many of these studies lack cost-benefit analysis, in part
because it is difficult to monetize the benefits. Our paper provides wage re-
turns that could be used for that purpose.
Finally, our results also provide some insights into a number of policy
debates. First, wage gains associated with admission to some schools and
fields can be sizable and, in fact, explain a substantial part of the variation
of the wage variance. This suggests that interventions aimed at helping low-
income and qualified students gain admission to certain fields and to four-
year colleges can improve welfare (Hoxby & Turner, 2013). Second, returns
to skills are positive and large, both on average and for most wage quantiles.
This suggests that, in the presence of resources constraints, policies that
aim at improving the quality of education of low-income individuals can be
expected to reduce wage inequality.
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Consider a continuum of skilled (S) and unskilled (U) workers indexed by
i endowed with a unit of time, and a continuum of firms indexed by j.
Workers choose between consumption and leisure, and have preferences over
the firms as in Card et al. (2018). In this model, workers have heterogeneous
preferences for firms who offer differentiated work environments. The utility
















where Cij corresponds to aggregate consumption and Lij to hours worked.
Note that preferences depend on the individual, i ∈ {S, U}, and the firm, j,
where the individual works. We define the wage elasticity of labor supply,
γij, as specific to every skill group i who works in a firm j. Individuals have
preferences over firms such that the wage elasticity of supply is firm specific.









where 0 < ρ < 1.1 To determine the consumption of both types of goods,
1This implies that the elasticity of substitution, σ = 11−ρ , is positive and bigger than


















where PF = P
0
F (1 + τ) and τ is an ad-valorem tariff charged to foreign
products. The solution to the worker’s problem yields consumption levels of




Ci for i ∈ {S, U}, and k ∈ {N,F},
where P =
[
P 1−σN + [P
0
F (1 + τ)]
1−σ] 11−σ is the CES price index. National and
foreign goods are substitutes because ρ < 1.2
The allocation of the worker’s unit of time between consumption and
















s.t. PC ≤ WijLij,
where the amount of leisure corresponds to Nij = 1 − Lij, and it varies by










where γij corresponds to the wage elasticity and ν to the price elasticity of
demand.
Firms
Consider a continuum of J national firms. Each firm j ∈ J produces output
combining labor and capital goods. Labor can be skilled, LS, or unskilled,
LU , whereas capital goods can be national, XN , or foreign, XF . The produc-
2The price elasticity of consumption of national goods with respect to the price of
foreign goods (or the the tariff τ) is positive. This implies that a price decrease of foreign
goods (or a decrease in tariffs) decreases the demand of national goods.
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tion function is formally given by:
Yj(Lj, Xj) = ϕjf (Lj(LSj, LUj), Xj(XNj, XFj))
where ϕj is the productivity associated to firm j, and f(·) is the production
function of firm j that combines labor and capital goods to produce output.3
We assume a monopsonic setup in which firms have market power when
hiring workers, but are price takers in the capital and output markets. Thus,
firms offer a wage bundle {WSj,WUj} that determines labor demand, and
choose an optimal amount of national and foreign capital goods subject to
the labor supply schedules of workers:
min
WUj ,WSj ,XNj ,XFj
WUjLUj +WSjLSj +XNjQNj +XFjQFj(1 + τ)











where τ corresponds to the ad-valorem tariff charged to foreign goods.
Firm- and Individual- Wage Premiums








where fL(Lj, Xj) is the marginal product of labor which is specific for each
firm, L′(Li) is the marginal product of skill type i, and λ is the lagrange mul-
tiplier that is constant across all workers. Note that we substitute L′j(Lij) =
L′(Li) because the marginal product of skill type i is the same across all firms.
3Fieler et al. (2018) present a solution for this model assuming different functional
forms of the production function. Their main results use a nested CES production function.
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Reordering terms and taking logarithms yields:
lnWij = lnλ+ ln(ϕjfL(Lj, Xj))︸ ︷︷ ︸
FWP






is a markdown that decreases wages from the com-
petitive equilibrium because of the firm’s market power. Thus, wages can be
decomposed into four separate components: 1) A value, lnλ, common to all
workers; 2) A component common to all workers in firm j (ln(ϕjfL(Lj, Xj)),
which we call the “firm-specific wage premium” (FWP); 3) an individual com-
ponent determined by the marginal productivity of skill type i (ln(L′j(Lij)), ,
which we call the worker-specific wage premium (WWP); and 4) a component
that quantifies the match between the worker and the firm (ln(mij(γij)) that
is equivalent to the wage markdown and is a function of the wage elasticity
of supply of workers to firm j.
Note that the FWP depends on the firm’s inherent productivity and on
the marginal product of labor in that specific firm. Thus, following Card et
al. (2018) we consider the FWP as a close proxy for the firm’s productivity
level.4 The WWP, on the contrary, is the marginal product worker type i
and is irrespective of the firm. Therefore, workers’ wage is highly mediated
by the firm where they work and their own productivity, which is a measure
of skill.
In addition, note that the equilibrium wages are affected by tariff changes
in two ways: 1) substituting with foreign capital goods; and 2) inducing firms
to close (or enter) and worker reallocation. Workers can receive wage in-
creases or decreases by moving to more or less productive firms, respectively.
If skilled workers (or any particular group) are more likely to reallocate into
more productive firms then we can expect wage inequality to rise.




Melitz (2003) suggested that international trade induces less productive firms
to exit the markets and more productive firms to enter. In the setting of this
paper, we observe similar patterns by analyzing the minimum productivity
level required to make a firm profitable.
Assume that firms have a level of productivity, ϕj ∼ G, that is known
before entering the market. A firm will only decide to enter if their own




WUjLUj +WSjLSj +XNQN +XFQF (1 + τ)
PN(τ)f(Lj, Xj)
(A.1)
If a firm’s productivity level is not below ϕ∗j then the firm will enter the
market. It can also be the case that a firm that is already in the market
decides to exit if ϕ∗j increases above its own productivity ϕj.
A change in tariffs affects the threshold in two ways. First, it decreases the
price of foreign goods used as inputs in production. This implies a reduction
in the input costs of firms which will enable less productive firms to enter the
market by decreasing ϕ∗j . This reduction decreases the numerator of (A.1).
Second, the reduction in the price of foreign goods also affects the demand





N) with respect to foreign goods’ prices is positive. There-
fore, a decrease in tariffs reduces the demand of national goods and therefore
the price PN . Formally P
′
N(τ) > 0, which implies that a reduction in tariffs
reduces PN , increases ϕ
∗
j , and induces less productive firms to exit the market.




depends on how these two forces interact. Formally, a change in tariffs mo-
tivates less productive firms to exit the market (i.e.
∂ϕ∗j (τ)
∂τ
< 0) if PN <
(1 + τ)P ′N(τ). In words, firm exit depends on the degree in which national
prices adjust to changes in tariffs, on the magnitude of the tariffs, and on
the magnitude of the national prices. Therefore, under certain conditions an
increase in imports penetration can motivate less productive firms to exit the
market. Workers who are able sort to more productive firms/industries will
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have wage increases, while workers who are less mobile will experience wage
losses and potentially unemployment.
A.2 Appendix Figures




















Value of Exports (in billions USD)
Notes: These graphs present the value of imports and exports in USD millions by two-digit industry
codes. These industries correspond to agriculture, manufacturing, mining, and services. The left
panel presents imports, whereas the right presents exports.
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Notes: These graphs describe the macroeconomic environment around the implementation of the free-
trade agreement. Panel A.2a presents the evolution of the exchange rate of U.S. dollars to Colombian
pesos. Panel A.2b presents the evolution of the price of oil (in dollars). The vertical solid lines depict the
period analyzed in this paper. The vertical dashed lines correspond to the year when Colombia (2010)
and the United States (2012) reduced tariffs.
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Notes: These graph presents the evolution of the informality
rate in Colombia defined as persons who do not contribute to
pension nor health. The vertical solid lines depict the period
analyzed in this paper. The vertical dashed lines correspond to




Appendix Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics Across Samples
Count Mean S.D. Min. Max.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A) Workers
1(Male) 5,870,178 0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00
Age 5,870,178 41.52 9.36 26.00 63.00
1(Works at Endline) 5,870,178 0.77 0.42 0.00 1.00
1(Same 2-digit Ind. at Endline) 4,504,017 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00
1(Same firm at Endline) 4,504,017 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00
1(Same State) 4,504,017 0.60 0.49 0.00 1.00
log(Wage) 5,499,549 15.69 1.17 0.25 22.11
log(Daily Wage) 5,482,481 10.57 0.69 0.00 18.84
1(State that Trades) 5,870,178 0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00
1(Col Reduction) 5,870,178 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00
1(USA Reduction) 5,870,178 0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00
1(Col Reduction)*1(State that Trades) 5,870,178 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00
log(Output Import Competition) 5,870,178 0.59 2.45 0.00 19.66
B) Firms
1(Open at Endline) 165,724 0.76 0.43 0.00 1.00
log(Days Worked) 165,724 7.40 1.87 0.22 15.20
log(Daily Wage) 165,693 10.48 0.55 0.04 15.92
Firm Wage Premium 152,793 -0.04 0.27 -10.75 6.96
1(State that Trades) 165,724 0.66 0.47 0.00 1.00
1(Col Reduction) 165,724 0.08 0.26 0.00 1.00
1(USA Reduction) 165,724 0.02 0.12 0.00 1.00
1(Col Reduction)*1(State that Trades) 165,724 0.05 0.23 0.00 1.00
log(Exports per Worker) 165,724 0.39 1.81 0.00 16.24
log(Output Import Competition) 165,724 0.53 2.31 0.00 19.66
C) Industry-State with at least one employee .
Employment 142,212 516.82 3,927.06 0.00 298,019.00
Wage with zeros (USD) 142,212 303.19 266.62 0.00 13,244.75
Number of Firms 142,212 20.90 264.90 0.00 34,465.00
Firm Size 142,212 23.46 114.31 0.00 16,671.00
Imports Per Worker (in millions) 142,212 0.03 2.36 0.00 384.50
Exports Per Worker (in millions) 142,212 0.01 1.09 0.00 179.68
1(COL reduction) 142,212 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00
1(USA reduction) 142,212 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00
1(States Trades with US) 142,212 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00
1(COL reduction)*Post*1(Customs) 142,212 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00
1(USA reduction)*Post*1(Customs) 142,212 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.00
Note: This table presents descriptive statistics of the three samples used. Panel A) describes the sample
of incumbent workers observed in 2010 and tracked until 2014. Panel B) describe the sample of incumbent
firms observed in 2010 and tracked until 2014. Panel C) describes the sample of industries-states-years from
2008 to 2014. Values of this sample were replaced to zero if that observation was missing for that year but
we observed it in any other year. 1() stands for a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the condition
inside parentheses is met.
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Appendix Table A.2: First Stage at the Worker and Firm Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A) Worker Level
1(COL reduction)1(Trade) 1.284** 1.277** 1.297** 1.725*** 1.731***
(0.589) (0.589) (0.589) (0.367) (0.361)
Log(Exports per Worker) 1.047*** 1.047*** 1.047*** 0.676*** 0.671***
(0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.042) (0.042)
Observations 6,615,624 6,615,624 6,615,624 6,615,624 6,615,624
F-stat 4.751 4.696 4.696 22.038 22.985
B) Firm Level
1(COL reduction)1(Trade) 4.065*** 4.066*** 4.157*** 2.728*** 2.734***
(0.352) (0.352) (0.357) (0.259) (0.254)
Log(Exports per Worker) 0.615*** 0.616*** 0.611*** 0.196*** 0.191***
(0.088) (0.088) (0.087) (0.043) (0.043)
Observations 165,724 165,724 165,724 165,724 165,724
F-stat 133.367 133.321 135.282 110.66 116.189
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes
Note: This table presents the first stage of equation 1.7. *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05,
* p¡0.1
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Appendix Table A.3: Effects of Import Competition on Indicator for
whether firm open by Quartiles of Firms-Specific Wage Premiums
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A) 2011
log(IC) 0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.003
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
B) 2012
log(IC) -0.020* -0.011 -0.007 -0.009
(0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011)
C) 2013
log(IC) -0.026*** -0.017** 0.003 -0.016*
(0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
D) 2014
log(IC) -0.027** -0.010 -0.004 -0.009
(0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012)
Observations 38,958 39,003 38,953 38,956
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
log(Exports) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table presents the estimation of Equation 1.7
on indicator for whether firm open separately by quartiles
of the firms-specific wage premiums and year. Panel A)
presents results for 2011, panel B) for 2012, panel C) for
2013, and panel D) for 2014. Column (1) plots estimates
among quartile 1, column (2) for quartile 2, column (3)
for quartile 3, and column (4) for quartile 4. All specifica-
tions control for age, age-squared, gender, wages in 2010,
and exports per workers. State and industry fixed effects
included. Standard errors clustered at the industry–state
level. *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1
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Appendix Table A.4: Effects of Import Competition on firm size by
Quartiles of Firms-Specific Wage Premiums
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A) 2011
log(IC) -0.093* 0.031 -0.024 -0.034
(0.053) (0.045) (0.055) (0.057)
B) 2012
log(IC) -0.118* -0.017 -0.007 -0.034
(0.071) (0.046) (0.062) (0.075)
C) 2013
log(IC) -0.102* 0.005 -0.012 -0.033
(0.053) (0.044) (0.056) (0.051)
D) 2014
log(IC) -0.099* 0.022 -0.014 -0.034
(0.055) (0.050) (0.059) (0.056)
Observations 37,505 37,512 37,858 38,013
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
log(Exports) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table presents the estimation of Equation 1.7
on firm size separately by quartiles of the firms-specific
wage premiums and year. Panel A) presents results for
2011, panel B) for 2012, panel C) for 2013, and panel D)
for 2014. Column (1) plots estimates among quartile 1,
column (2) for quartile 2, column (3) for quartile 3, and
column (4) for quartile 4. All specifications control for age,
age-squared, gender, wages in 2010, and exports per work-
ers. State and industry fixed effects included. Standard
errors clustered at the industry–state level. *** p¡0.01, **
p¡0.05, * p¡0.1
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Appendix Table A.5: Effects of Import Competition on Indicator for
whether the individual works by Quartiles of Firms-Specific Wage
Premiums
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A) 2011
log(IC) 0.009* 0.001 0.004 0.004
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
B) 2012
log(IC) 0.011 0.002 -0.000 -0.003
(0.007) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
C) 2013
log(IC) 0.007 -0.002 0.000 -0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
D) 2014
log(IC) 0.004 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Observations 1,411,549 1,412,053 1,411,162 1,411,607
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
log(Exports) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table presents the estimation of Equation 1.7
on indicator for whether the individual works separately by
quartiles of the workers-specific wage premiums and year.
Panel A) presents results for 2011, panel B) for 2012, panel
C) for 2013, and panel D) for 2014. Column (1) plots esti-
mates among quartile 1, column (2) for quartile 2, column
(3) for quartile 3, and column (4) for quartile 4. All specifi-
cations control for age, age-squared, gender, wages in 2010,
and exports per workers. State and industry fixed effects
included. Standard errors clustered at the industry–state
level. *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1
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Appendix Table A.6: Effects of Import Competition on Worker log Daily
Wage by Quartiles of Firms-Specific Wage Premiums
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A) 2011
log(IC) -0.032* -0.002 -0.004 -0.004
(0.017) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008)
B) 2012
log(IC) -0.056** 0.016** 0.000 0.000
(0.023) (0.008) (0.006) (0.011)
C) 2013
log(IC) -0.045*** 0.009 0.002 -0.001
(0.017) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008)
D) 2014
log(IC) -0.028** 0.013* -0.000 0.003
(0.013) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008)
Observations 1,202,821 1,237,696 1,240,444 1,266,747
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
log(Exports) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table presents the estimation of Equa-
tion 1.7 on worker log daily wage separately by quartiles
of the workers-specific wage premiums and year. Panel A)
presents results for 2011, panel B) for 2012, panel C) for
2013, and panel D) for 2014. Column (1) plots estimates
among quartile 1, column (2) for quartile 2, column (3)
for quartile 3, and column (4) for quartile 4. All specifica-
tions control for age, age-squared, gender, wages in 2010,
and exports per workers. State and industry fixed effects
included. Standard errors clustered at the industry–state
level. *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1
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Appendix Table A.7: Effects of Import Competition on Indicator for
whether working in unaffected industry by Quartiles of Firms-Specific Wage
Premiums
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A) 2011
log(IC) 0.033** 0.018 0.012 0.017
(0.016) (0.015) (0.011) (0.012)
B) 2012
log(IC) 0.038* 0.035* 0.006 0.007
(0.021) (0.018) (0.009) (0.013)
C) 2013
log(IC) 0.016 0.033* 0.016 -0.007
(0.014) (0.019) (0.015) (0.012)
D) 2014
log(IC) 0.016 0.028 -0.012 -0.004
(0.014) (0.021) (0.016) (0.014)
Observations 1,164,541 1,193,932 1,203,767 1,234,526
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
log(Exports) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table presents the estimation of Equation 1.7
on indicator for whether working in unaffected industry sep-
arately by quartiles of the workers-specific wage premiums
and year. Panel A) presents results for 2011, panel B) for
2012, panel C) for 2013, and panel D) for 2014. Column
(1) plots estimates among quartile 1, column (2) for quar-
tile 2, column (3) for quartile 3, and column (4) for quartile
4. All specifications control for age, age-squared, gender,
wages in 2010, and exports per workers. State and indus-
try fixed effects included. Standard errors clustered at the
industry–state level. *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1
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Appendix Table A.8: Effects of Import Competition on Indicator for
whether working in unaffected state by Quartiles of Firms-Specific Wage
Premiums
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A) 2011
log(IC) 0.005* 0.003 0.006*** 0.005
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
B) 2012
log(IC) 0.008 0.005* 0.009*** 0.010**
(0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005)
C) 2013
log(IC) 0.006 0.005* 0.010*** 0.008**
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
D) 2014
log(IC) 0.007* 0.004 0.010*** 0.005
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Observations 1,209,538 1,240,741 1,245,414 1,273,099
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
log(Exports) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table presents the estimation of Equation 1.7
on indicator for whether working in unaffected state sepa-
rately by quartiles of the workers-specific wage premiums
and year. Panel A) presents results for 2011, panel B) for
2012, panel C) for 2013, and panel D) for 2014. Column
(1) plots estimates among quartile 1, column (2) for quar-
tile 2, column (3) for quartile 3, and column (4) for quartile
4. All specifications control for age, age-squared, gender,
wages in 2010, and exports per workers. State and indus-
try fixed effects included. Standard errors clustered at the
industry–state level. *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1
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Appendix Table A.9: Effects of Import Competition on Indicator for
whether the individual works by Quartiles of Workers-Specific Wage
Premiums
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A) 2011
log(IC) -0.000 0.005 0.004 0.003
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
B) 2012
log(IC) -0.008** 0.003 0.005 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
C) 2013
log(IC) -0.011** 0.003 0.004 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
D) 2014
log(IC) -0.006 0.002 0.005 0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Observations 1,411,610 1,411,950 1,411,189 1,411,620
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
log(Exports) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table presents the estimation of Equation 1.7
on indicator for whether the individual works separately by
quartiles of the workers-specific wage premiums and year.
Panel A) presents results for 2011, panel B) for 2012, panel
C) for 2013, and panel D) for 2014. Column (1) plots esti-
mates among quartile 1, column (2) for quartile 2, column
(3) for quartile 3, and column (4) for quartile 4. All specifi-
cations control for age, age-squared, gender, wages in 2010,
and exports per workers. State and industry fixed effects
included. Standard errors clustered at the industry–state
level. *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1
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Appendix Table A.10: Effects of Import Competition on Worker log Daily
Wage by Quartiles of Workers-Specific Wage Premiums
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A) 2011
log(IC) 0.002 -0.010* -0.011* -0.001
(0.011) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
B) 2012
log(IC) 0.003 -0.002 -0.009 -0.005
(0.014) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
C) 2013
log(IC) 0.005 -0.002 -0.004 -0.006
(0.012) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
D) 2014
log(IC) 0.002 0.000 -0.004 -0.001
(0.012) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
Observations 1,231,395 1,205,653 1,203,824 1,306,830
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
log(Exports) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table presents the estimation of Equa-
tion 1.7 on worker log daily wage separately by quartiles
of the workers-specific wage premiums and year. Panel A)
presents results for 2011, panel B) for 2012, panel C) for
2013, and panel D) for 2014. Column (1) plots estimates
among quartile 1, column (2) for quartile 2, column (3)
for quartile 3, and column (4) for quartile 4. All specifica-
tions control for age, age-squared, gender, wages in 2010,
and exports per workers. State and industry fixed effects
included. Standard errors clustered at the industry–state
level. *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1
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Appendix Table A.11: Effects of Import Competition on Indicator for
whether working in unaffected industry by Quartiles of Workers-Specific
Wage Premiums
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A) 2011
log(IC) -0.000 0.013 0.046*** 0.007
(0.011) (0.009) (0.017) (0.007)
B) 2012
log(IC) -0.009 0.020* 0.057*** 0.011
(0.010) (0.011) (0.019) (0.007)
C) 2013
log(IC) -0.028* 0.014 0.054*** 0.008
(0.014) (0.014) (0.019) (0.010)
D) 2014
log(IC) -0.005 -0.008 0.040** 0.004
(0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.012)
Observations 1,199,398 1,159,688 1,158,841 1,278,832
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
log(Exports) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table presents the estimation of Equation 1.7
on indicator for whether working in unaffected industry sep-
arately by quartiles of the workers-specific wage premiums
and year. Panel A) presents results for 2011, panel B) for
2012, panel C) for 2013, and panel D) for 2014. Column
(1) plots estimates among quartile 1, column (2) for quar-
tile 2, column (3) for quartile 3, and column (4) for quartile
4. All specifications control for age, age-squared, gender,
wages in 2010, and exports per workers. State and indus-
try fixed effects included. Standard errors clustered at the
industry–state level. *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1
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Appendix Table A.12: Effects of Import Competition on Indicator for
whether working in unaffected state by Quartiles of Workers-Specific Wage
Premiums
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A) 2011
log(IC) -0.000 0.009*** 0.006** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
B) 2012
log(IC) 0.001 0.014*** 0.008*** 0.009***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
C) 2013
log(IC) 0.001 0.014*** 0.008*** 0.009***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
D) 2014
log(IC) 0.001 0.014*** 0.008** 0.005*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Observations 1,235,568 1,209,926 1,209,570 1,313,721
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
log(Exports) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table presents the estimation of Equation 1.7
on indicator for whether working in unaffected state sepa-
rately by quartiles of the workers-specific wage premiums
and year. Panel A) presents results for 2011, panel B) for
2012, panel C) for 2013, and panel D) for 2014. Column
(1) plots estimates among quartile 1, column (2) for quar-
tile 2, column (3) for quartile 3, and column (4) for quartile
4. All specifications control for age, age-squared, gender,
wages in 2010, and exports per workers. State and indus-
try fixed effects included. Standard errors clustered at the
industry–state level. *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1
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Appendix Table A.13: Most and Less Imported Products
Before free-trade agreement (2008-2010) After free-trade agreement (2011-2014)
Product Value of Product Value of
Imports (USD) Imports (USD)
More Imported Products
Manufacture of refined petroleum products 3,454,817,062 Manufacture of refined petroleum products 18,043,048,647
Manufacture of basic chemicals 2,986,627,388 Manufacture of basic chemicals 4,618,210,761
Manufacture of aircraft and spacecraft 2,671,057,996 Manufacture of aircraft and spacecraft 3,904,964,753
Growing of cereals and other crops n.e.c. 2,434,170,631 Growing of cereals and other crops n.e.c. 2,918,795,023
Manufacture of machinery for mining, quarrying and construction 1,674,661,590 Manufacture of plastics in primary forms and of synthetic rubber 2,424,816,198
Manufacture of plastics in primary forms and of synthetic rubber 1,319,655,422 Manufacture of motor vehicles 2,011,364,592
Manufacture of pumps, compressors, taps and valves 1,046,711,803 Manufacture of machinery for mining, quarrying and construction 1,984,965,474
Manufacture of motor vehicles 1,045,354,478 Manufacture of other chemical products n.e.c. 1,657,742,734
Manufacture of other chemical products n.e.c. 901,847,834 Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal, and botanical products 1,604,872,773
Less Imported Products
Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal, botanical 864,893,890 Manufacture of pumps, compressors, taps and valves 1,578,531,260
Dramatic arts, music and other arts activities 485,316 Motion picture and video production and distribution 810,482
Manufacture of structural non-refractory clay and ceramic products 351,996 Manufacture of television and radio transmitters 748,602
Cutting, shaping and finishing of stone 197,031 Cutting, shaping and finishing of stone 567,766
Photographic activities 191,111 Fishing, operation of fish hatcheries and fish farms 521,867
Manufacture of tobacco products 134,139 Manufacture of gas; distribution of gaseous fuels through mains 485,745
Manufacture of coke oven products 54,830 Manufacture of wooden containers 110,183
Manufacture of wooden containers 36,301 Photographic activities 79,673
Hairdressing and other beauty treatment 33,667 Manufacture of coke oven products 57,461
Dressing and dyeing of fur; manufacture of articles of fur 24,040 Architectural and engineering activities 38,926
Manufacture of gas; distribution of gaseous fuels through mains 10,515 Dressing and dyeing of fur; manufacture of articles of fur 29,811
Architectural and engineering activities 9,797 Hairdressing and other beauty treatment 4,214





Appendix Table B.1: School Shooting Episodes
Year School City State Victims Fatalities
1 1998 Westside School Jonesboro Arkansas 15 5
2 1998 Thurston High School Springfield Oregon 29 4
3 1999 Columbine High School Littleton Colorado 37 13
4 1999 Heritage High School Conyers Georgia 6 0
5 1999 Fort Gibson Middle School Fort Gibson Oklahoma 4 0
6 2001 Santana High School San Diego California 15 2
7 2006 Orange High School Hillsborough North Carolina 3 1
8 2006 West Nickel Mines Amish School Lancaster Pennsylvania 10 5
9 2007 Springwater Trail High School Gresham Oregon 10 0
10 2007 Success Tech Academy Cleveland Ohio 4 1
11 2007 South Middle School Football Game Saginaw Michigan 4 0
12 2012 Chardon High School Chardon Ohio 6 3
13 2012 Sandy Hook Elementary School Newtown Connecticut 29 27
14 2013 Sparks Middle School Sparks Nevada 3 1
15 2014 Marysville-Pilchuck High School Marysville Washington 5 4
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Appendix Table B.2: Taking out one episode at a time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Chardon Cleveland Columbine Conyers Fort Gibson Gresham Hillsborough Jonesboro
1(Within Affected SD) -0.120*** -0.040** -0.124*** -0.118*** -0.113*** -0.114*** -0.113*** -0.111***
*1(After Shooting) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016)
Observations 787,851 728,053 612,455 676,761 791,852 784,542 750,846 797,611
R-squared 0.710 0.712 0.711 0.720 0.703 0.707 0.710 0.706
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Lancaster Marysville Newton Saginaw San Diego Sparks Springfield
1(Within Affected SD) -0.112*** -0.121*** -0.111*** -0.071*** -0.124*** -0.142*** -0.128***
*1(After Shooting) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.011) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018)
Observations 788,216 762,995 788,427 788,506 604,951 724,930 778,558
R-squared 0.707 0.706 0.703 0.699 0.673 0.703 0.721
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year*Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Episode Specific Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Property Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weighted Regression Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: All columns use a three-year window around the episode. For each column we dropped observations for one of the episodes and
estimate the model in the remaining ones. All the regressions are weighted by one over the total number of transactions per episode.
Property characteristics include the log of area of land, the log of area of building, a dummy for whether or not is an apartment, a dummy
if the property has a fireplace, a dummy if the house is constructed with brick, and the number of bedrooms. Standard errors clustered
at the census tract level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Appendix Table B.3: Effect of School Shootings around Boundary with
Different Radius
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0.3 Mi. 0.5 Mi. 1 Mi. 2 Mi. 3 Mi.
1(Within Affected SD) 0.054 0.050 0.044 0.025 0.021
(0.046) (0.040) (0.041) (0.036) (0.034)
1(Within Affected SD) -0.104*** -0.114*** -0.125*** -0.126*** -0.112***
*1(After Shooting) (0.037) (0.032) (0.023) (0.016) (0.013)
Constant 352.736*** 334.771*** 298.816*** 191.569*** -26.281
(62.475) (51.393) (40.065) (33.737) (49.847)
Observations 11,855 19,661 39,481 70,548 98,493
R-squared 0.733 0.739 0.726 0.735 0.744
Census Tract FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year*Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Episode Specific Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Property Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the deflated price per property. All the
columns vary the radius around the school district boundary. Property characteristics
include the log of area of land, the log of area of building, a dummy for whether or
not is an apartment, a dummy for whether or not is a condo, a dummy if the property
has a fireplace, a dummy if the house is constructed with brick, and the number of
bedrooms. Standard errors clustered at the census tract level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
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Appendix Table B.4: Average Effect of School Shootings on
Non-Residential Properties
Dependent Variable : ln(Price)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1(Within Affected SD)*1(After Shooting) 0.011 0.005 0.033 0.091*
(0.048) (0.043) (0.042) (0.047)
Constant 7.054*** 2.052*** 201.955 -99.178
(0.438) (0.344) (366.194) (435.684)
Observations 13,151 13,151 13,151 13,151
R-squared 0.509 0.621 0.623 0.633
Year*Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Census Tract FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Property Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Episode Specific Trend Yes Yes
Weighted Regression Yes
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the deflated price per property. Estimations
include all non-residential properties (i.e. industrial and commercial properties) within the
school district. Property characteristics include the log of area of land, the log of area
of building, a dummy for whether or not the property is an apartment. The regression in
column 4 weighs the observations by the inverse of the total number of properties sold within





C.1 Appendix: Additional Tables
Appendix Table C.1: Estimates of the Effect of Cognitive Skills from
Previous Literature
Skills Reference Country/ Population Identification Estimation Dependent Rangea
City in Estimating Strategy Variable Lowest Highest
Sample (log) Estimate Estimate
Panel A: Numeracy




1990 & 1986 weekly
wage
0.028 0.030b




1978 & 1986 hourly
wage
0.026 0.069c







(Song et al., 2008) USA College graduates
Selection on
Observables
IV 1993 earnings 0.181 0.210d







(Hanushek et al., 2015) Several








Panel B : Literacy
(Ishikawa & Ryan, 2002) USA Adults above 16
Selection on
Observables
OLS weekly wages 0.001 0.008g
(Fasih et al., 2013) Several




OLS hourly wage 0.021 0.210h
(Hanushek et al., 2015) Several




OLS 1993 earnings 0.068 0.171
(Sanders, 2016) USA




OLS real wages -0.056 -0.024
a Estimates points correspond to standardized test scores, unless another interpretation is suggested. b Estimations correspond to the number of mathematics
classes taken during high school. c Point estimates are given originally for levels of a mathematics score. Since a one standard deviation is 6.25, then coefficients
are translated into this scale. Lower and upper bounds correspond, respectively, to 1972 and 1980 high school graduates. d The mathematics score is estimated in
levels. e Numeracy is a dummy valued 1 if individuals took a high-level mathematics course during high school. Reported bounds correspond to the pilot school
sample. f Numeracy is also estimated using literacy as instrument and the coefficient found is 0.201. g Lower and Upper bounds correspond to the point estimates
for Black men’s and Hispanic men’s samples, which respectively are the lowest and highest point estimates. Literacy was estimated in levels. h Lower and Upper
bounds correspond to the point estimates for Denmark and Bermuda, which are respectively the lowest and largest estimates found. See the paper for more details.
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Appendix Table C.2: Estimates of the Effect of Cognitive Skills from
Previous Literature (Cont.)
Skills Reference Country/ Population Identification Estimation Dependent Range
City in Estimating Strategy Variable Lowest Highest
Sample (log) Estimate Estimate
Panel C : Foreign Language





IV 1990 annual wage 0.222 0.334i
(Saiz & Zoido, 2005) USA College graduates
Selection on
Observables
OLS 1997 hourly wage 0.025 0.028j
(Christofides & Swidinsky, 2010) Quebec (CA)
Fulltime native work-
ers aged 15 to 64
Selection on
Observables
OLS 2000 earnings 0.109 0.139k
(Azam et al., 2013) India




OLS 2005 earnings 0.345 0.603l
(Guo & Sun, 2014) China College graduates
Selection on
Observables
OLS 2010 monthly wage 0.033 0.131m









(Di Paolo & Tansel, 2015) Turkey Male workers
Selection on
Observables
OLS 2007 wage 0.107 0.072o







i The independent variable takes 1 as value if individual speaks English very well. j IV, Panel and PSM estimations are also considered. For instance, PSM point estimates
ranged from 0.020 to 0.021. k Point estimates correspond to a subsample of only men. The independent variable takes 1 as value if individual uses English in his/her
workplace. Estimations are also carried for women and ranged from 0.068 to 0.076. l Point estimates for a dummy variable that takes 1 as value if the individual is fluent
in English. Estimations for knowing little English can be seen in the paper. m The English score of CET-4 test is used to measure foreign language proficiency, check the
paper for more details. n Lower bound corresponds to OLS estimation and Upper bound corresponds to IV estimation using simultaneously the following instruments:
1(arrived before 12), 1(has a child proficient in spanish) and 1(willingness to stay in Spain). o The independent variable takes 1 as value if the individual knows english.
Other languages are estimated (French, German, Arabic and Russian), but those who know english account for 76%. pThe independent variable takes 1 as value if the
individual’s occupation requires expertise in a foreign language.




Accept the difference and work under multicultural contexts 0.565
Learn and keep updated 0.593
Work under pressure 0.504
Adopt a coexistence culture 0.589
Work independently without permanent supervision 0.557
Convince and persuade others 0.532
Identify and use communication symbols
0.344
(i.e. non-verbal or iconic language)
Abstraction capacity, analysis and synthesis 0.625
Identify, plan and solve problems 0.680
Notes. The answers for each item ranges from 1 to 4: (1) Very unsatisfied, (2) Unsatisfied, (3)
Satisfied and (4) Very satisfied. The largest eigenvalue from a factor analysis model is 2.836, and
the second largest is 0.109. For each item, the factor loadings in this table correspond to the factor
with the largest eigenvalue. The scale reliability coefficient, α, is 0.80.
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To be creative and innovative 0.5836
Look for, analyze, manage and share information 0.6014
Understand the surrounding reality 0.6350
Assume responsibilities and make decisions 0.6959
Plan and use time effectively to achieve the goals 0.6294
Formulate and execute projects 0.5479
Work in teams to achieve common goals 0.6575
Consider values and professional ethics to perform tasks 0.6479
Adapt to changes 0.6486
Take risks 0.6712
Identify opportunities and resources 0.6660
Notes. The answers for each item ranges from 1 to 4: (1) Very unsatisfied, (2) Unsatisfied, (3)
Satisfied and (4) Very satisfied. The largest eigenvalue from a factor analysis model is 4.453,
and the second largest is 0.109. For each item, the factor loadings in this table correspond to
the factor with the largest eigenvalue. The scale reliability coefficient, α, is 0.88.
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(N = 363,330) (N = 155,939) (N = 2,401)
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. p-value
(1) (2) (3) (1) - (2) (1) - (3)
Panel A: Socioeconomic Statistics
Age 26.93 3.44 26.86 3.5 28.74 4.57 0.00 0.00
Share female 0.61 0.49 0.63 0.48 0.59 0.49 0.00 0.08
Share living in big urban areas 0.73 0.45 0.71 0.45 0.80 0.40 0.00 0.00
Share living in low income households 0.45 0.50 0.43 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.00 0.40
Share graduate students 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.17 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.00
Panel B : Education Statistics
Share graduated from:
STEM 0.26 0.44 0.26 0.44 0.25 0.44 0.29 0.36
Business and Economics 0.31 0.46 0.27 0.45 0.27 0.44 0.00 0.00
Social Sc. and Humanities 0.16 0.36 0.15 0.36 0.12 0.33 0.00 0.00
Health and Education 0.22 0.41 0.28 0.45 0.22 0.41 0.00 0.66
Share postsecondary degrees:
Two-Year Private 0.09 0.29 0.04 0.20 0.40 0.49 0.00 0.00
Two-Year Public 0.10 0.30 0.05 0.21 0.10 0.3 0.00 0.64
Four-Year Private 0.50 0.50 0.56 0.50 0.32 0.47 0.00 0.00
Four-Year Public 0.32 0.47 0.36 0.48 0.18 0.38 0.00 0.00
Panel C : Occupation Statistics
Share working in:
Manufacture 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.27 0.00 0.60
Commerce 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.17 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.27
Services 0.54 0.50 0.55 0.50 0.60 0.49 0.00 0.00
Turism 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.83
Retail 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.20 0.00 0.95
Share working as:
Public Employee 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.21 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.12
Independent Workers 0.07 0.25 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.03
Share working in firms that are:
[1− 10] 0.15 0.36 0.14 0.35 0.12 0.32 0.00 0.00
[11− 50] 0.18 0.39 0.18 0.39 0.16 0.37 0.97 0.02
[51− 100] 0.08 0.28 0.08 0.28 0.09 0.29 0.32 0.13
[101− 500] 0.21 0.40 0.21 0.41 0.21 0.41 0.15 0.50
[501− 1000] 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.29 0.02 0.26
[1001+] 0.28 0.45 0.28 0.45 0.33 0.47 0.01 0.00
Panel D : Labor Statistics
Current Wage 16.86 11.24 17.48 11.59 19.75 10.79 0.00 0.00
First Wage 13.42 8.48 14.07 8.88 12.85 7.72 0.00 0.00
Average Wage 15.17 8.86 15.8 9.21 16.19 7.92 0.00 0.00
Current Tenure 1.77 1.02 1.78 1.11 2.28 1.3 0.00 0.00
Notes. Descriptive statistics of students who took the college exit exam from 2011 to 2015 for whom data were matched to earnings and college
records. Big urban area refers to the largest 13 cities in Colombia. Low-income households refer to individuals in the first two income strata designated
by place of residence. Wages are presented in nominal 2016 USD currency (1 USD = 3,050.98 COP).
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Appendix Table C.6: Correlation Matrix across Test Scores
High School Exit Exams College Exit Exams
Average Subject Literacy Numeracy Foreign Literacy Numeracy Foreign
Panel A:
Full Sample (N = 363,330)
High School Exit Exams:
Subject 0.941*
Literacy 0.708* 0.595*
Numeracy 0.671* 0.546* 0.394*
Foreign Language 0.726* 0.571* 0.460* 0.428*
College Exit Exams:
Literacy 0.537* 0.497* 0.438* 0.314* 0.390*
Numeracy 0.584* 0.553* 0.394* 0.487* 0.401* 0.449*
Foreign Language 0.611* 0.515* 0.414* 0.393* 0.678* 0.458* 0.464*
Panel B :
Specific Sample (N = 155,939)
High School Exit Exams:
Subject 0.941*
Literacy 0.705* 0.593*
Numeracy 0.676* 0.553* 0.396*
Foreign Language 0.727* 0.573* 0.459* 0.431*
College Exit Exams:
Literacy 0.553* 0.513* 0.446* 0.331* 0.401*
Numeracy 0.611* 0.579* 0.409* 0.509* 0.424* 0.470*
Foreign Language 0.623* 0.526* 0.419* 0.405* 0.687* 0.472* 0.490*
Major-Specific 0.520* 0.496* 0.394* 0.344* 0.345* 0.519* 0.511* 0.413*
Panel C :
Survey Sample (N = 2,401)
High School Exit Exams:
Subject 0.933*
Literacy 0.708* 0.586*
Numeracy 0.620* 0.483* 0.369*
Foreign Language 0.668* 0.508* 0.420* 0.347*
College Exit Exams:
Literacy 0.505* 0.461* 0.430* 0.278* 0.335*
Numeracy 0.513* 0.483* 0.373* 0.417* 0.321* 0.395*
Foreign Language 0.597* 0.500* 0.434* 0.352* 0.636* 0.463* 0.400*
Socioemotional :
Factor Score 0.054* 0.053* 0.038† 0.047* 0.039† 0.026 0.025 0.058*
Notes. Pairwise correlations are estimated using the Pearson’s formula. For both the college exit exam (Saber Pro) and the high school
exit exam (Saber 11 ), individuals’ scores are standardized with respect to the corresponding average in each test edition. The specific scores
from the college exit exam are standardized with respect to the average of the test edition and the corresponding group of related programs.
The subject score from the high school exit exam is computed as the standardized average of biology, philosophy, physics, chemistry, and
social science tests. The non-cognitive scores were computed as the predictions from a factor model considering categorical answers to nine
questions (see Appendix Table C.3). † p<0.1, * p<0.05.
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Appendix Table C.7: Other Outcomes
Dependent Variable: Dependent Variable: Dependent Variable:
log(First Wage After Graduation) log(Avg. Wage Since Graduation) log(Current Earnings)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Two-Year Private 0.068 0.061 0.144 0.078 0.077 0.137 0.080 0.084 0.130
[0.009] [0.010] [0.026] [0.011] [0.009] [0.036] [0.014] [0.013] [0.050]
Four-Year Public 0.149 0.156 0.287 0.174 0.171 0.263 0.177 0.159 0.199
[0.010] [0.013] [0.029] [0.010] [0.012] [0.029] [0.011] [0.014] [0.041]
Four-Year Private 0.211 0.221 0.216 0.244 0.244 0.225 0.251 0.239 0.218
[0.017] [0.019] [0.027] [0.018] [0.018] [0.025] [0.020] [0.022] [0.035]
Literacy 0.016 0.010 0.008 0.023 0.016 0.017 0.027 0.020 0.015
[0.001] [0.002] [0.009] [0.001] [0.002] [0.006] [0.001] [0.002] [0.008]
Numeracy 0.025 0.018 0.032 0.031 0.023 0.020 0.035 0.026 0.022
[0.001] [0.002] [0.011] [0.001] [0.002] [0.010] [0.002] [0.003] [0.010]
Foreign language 0.011 0.013 0.047 0.015 0.016 0.032 0.015 0.015 0.025
[0.003] [0.003] [0.008] [0.004] [0.004] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005] [0.007]
Field Specific 0.016 0.020 0.022
[0.003] [0.004] [0.004]
Socioemotional 0.010 0.021 0.021
[0.011] [0.008] [0.006]
College Reputation 0.026 0.029 0.030 0.031 0.032 0.050 0.032 0.031 0.059
[0.005] [0.005] [0.017] [0.004] [0.005] [0.020] [0.004] [0.005] [0.023]
Sample: Full Specific Survey Full Specific Survey Full Specific Survey
Observations 363,330 155,939 2,401 363,330 155,939 2,401 363,330 155,939 2,401
R-squared 0.196 0.237 0.244 0.233 0.264 0.324 0.195 0.220 0.244
Controls:
Individual Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Field of Study Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes. Estimations in columns (1), (4) and (7) follow the specification of column (4) in Table 3.1. Estimations in columns (2), (5) and (8) follow the
specification of column (5) in Table 3.1. Estimations in columns (3), (6) and (9) follow the specification of column (6) in Table 3.1. The dependent variable
for columns (1) to (3) is the log of the first wage observed after the individual’s graduation year. The dependent variable for columns (4) to (6) is the log of
the average wage from 2011 to 2016 for each individual, taking into account only wages after the year of graduation. The dependent variable for columns
(7) to (9) is the log of the last observed annual earnings for each individual. Individual and field of study controls as described in the notes of Table 3.1.
Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and in brackets.
Appendix Table C.8: Extensions: Estimates’ Ranges and Measurement
Error
Dependent Variable: log(Current Wage)
OLS IV: Measurement Error Correction
Simultaneous Stacked Simultaneous Stacked
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Literacy 0.026 0.020 0.015 0.036 0.034 0.022 0.075 0.010 0.099 0.100 0.110
[0.001] [0.002] [0.008] [0.001] [0.002] [0.009] [0.010] [0.059] [0.012] [0.014] [0.046]
Numeracy 0.034 0.025 0.017 0.043 0.040 0.024 0.048 0.114 0.085 0.081 0.127
[0.003] [0.003] [0.009] [0.003] [0.003] [0.009] [0.007] [0.044] [0.010] [0.013] [0.029]
Foreign Language 0.010 0.011 0.024 0.024 0.026 0.031 -0.009 0.021 0.034 0.036 0.060
[0.005] [0.005] [0.013] [0.006] [0.006] [0.014] [0.004] [0.028] [0.006] [0.006] [0.022]
Field Specific 0.021 0.037 0.119
[0.004] [0.002] [0.019]
Socioemotional 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.007
[0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.007]
Sample: Full Specific Survey Full Specific Survey Full Survey Full Specific Survey
Observations 363,330 155,939 2,401 363,330 155,939 2,401 363,330 2,401 363,330 155,939 2,401
Controls:
Individual & Field Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
College Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes. The dependent variable and measures of skills are as described in the notes of Table 3.1. Estimations within the full sample use the same
specification as column (6) of Table 3.1. Likewise, estimations within the specific and survey samples use respectively the specifications of columns (8)
and (10) of Table 3.1. Stacked results refer to separate regressions for each ability measure. In columns (7) to (9), cognitive skills were instrumented, each
time using numeracy, literacy and foreign language standardized scores computed from the high school exit exam. Individual and types of degrees area as
described in the notes of Table 3.1. Standard errors clustered by municipality and in brackets.
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Appendix Table C.9: Extensions: Estimates’ Ranges and Measurement
Error
Dependent Variable: log(Current Wage)
Panel A: Ordinary Least Squares Estimations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Two-Year Private 0.080 0.084 0.128 0.081 0.078 0.078 0.086 0.083 0.083 0.084 0.129 0.129 0.126 0.132
[0.014] [0.012] [0.049] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.053] [0.052] [0.051] [0.052]
Four-Year Public 0.174 0.156 0.197 0.176 0.175 0.173 0.159 0.156 0.161 0.164 0.197 0.199 0.206 0.208
[0.011] [0.013] [0.042] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.043] [0.043] [0.042] [0.044]
Four-Year Private 0.249 0.236 0.212 0.247 0.249 0.240 0.235 0.234 0.232 0.240 0.215 0.221 0.211 0.222
[0.020] [0.021] [0.036] [0.020] [0.020] [0.019] [0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.039] [0.038] [0.037] [0.038]
Literacy 0.027 0.020 0.017 0.038 0.036 0.026
[0.001] [0.002] [0.007] [0.002] [0.002] [0.007]
Numeracy 0.035 0.025 0.019 0.044 0.041 0.027
[0.002] [0.003] [0.010] [0.003] [0.003] [0.010]
Foreign language 0.016 0.016 0.026 0.030 0.031 0.035
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007]




Sample: Full Specific Survey Full Full Full Specific Specific Specific Specific Survey Survey Survey Survey
Observations 363,330 155,939 2,401 363,330 363,330 363,330 155,939 155,939 155,939 155,939 2,401 2,401 2,401 2,401
R-squared 0.194 0.219 0.247 0.191 0.192 0.189 0.216 0.217 0.215 0.217 0.243 0.243 0.243 0.243
Panel B : IV: Measurement Error Correction
(15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27)
Two-Year Private 0.083 0.128 0.085 0.079 0.078 0.090 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.126 0.126 0.124 0.132
[0.015] [0.045] [0.016] [0.014] [0.014] [0.013] [0.011] [0.013] [0.012] [0.054] [0.047] [0.050] [0.052]
Four-Year Public 0.176 0.169 0.177 0.174 0.173 0.153 0.148 0.160 0.168 0.165 0.170 0.206 0.208
[0.012] [0.045] [0.012] [0.011] [0.011] [0.014] [0.013] [0.013] [0.015] [0.040] [0.041] [0.042] [0.044]
Four-Year Private 0.257 0.225 0.255 0.254 0.238 0.235 0.232 0.231 0.252 0.197 0.222 0.206 0.222
[0.022] [0.034] [0.022] [0.021] [0.020] [0.022] [0.021] [0.021] [0.023] [0.042] [0.035] [0.036] [0.038]
Literacy 0.075 -0.004 0.105 0.106 0.112
[0.011] [0.057] [0.012] [0.013] [0.046]
Numeracy 0.045 0.154 0.087 0.083 0.140
[0.006] [0.046] [0.008] [0.010] [0.028]
Foreign language -0.002 0.002 0.040 0.041 0.053





Sample: Full Survey Full Full Full Specific Specific Specific Specific Survey Survey Survey Survey
Observations 363,330 2,401 363,330 363,330 363,330 155,939 155,939 155,939 155,939 2,401 2,401 2,401 2,401
R-squared 0.042 0.046 0.034 0.042 0.043 0.028 0.036 0.037 0.023 0.071 0.054 0.097 0.097
Controls:
Individual & Field Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Types of Degrees Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes.The dependent variable and measures of skills are as described in the notes of Table 3.1. Estimations within the full sample use the same specification as column
(1) of Table 3.1. Likewise, estimations within the specific and survey samples use, respectively, the specifications of columns (3) and (5) of Table 3.1. Measures of
numeracy, literacy and foreign language computed from the high school exit exam are used as instruments within the full and specific samples. We additionally include an
alternative measure of non-cognitive skill as instrument within the survey sample. Individual and types of degrees area as described in the notes of Table 3.1. Standard
errors clustered by municipality and in brackets.
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C.2 Appendix: Skills Measures
In this appendix, we describe the cognitive abilities evaluated in the college
exit exam and the high school exit exam. We also describe the non-cognitive
abilities collected in the follow-up survey of graduates, and how we compute
the different measures of skills used in the paper.
The abilities tested in the college exit exam (Saber Pro) are divided into
two sections. The first section has five mandatory general tests and consists
of 160 multiple choice questions and one open question, lasting a maximum
of four hours and 40 minutes. The main objective of this section is to eval-
uate common abilities that students from the wide range of fields should be
able to apply in non-specialized tasks. On the other hand, some students
also take a second section with specific tests. This section is only available if
the student’s college previously decided which specific tests will be applied to
their undergraduate programs. There are 40 specific tests and combinations
of theses suggested for each field of study or group of related programs.1 Fol-
lowing those combinations, colleges can require up to three specific tests. The
maximum time allowed for students taking one specific test is one hour and
30 minutes, while students taking two or three specific tests have a maximum
of four hours and 30 minutes. Appendix Table C.10 presents more details on
the abilities evaluated and a sample question for each general test. It also
shows one question for the Economic Analysis test, to present an example
for one of the specific tests evaluated in the second part of the college exit
exam.
We now describe how the different measures of skills were computed. Let
ηti be student i’s scores for ηt, which is test η applied in time t. Let µηt be







where It is the set of students who took ηt. Thus, the standardized score
of ηti with respect to µηt is τti =
(ηti−µηt )
σηt
, where the standard deviation of ηt
1Throughout the years there have been changes in some of these specific evaluations
and, thus, our data contains a total of 87 specific tests. For instance, some specific tests










Now let µsηt be the mean of ηt, but computed within a sample s ⊆ |It|. If
i ∈ s, then τ st i is the standardized score of ηti within sample s.
Taking the previous framework into account, we use the test scores from
the Saber Pro exam to compute literacy, numeracy and foreign language
measures as the standardized scores within the four samples mentioned in
Appendix C.3. Hence, for each individual in a sample, the numeracy ability
level is the standardized score of the quantitative reasoning test with respect
to the mean in the time period in which the test was taken, considering
only individuals within the sample. Likewise, the foreign language ability
level is computed as the standardized score of the English proficiency test
within each sample. On the other hand, to define the literacy measure we
first compute the average score of written communication and critical reading
tests, and then standardized the resulting vector in the same way as we did
for numeracy and foreign language. To compute the specific skills measure,
we first average all field-specific test scores available for each student and
then proceed to standardize the resulting vector, this time considering both
the sample and group of related majors.
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Appendix Table C.10: Description of Tests and Abilities Evaluated in the
Saber Pro Exam
Test Evaluated Abilities Sample Question
Section 1:
Critical Reading Abilities that allow individuals to understand, inter- The text’s author states that “seeking justice
(35 Questions) pret and analyze texts found in both, common life is the eternal seeking of human happiness”.
and non-specialized academic scenarios. This statement: A) implies that “every human
pursues hapiness”, B) does not imply that
“seeking justice is seeking happiness”
Quantitative Mathematic abilities that every citizen should have, Four utility companies estimated their daily
Reasoning independently of their profession or occupacion, such efficiency to solve customer complaints:
(35 Questions) as: algebra, calculus, geometry, statistics, interpreta- Electricity: 2 out of 3 solved complaints per
tion of numeric information, use of mathematics to day. Aqueduct: 5 out of 6. Telephone: 9 out
formulate and execute plans, and use of mathematics of 10. The average efficiency for one of
to solve problems. these companies is : A) 72%, B) 79%
Citizenship Knowledge and abilities to understand the social To reduce traffic jams within a city, a major
Abilities environment and its issues, as well as abilities to decided to restrict the free circulation of vehi-
(35 Questions) analyze positions taken by different parties invol- cles using the last digit of license plates.
ved in a conflicting situation. The offer of public transporation in the city
is limited and has low quality. What undesired
effects may cause to the mentioned policy
for citizens using the public transportation?
Written Abilities to communicate ideas in writing, regarding Some consider that national and international
Communication a given topic. Students are asked to produce a text sport competitions are used for political and
(1 Open Question) in response to a non-specialized problem. commercial means. Do you agree or disagree
with this opinion? Discuss.
English Communication abilities in English throughout read- The Ozone Layer is a “blanket” (1) earth.
Proficiency ing, grammar and vocabulary tasks. It protects (2) from the sun’s UV rays.
(55 Questions) Fill the blanks: (1) A) around, B) through;
(2) A) our, B) us.
Section 2:
Specific Tests Abilities that different postsecondary programs must (Economic Analysis Test:) Consider a linear model
(30 - 60 Questions) provide to its students. These abilities have been de- y = Xβ + ε, where ε is an error term. Assuming that
fined between the Ministry of Education, the academic E(X ′ε) = 0, then: A) OLS are consistent, and 2SLS
and professional community, and the industry. are consistent and efficient. B) OLS are inconsistent
and 2SLS are consistent and efficient. (OLS: Ordi-
nary Least Squares; 2SLS: Two-Stage Least Squares)
Notes. Information adapted by the authors from Icfes (2017).
To compute the non-cognitive skills measure, we rely on a module of abil-
ities contained in the follow-up survey of graduates. The questionnaire for
this module emphasizes, previous to ask any question, that an acquired abil-
ity allows individuals to use their knowledge to solve problems in different
contexts, and to perform efficiently in their social, academic and working
activities. The items we use from the module of abilities are presented in
Appendix Table C.3. Surveyed individuals are asked to pinpoint the satisfac-
tion level, regarding the academic and labor impact of each item or ability
acquired during their undergraduate studies. Additionally, we present the
loadings from a factor analysis model performed using the nine items in this
table. Using these results we predict a vector of non-cognitive scores, which
is then standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation one.
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Following MacLeod et al. (2017), we used the administrative records of
undergraduate students to build a measure of college reputation or quality.
This measure is defined as the mean admission score of graduates, then for







where Gct is the set of students graduating from college c in time t, and
η̃i is the percentile score of individual i ∈ Gct in the high school exit exam.
We then standardized Rct to have mean zero and standard deviation one.
C.3 Appendix: Data Construction
In this appendix, we explain in detail the construction of samples used in
the paper. The starting point is to append the individual records of Saber
Pro exams applied between the second semester of 2011 and 2015. This is
our population.2 The Colombian Institute for the Evaluation of Education
(ICFES, in Spanish) applies Saber Pro twice per year to undergraduate stu-
dents who have passed at least three-fourths of their coursework. For thesis
students, the exam constitutes a graduation requirement. Our data contain
information for around 1,448,000 students who have been tested in critical
reading, written communication, English proficiency, and quantitative rea-
soning. A test in citizenship abilities has been also evaluated since 2012, and
almost 90% of students have available scores for this test.
For almost 42% of the population, the data include scores from different
field-specific tests. The specific exam taken by each student depends exclu-
sively on the college decision, which has to be supported by ICFES. For each
program, ICFES suggests a list of potential specific tests per program. Then,
each college decides which specific test(s) are their students taking. Students
can take up to three specific tests. For more details on measures of skills,
and the test scores used to compute them, see Appendix C.2.
2It is worth noting that the decision to choose the mentioned period of time was driven
by the fact that students attending certain undergraduate programs were exempted from
taking Saber Pro during previous editions of the exam.
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The second step in our data construction is to link the data from Saber
Pro with college and labor market records from different sources. We merge
individuals using the national identification number. For the subset of indi-
viduals that we are unable to merge by these means, we conduct a record
linkage procedure using names and dates of birth.3 Appendix Table C.11
shows the merging results by technique and a measure of reliability for ob-
servations merged using record linkage.
We merge the population of students in Saber Pro with three other datasets.
First, we merge it with the corresponding results in the high school exit ex-
amination, known as Saber 11. We merge 83% of observations with a file
containing high school test-takers from 1996 to 2013. Saber 11 data in-
clude socioeconomic variables such as gender, household stratum and the
high school from which the student graduated.4 Most importantly, these
data allow us to obtain a proxy of initial abilities, since individuals taking
Saber 11 were evaluated in mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, lan-
guage, philosophy, geography, history, social sciences and foreign language.5
Second, we merge individuals in Saber Pro with a file containing records of
individuals enrolled in college between 1998 and 2016. This dataset is known
as Spadies (in Spanish “Sistema para la prevención de la deserción de la Ed-
ucación Superior”). The information in this file is collected each semester
by the Ministry of Education directly from all colleges. Eighty-two percent
of students in Saber Pro were linked to this administrative data, which al-
lowed us to compute a measure of college quality proposed by MacLeod et al.
3In Colombia, individuals change their identification number when they turn 18. A
large portion of individuals graduate from high school before this age and, thus, using the
identification number is not enough to merge information from postsecondary education,
or labor market information, with high school information. We use a crosswalk of national
identification numbers between youth IDs (before they turn 18) and adult IDs (after they
turn 18) provided by the Colombian registry’s office (in Spanish “Registraduŕıa General
de la Nación”). We minimize the number of fuzzy matches using this crosswalk. For the
remaining sample, we rely on other merging techniques to link our available datasets.
4In the text we explain that each household in Colombia is given a stratum number
depending on the neighborhood in which it is located.
5Before the second semester of 2006, students taking Saber 11 were allowed to choose
among three foreign language tests: English, French or German. But, despite having these
options, 99% of students chose English as their test. Because of this reason, nowadays the
only foreign language tested is English.
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(2017). By these means, we obtain information regarding college attendance,
students’ major, and access to college loans.
Third, we merge records on monthly wages of college graduates. These
records are gathered by the Colombian social security administration office.6
We merge 64% of Saber Pro students with these records. We use a sample
of graduates who received their degrees between 2012 and 2016, and whose
monthly wage is observed between the second and third quarters after their
corresponding semester of graduation. The merged data provided us with
an observation of the monthly wage after graduation for each year between
2012 and 2016. The data also allow us to have information on the city
or municipality where individuals work, four-digit industrial codes, and the
tax-identification of employers or firms. Notice that some individuals, among
Saber Pro test-takers, may have received their diplomas after the period of
time for our sample of graduates, or may have dropped out of college. In
these two cases, we are not able to link or merge them into our sample,
explaining our merging results.
Appendix Table C.11: Results by Merging Technique with Saber Pro
Dataset
Dataset Identity Card Record Linkage
High School Exit Exam (Saber 11) 281,861 905,748 (0.98)
Undergraduate Enrollees (Spadies) 1,027,802 160,435 (0.97)
Graduates Social Security Records (OLE) 922,684 12,844 (0.96)
Notes. The numbers in this table correspond to individuals merged with a total of 1,448,395
Saber Pro test-takers. Record linkage merging method used names and birthdates to pair
individuals. Average Jaccard index of similarity between names in parenthesis. A score of
1 is assigned to names with perfect similarity, a score of 0 is assigned to names without
similarity. We required birth dates to be equal in order to merge individuals.
After assembling the mentioned datasets with the Saber Pro population,
we obtain a subset of 743,542 students who belong to the intersection of the
three merging processes. However, we also make some selection of individuals
in order to have more homogeneous samples. For instance, some individuals
may have taken the college exit exam on different occasions. These could be
individuals attending different undergraduate programs. For these, we keep
the information from the first observed test scores, considering that those
6We were given access to these data by the Labor Observatory for Education (OLE,
in Spanish), which is part of the Ministry of Education.
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should reflect their level of skills at the time when they entered the labor
market as graduates. It is also possible that some students took the high
school exit exam more than once. In that case, we leave the information
from the first observed results, keeping in mind that some individuals could
have prepared after graduating from high school to apply for funding or a
scholarship. It is also possible that students took the test more than once
in order to get the minimum scores required to be admitted to some under-
graduate programs. Also, we drop individuals who are under 19 or above the
retirement age in Colombia (i.e. 57 years old for women and 62 for men).
Individuals who graduated from other undergraduate programs before 2012
are dropped as well.
We exclude observations with missing values in any of the independent
variables commonly used in our regressions, remaining with a pool of 437,673
test-takers. We link them to individuals in a follow-up survey of graduates
that contains information on non-cognitive abilities. The survey takes a strat-
ified probabilistic sample from students who received their diplomas during
the past year, three years ago and five years ago. Using the 2013 and 2014
surveys, we obtain information for a random sample of individuals whobe-
long to cohorts of graduates from 2011 to 2013.
Notice that for the described sample, we observe values for gender, age,
socioeconomic stratum, and also for literacy, numeracy and foreign language
skills from both the college and high school exit exams. However, we may
not have information about their high school, their specific skills, their non-
cognitive skills or current wage. Thus, from this pool or complete sample
(N = 437, 673), we obtained three subsets: i) a full sample with formal
workers for whom we observe high school and current wage (N = 363, 330);
ii) a specific sample with formal workers for whom we observe high school,
current wage, and a measure of specific skill (N = 155,939); and iii) a survey
sample with formal workers for whom we observe a measure of non-cognitive
skills and current wage, but for whom we may not observe their high school
of graduation (N = 2,401).
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C.4 Appendix: Alternative Robustness on Returns to
Skills
Following Heckman et al. (2006) and Acosta, Muller, and Sarzosa (2015),
we additionally address the potential attenuation bias by estimating the re-
turns using a latent skills model. This model identifies the underlying latent
parameters of a set of skills and estimates the associated economic returns.
Assume the following model in which wages (W ) are a function of latent
skills (Θ) and other observables (XW ). The reduced equation is given by:
W = αWΘ +XWβ
W + eW (D.1)
While the latent variable is unobservable, there are measures available in
the data (i.e., test scores) that represent realizations of latent skills:
T = αTΘ +XTβ
T + eT (D.2)
where T is an L×1 vector of test scores, and L corresponds to the number of
associated test scores per latent skill. The identification assumption states
that eT ⊥ eW conditional on (Θ, XW ), and that L ≥ 3.7. Parameters
αW , αT , βW and βT , from equations (D.1) and (D.2), can be jointly estimated
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The results of this model (αW ) should be interpreted as the economic re-
turn of a latent skill allowing for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity
(Sarzosa & Urzúa, 2016; Carneiro, Hansen, & Heckman, 2003). Since the
return should be read in levels of the latent skill, we use the estimated dis-
tribution of the skill, F̂Θ(ζ
Θ), to rescale αW so it can be read in terms of
standard deviations. This way we can compare the results from this model
with those previously obtained.
7More details about these identification assumptions are given in Sarzosa and Urzúa
(2016).
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Identification requires at least three test scores for each latent skill. Thus,
to estimate the effect of latent literacy skills we use writing and reading scores
from the college exit exam and the language (Spanish) test scores from the
high school exit exam. To identify the latent effect of numeracy we use the
numeracy measures from the college exams and the standardized mathemat-
ics and physics scores from the high school exit exams. For foreign language
we use the test scores from the college and high school exit exams, and the
social science score from the high school exit exam, since it is strongly corre-
lated with the results on foreign language (0.46). Among the survey sample
we replace the social sciences scores with self-assessed information in the
graduates’ follow-up survey about respondents’ abilities in listening, speak-
ing, reading and writing in a foreign language.8 For major-specific skills we
use different scores from the set of field-specific tests in the college exit exam,
and a combination of scores from the high school exit exams. 9 For non-
cognitive skills we divided the nine questions used to build the non-cognitive
measure into three dimensions. We therefore exploit the full extent of the
data and the large number of available tests scores to estimate the returns
to latent literacy, numeracy, major-specific, and non-cognitive skills.
This model is computationally demanding, and estimation times increase
dramatically with sample size, controls, and the number of factors or latent
skills to estimate (Sarzosa & Urzúa, 2016). Therefore, we respectively took
two random samples of 36,403 and 15,585 individuals from both the complete
set of test takers working formally and the set of formal workers with specific
scores available.10 Notice as well that we use all the individuals in the survey
8The follow-up survey includes a module in which respondents assess their own ability
in listening, speaking, reading and writing in a foreign language. This information is only
available for the sub-sample that was surveyed.
9Given the constraint on the number of test scores, we do this only for individuals who
have taken only one or two specific tests and exclude those who took three. For students
in health and agronomy, we use biology and chemistry test scores. For education, social
sciences, humanities, and economics and business, we use history and geography tests
scores. For students in arts, we use philosophy and history test scores. For engineering,
mathematics and natural sciences we use chemistry and biology.
10We conducted a stratified probabilistic sampling within both sets of information: i)
the set of workers who took the college exit exam between 2011 and 2015, and ii) the
workers for whom specific test scores are available. Strata were defined using the nine test
editions of the college exit exam, 18 groups of related majors, six cohorts of graduates, four
groups or quartiles defined using the average score in the college exit exam, and quartiles
defined by the current wage of individuals. Within each stratum, we applied a simple
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sample to estimate the model.
Appendix Table C.12 presents the estimation of the latent skill model for
each sample and, for comparison, it also presents OLS estimations. Again,
simultaneous and stacked results could be interpreted as lower and upper
bounds. Within the survey sample, the results suggest that latent numeracy
skills have the largest returns (from 4.8 percent to 7.2 percent), followed
by latent literacy skills (5.1 percent to 6 percent), foreign language skills
(up to 1.8 percent) and, finally, non-cognitive skills (around 2 percent). On
the other hand, using the random sample representing our complete set of
students, we see that numeracy returns up to 6.4 percent, literacy latent
skills returns from 3.7 percent to 7.1 percent, and foreign language returns
up to 12 percent. The results from the sample representing the students with
field-specific scores show that latent specific skills returns up to 6.7 percent.
random sampling methodology to select 10 percent of test-takers. Expansion factors were
computed as πkh =
nh
Nh
, with nh as the number of sampled individuals in stratum h, and
Nh as the original number of individuals in h.
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Appendix Table C.12: Structural Estimations: Measurement Error
Correction
Dependent Variable: log(Current Wage)
OLS in Random Sample Unobserved Heterogeneity
Simultaneous Stacked Simultaneous Stacked
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Literacy 0.029 0.013 0.040 0.030 0.037 0.035 0.051 0.071 0.070 0.060
[0.002] [0.007] [0.003] [0.006] [0.006] [0.009] [0.012] [0.004] [0.006] [0.011]
Numeracy 0.032 0.033 0.042 0.047 -0.002 0.014 0.048 0.064 0.073 0.072
[0.004] [0.007] [0.005] [0.007] [0.007] [0.010] [0.020] [0.004] [0.006] [0.012]
English 0.018 0.016 0.031 0.031 0.096 0.126 0.011 0.049 0.058 0.018
[0.007] [0.009] [0.008] [0.008] [0.011] [0.016] [0.011] [0.003] [0.005] [0.011]
Field Specific 0.023 0.040 0.031 0.067
[0.005] [0.005] [0.007] [0.005]
Socioemotional 0.023 0.022
[0.012] [0.011]
Sample Full Specific Full Specific Full Specific Survey Full Specific Survey
Observations 36,403 15,585 36,403 15,585 36,403 15,585 2,401 36,403 15,585 2,401
Controls:
Individual & Field Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Types of Degrees Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes. The dependent variable is as described in the notes of Table 3.1. Columns (1) and (3) use the same specifications
as columns (1) and (4) of Table 3.3, but within a stratified random sample. Columns (2) and (4) use the specifications of
columns (2) and (5) of Table 3.3, within another random sample. Expansion factors for each random sample were used to
estimate columns (1) to (4). The point estimates from the unobserved heterogeneity model are originally computed in levels
of each latent skill. Using the standard deviation of these skills, we rescale the coefficients and the standard errors applying
the “delta method.” From columns (5) to (10), to estimate literacy we used i) writing scores from the college exit exam,
ii) reading scores from the college exam, and iii) language (Spanish) scores from the high school exit exam. Numeracy
used i) quantitative reasoning scores from the college exam, ii) mathematics scores from the high school exam, and iii)
physics scores from the high school exam. Foreign language used i) foreign language scores from the college exam, ii) foreign
language scores from high school exam, and iii) a factor score predicted using self-reported ability in a foreign language for
columns (7) and (10). For columns (5), (6), (8) and (9) we used the social science scores from the high school exam as the
third score for foreign language. For non-cognitive estimations, we divided the nine categorical questions of Appendix Table
C.3 into three scores, each time computed using a factor analysis model. Major-specific skills used the specific test scores
from the college exit exam. When a student has only taken one or two specific tests in the college exam, we used the set of
test scores from the high school exam, depending on the study area of the student (see footnote 26). Stacked results refer to
separate regressions for each ability measure. Field of study and type of degrees controls as described in the notes of Table
3.1, however individual controls in columns (5) to (10) do not include high school fixed effects and the initial ability proxy.
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